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Abstract 
 
 
This is a study of vernacular political thought and organisation among southern Sudanese 
residents of Khartoum during the last Sudanese civil wars. Characterised variously as 
dangerous revolutionaries at the heart of the Sudanese state, or as collaborationist sell-outs, 
southern Sudanese displaced and migrant residents of Khartoum were engaged in multiple 
and often competing or contradictory nationalist and ethno-nationalist projects; this thesis is 
a study of home-grown political philosophies. 
 
Based on archival sources and ethnographic research conducted in 2012-13 and 2015 in 
South Sudan, this thesis draws on retrospective accounts and on personal archives of 
literature, poetry and song produced within Khartoum to explore these residents’ multiple 
political projects to articulate, engage and mobilise a “southern” community. It evidences 
the slippery plurality of personal and political identification, and the messy intellectual work 
of imagining radical futures while getting by in the violent everyday realities of civil war. 
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Glossary 
 
Arabic 
 
abd (pl. abiid) slave 
Ashara Wilayat lit. Ten States; southern Sudanese ethnicised court system 
established in Khartoum, c. early 1980s 
janubi (pl. janubiin) a southern Sudanese person 
jellaba a historical slur against Arab traders, now more broadly against 
Arabs 
jellabiya a traditional long garment popular in the Nile Valley 
malakiya suburbs established by ex-slave soldiers and their descendants, 
common across Sudan 
murahaleen southern Darfur and southern Kordofan armed raiding parties 
muwaaliid slave descendants 
rakuba basic shelter 
sanduq  small-scale collective savings scheme, lit. “box” 
Sudani a Sudanese person 
 
Dinka 
 
Akut Jieng lit. Dinka group; Dinka Cultural Society 
Akut Kuei the Eagle Group; political song group established in Khartoum, c. 
1991 
gol extended family group, sometimes translated as clan 
hakuma the government 
jieng the Dinka (sing. muonyjang) 
jok spirit, power 
wut cattle camp, a grazing community or territorial section of the 
Dinka 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
At the moment, South Sudan is only slightly more than a geographical expression. 
 
Jok Madut Jok, Diversity, Unity, and Nation Building in South Sudan (US Institute of 
Peace, 2011), p. 2. 
 
 
 
There is currently a standard reading of the short national history of South Sudan: that the 
overwhelming vote for secession in 2011 was an expression of a negative nationalism, more 
an anti-colonialist mass sentiment against Sudan’s successive violent and exclusionary 
regimes than any coherent idea of a post-independence nation.1 This reactionary anti-Sudan 
vote disguised a fundamental lack of national identity and community, which allowed the 
growth of a corrupt, rent-seeking and factionalised military kleptocracy, alienated from a 
citizenry that is still predominantly rural, and which prioritises ethnic affiliation and local 
society. The very few South Sudanese people who try to take on the role of “civil society” – 
often in diaspora – face real risks in criticisms of the new state, and find little practical 
power or protection in ideas of responsibility to the nation.2 
 
This overview, focused as it is on the “root causes” of South Sudan’s current predicament, is 
linked to a generalised characterisation of the “ordinary people” of South Sudan. Jok Madut 
Jok, a high-profile South Sudanese anthropologist, wrote in 2005: 
 
Listening to so many Sudanese who are not men or women of political power, those 
whom one might characterise as “ordinary people”, I rarely hear them discussing the 
                                                
1 See, for example, Matthew LeRiche and Matthew Arnold, South Sudan: From Revolution to 
Independence (London, 2012), pp. 3–7; James Copnall, A Poisonous Thorn in Our Hearts: Sudan and 
South Sudan’s Bitter and Incomplete Divorce (Oxford, 2014), pp. 25–27. 
2 Tom Rhodes, ‘New but narrow: free expression in South Sudan’, Rhodes Journalism Review, 33 (August 
2013); Alex de Waal, ‘When kleptocracy becomes insolvent: brute causes of the civil war in South 
Sudan’, African Affairs, 113:452 (July 2014), pp. 347–369; Douglas H. Johnson, ‘Briefing: the crisis in 
South Sudan’, African Affairs, 113:451 (April 2014), pp. 300–309. 
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causes or the histories of the conflicts. Their discussions, heated as they may be, are 
rarely about the issues of wealth and power-sharing that are usually identified as the 
root causes of the conflicts: these are focused on by the leadership and without 
popular discussions. Where they do discuss national politics, wealth and power-
sharing at the centre, it is easy to see that the interviewees have merely adopted the 
discourse handed down to them by their political leaders, rather than thinking 
independently about these issues.3 
 
In this reading, South Sudanese people are mostly passive subjects of elite conflicts, 
disengaged from national interests, and focused on either – viewed ungenerously – an 
ethno-nationalist politics of the belly,4 or – more sympathetically – on local community 
protection and moral orders in the face of extractive and violent “national” regimes. Either 
way, in this view, there is little emotional content or intellectual substance to a country-wide 
South Sudanese nationalism. 
 
 
Khartoum 
 
This study is a history of vernacular political thought on South Sudanese national futures, 
from the 1970s to the present.5 It aims to populate, complicate, and deepen this 
contemporary teleological narrative of a united nationalist fight for state independence 
through exploring histories of political discussion among southern communities resident in 
Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, roughly since the end of Sudan’s first civil war in 1972. 
 
Khartoum itself can be seen as Sudan in microcosm.6 The city is often used as a synecdoche 
for describing the central government of Sudan and its elite local power base around the 
junction of the two Niles: Africa Watch observed in 1995 that ‘for the ruling elite, socially 
                                                
3 Jok Madut Jok, Sudan: race, religion and violence (Oxford, 2005), pp. 35–6. 
4 Jean-Francois Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly (London, 1993). 
5 Vernacular is used here to refer to these “masses” in the general literature on the Sudans: the non-elite, 
everyday understandings and discussions of those with little “voice” or influence in political affairs. It 
does not, however, mean that these people or their discussions were geographically static or 
parochial. 
6 As observed by Sara Pantuliano, Margie Buchanan-Smith, Victoria Metcalfe, Sara Pavanello, and Ellen 
Martin, City Limits: Urbanisation and vulnerability in Sudan (January 2011), p. 1; and African Rights, 
Sudan’s invisible citizens: the policy of abuse against displaced people in the north (London, 1995), p. 
14. 
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and culturally speaking, the city is Sudan.’7 It has a complicated place in the imagination of 
the people of its surrounding regions as a symbol and seat of oppression, as well as a place 
of opportunity, refuge and education. Khartoum’s political geography is, however, shaped by 
the politics and violence of Sudan’s peripheries. With the independence of Sudan in 1956, 
the lifting of ordinances restricting migration within Sudan – including the colonial closed 
districts ordinances that served to isolate the southernmost areas of Bahr el Ghazal, 
Equatoria and Upper Nile – encouraged Khartoum’s rapid expansion in the 1960s and 1970s. 
This migration increasingly included people from these three regions, as well as the 
neighbouring areas of Southern Darfur, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. The extreme 
famine in Darfur in the early 1980s, and the increasing violence of the second civil wars in 
southern Sudan by the mid-1980s, were the catalyst for mass migration across central and 
northern Sudan and to Khartoum.  
 
This rapid self-managed movement of people to Khartoum’s fast-expanding suburbs created 
a tense, changing urban geography, where often the state has been either absent, or 
present through ambiguous local proxy. By the late 1980s, the sprawling peripheries of the 
city – an uncontrolled and generally frightening prospect for its core residents – were 
pejoratively named the “black belt.” This period also saw the rise of central Sudanese 
Islamic elites to economic and political dominance, with the Sudanese government 
increasingly monopolised by the National Islamic Front (NIF) (later the National Congress 
Party (NCP)) after a 1989 coup. By the early 1990s, under Omer el-Bashir’s populist 
Islamicist regime, and with southern and central Sudan experiencing intense violent conflict, 
famine and displacement, Khartoum’s landscape was heavily politically charged, requiring 
the everyday negotiation of political significances, meanings and boundaries by its southern 
and other peripheral migrant residents. 
 
 
  
                                                
7 African Rights, Sudan’s invisible citizens, p. 14. 
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Figure 1: Map of pre-separation Sudan 
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The Khartoum context was markedly different to other “Internally Displaced Persons” (IDPs)’ 
refuges in and outside of Sudan. Khartoum’s massive new suburbs of dense settlements and 
networks of heterogeneous individuals and families from south, east and west developed 
right next to the centre of Sudanese government imaginaries and applied state power, and 
experienced little substantive international engagement until the early 2000s. But while the 
Khartoum context was unique, it was not necessarily isolated. The city’s population was (and 
is) highly mobile, particularly in the 1990s and 2000s, with networks of communication, 
family, work and residence extending across Sudan and into neighbouring countries. This 
intense, heterogeneous and self-managed context made Khartoum a fertile site for political 
discussion. 
 
By the early 1980s, Khartoum’s new marginal “southern” populations were largely seen as 
apolitical victims in aid discourse. For the successive national and city administrations, their 
supporters and pro-government press, they were suspected “fifth columnists” for the rebel 
group the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA):8 particularly those who were, or were 
believed to be from Dinka and Nuer tribes, and people who were otherwise physically 
similar.9 Latterly, after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ended the SPLA’s civil 
war in 2005, this suspicion of the political disloyalty of ex-Khartoum communities has re-
emerged in the south; since many returned southwards from 2006 to 2015, ex-IDPs have 
had a further designation in South Sudan, as “sell-outs”, wartime cowards, and “jellaba”, a 
common slur against northern Sudanese elites historically used against exploitative traders. 
These wartime “displaced” have long experience of being differentiated, stereotyped and 
resented. 
 
                                                
8 See, for example Tom Masland, ‘Khartoum Bursting With Refugee Slums’, Chicago Tribune, 30 
September 1988: ‘some officials warn that the teeming shantytowns could breed a “third column” in 
support of the Dinka-based guerrilla movement of John Garang, a former army colonel leading the 
rebels in the south. “Every southerner is considered a Garang supporter,” said Martin Kiir Majote [sic], 
an official of the Aweil Youth Union.’ Martin was interviewed during research for this thesis. 
9 Mark Duffield, ‘Aid and Complicity: The Case of War-Displaced Southerners in the Northern Sudan’, The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 40:1 (March 2002), p. 87. Also see Archbishop Gabriel Zubeir to 
Caritas Germany, 4 July 1986, Comboniani, 6734.21.1, 8159-8166. This was an experience reported 
by several interviewees during research: for instance, PM was suspected or accused of being an SPLA 
member when working as a cook for a petroleum company: PM, 17 October 2013. 
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Taking up Cherry Leonardi’s research on the productivity of urban margins for articulating 
personal identifications and political community,10 this thesis examines Khartoum as a site 
for the negotiation and construction of specific “southern” Sudanese moral and political 
community. As with most scholarship on urban life, it evidences the productivity of the city 
in propagating community organisation, in which it was maybe better than the “home” 
context that these organisations most often reference. This study examines only part of this 
community organisation, but emphasises that this work was not isolated or insular, and not 
limited to “southern” communities. Increasingly globalised urban living, the prejudicial and 
violent forces of the civil war, and the dynamics of close-built squatter space demanded new 
forms of self-explanation in national and international frames.11 Instead of being passive 
local receptors of elite ideological narratives, many people in Khartoum were invested in 
constructing emotional content for their own ideas of political collectives, that included 
layered understandings of ethnic, pan-ethnic, regional and racial solidarities. This creative 
Straussian bricolage of moral and political associations – in response to the primarily internal 
community stresses of Khartoum living – was led, or articulated most clearly, by people who 
were simultaneously spanning Derek Peterson’s typologies of ethnic patriots and iconoclastic 
nationalists, who held multiple, and sometimes paradoxical, ideas of theoretical and practical 
future communities.12 This study demonstrates Lonsdale’s point that 
 
thought and practice are contradictory. They can be ethnically honourable and tribally 
factional. They can be paternally authoritarian and democratically plural, theologically 
liberal and fundamentalist… contradictory political culture may be contributing to a 
nation-in-formation.13 
 
                                                
10 Cherry Leonardi, Dealing with government in South Sudan: histories of chiefship, community & state 
(Woodbridge, Suffolk, 2013). 
11 As explored in Wendy James’ work, as well as in broader research on Horn of Africa refugee 
movements: see, for example, Wendy James, ‘War and “ethnic visibility”: the Uduk on the Sudan-
Ethiopia border’, in Katsuyoshi Fukui, Ethnicity & conflict in the Horn of Africa (London, 1994), pp. 
140–164; Laura C. Hammond, This Place Will Become Home: Refugee Repatriation to Ethiopia 
(Ithaca, NY, October 2004); Johnathan Bascom, Losing place: refugee populations and rural 
transformations in East Africa (New York; Oxford, 1998). 
12 Derek R. Peterson, Ethnic Patriotism and the East African Revival: A History of Dissent, c.1935-1972 
(Cambridge, 2012). 
13 John Lonsdale, ‘Moral and political argument in Kenya’, in Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh, and Will 
Kymlicka (eds.), Ethnicity & democracy in Africa (Oxford, 2004), p. 75. 
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This Khartoum testing-ground is an example of the messy intellectual and practical work of 
building southern Sudanese and Sudanese political communities, and the more essential 
discussions of the moral knowledge, values, and practical work needed to underpin these 
potential nations. A small part of these men and women’s work is examined here: this is a 
history of idealism, anger, necessity and constraint in the construction of "southern" 
Sudanese communities in Khartoum. 
 
 
Research in South Sudan 
 
Research for this study was undertaken initially through an exploration of the scattered 
English language archival record of southern Sudanese Khartoum residents since the 1960s 
in archives in the UK, Europe, Kenya and South Sudan, and then largely through interviews 
with networks of these recently returned Khartoum residents living in South Sudan in 2012, 
2013 and mid-2015.14 Most of these urban residents were displaced from northern parts of 
southern Sudan in the late 1980s and early 1990s, particularly from areas of intense 
violence and famine in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Unity, Upper Nile, Abyei, Lakes and Warrap 
states, which are also regions with historical trading and labour routes northwards. Southern 
residents of Khartoum mostly returned southwards under the changing political context in 
Sudan after 2005, and particularly with the increasing certainty of a vote for the secession of 
southern Sudan by 2010. 
 
There were no reliable statistics for the southern population of Khartoum at the time of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, when the peace prompted massive “return 
and rehabilitation” work by the United Nations and other agencies. By the early 1990s, with 
huge numbers of new arrivals in the thousands per week from Darfur, Kordofan, and 
southern Sudan, observers began rounding estimates to the nearest hundred thousand, and 
                                                
14 I did not conduct research in Khartoum for this thesis, in part because of previous personal issues with 
immigration and security in Khartoum, and because the majority of the southern population of 
Khartoum had returned to the south by the time of research for this study, and were more likely to be 
able to speak freely about recent experience than those struggling to continue to reside in Khartoum 
under new nationality restrictions and on-going political pressures. 
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then to millions, with about one and a half to two million being the most common estimate 
for all southern Sudanese people in Khartoum in the 2000s.15 Over 2006 to 2012, the 
International Organisation for Migration (IOM) estimated that about two and a half million 
“IDPs” would return to South Sudan from Sudan and neighbouring countries, a majority of 
whom would be coming from Khartoum.16 Most of these people returned from 2010 to 2012, 
to Upper Nile, Bahr el Ghazal and to Juba, the new capital:17 the highest rates of 
resettlement were seen in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, where around half a million people 
settled between 2007 and 2012, mostly from Khartoum. In many areas of the state, these 
new residents make up well over half of the population.18 
  
                                                
15 Agnès De Geoffroy, ‘The challenge of protracted displacement: The case of Khartoum’, Middle East 
Institute and the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (2011), p. 2. 
16 IOM, Village Assessment Survey Report 2013 (2013), p. 2. 
17 IOM, Sustainable Reintegration of South Sudanese: Final Draft Strategy (March 2012), p. 2. 
18 Larissa Carol Meier, ‘Returning to Northern Bahr el Ghazal, South Sudan’ (Lund University thesis, 
2013), p. 2. 
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Figure 2: Satellite images of Aweil town 
Aweil town in 2003 (above) and 2015 (below), showing part of the massive suburban 
growth of the town. My rented room is marked by the black star. Images copyright Google 
Earth.  
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Most research work within South Sudan focused on Aweil town, the capital of Northern Bahr 
el Ghazal state, and the surrounding villages in Aweil North and East counties, partly 
because of this critical mass of returned Khartoum residents.19 This region suffered a 
devastating famine in the late 1980s, partly due to intensive government-sponsored militia 
raiding against villages and settlements, including the destruction and depopulation of areas 
along the train line supply route from southern Darfur. The area itself is relatively 
homogenous, with most people belonging to the Malual division of the Dinka. The Malual, 
like the Rek, Twic, and others across southern Sudan, are locally referred to as a tribe of the 
Dinka. “The Dinka” – or in Dinka, monyjiang, or jieng – have, however inaccurately, long 
been considered as a broad ethno-political collective, although united more by common 
language and mutual cultural practice than as a coherent “tribal” entity.20 
 
This study therefore cannot be representative of Khartoum experience, or of a “southern 
intellectual history”; it is predominantly shaped by the understanding of Dinka people, and 
Dinka-language songs, poems and texts. However, ethnic intermarriage has been 
increasingly common, particularly among Khartoum and urban residents, and this research 
included interviews with Darfur, Nuba, Dinka Ngok, and Shilluk informants, as well as the 
local minority Jur Col (Luo). The ethnographic imbalance of this study was also somewhat 
redressed through work in Juba in autumn 2013, including interviews and group discussions 
with Nuer, Bari, Kuku, and Zande residents, and work in Kuajok, Warrap State in mid-2013, 
although further research in Yambio and Torit was stopped by violent conflict and the split in 
the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A) in December 2013. This thesis 
                                                
19 476,143 returnees were registered by IOM from 2007 to 2013 in Northern Bahr el Ghazal alone, 
100,000 more than in the whole of the three Equatorian states: IOM, Village Assessment Survey 
Report 2013. The constraints of insecurity in Jonglei, and the horrific political crisis in December 2013, 
prevented me from conducting further research outside of Juba and Aweil. This thesis therefore is 
based mostly on discussions with Dinka Malwal people, with Dinka of other clans and sub-clans 
resident in the Aweil area for marriage or work, with some Jur Col residents, and with Nuer, Kuku and 
Bari communities in Juba. This is somewhat problematic, even if justifiable in terms of the ethnic 
composition of Khartoum's southern populations. This study does not claim to be representative, and 
is also not seeking to be a "proportionate" survey by ethnicity. A focus on ethnic representation would 
be at variance with the central intents of this thesis, and in all discussions, people emphasised 
collaboration, translation and replication of associational and cultural work across ethnic boundaries. 
20 See Simon Harragin and Chol Changath Chol, The Southern Sudan Vulnerability Study (1999); for a 
more recent discussion of the specificity of the range of ‘Dinka’ people, see Zoe T. Cormack, ‘The 
Making and Re-Making of Gogrial’ (Durham University thesis, 2014). 
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also makes no claim to accurately render the trauma, stress and violence of the civil war and 
return home, though it does draw on people's own explanations of how they coped with and 
contextualised their experiences, fears and pain. 
 
This study is based on retrospectives, researched mostly from mid-2012 to the end of 
November 2013, a period of intensive return, hope, and reframing of wartime experiences in 
a new social and political context. Many of these ex-Khartoum residents are reconstructing 
social orders and personal lives in peri-urban areas and villages across South Sudan, in 
settlements that are often colloquially known as “New Khartoum.”21 These new citizens of 
South Sudan – particularly the younger “returnees” – have brought with them a distinct 
urban and Khartoum-shaped understanding of southern community and identity.22 This is 
thus also a study of these people's making sense of their histories: my research in Aweil and 
Juba became part of people's on-going conversations and plans for education, organisation 
and community governance. It echoes the memorialisation of Khartoum life since 2005 by its 
southern residents: in the late 2000s, for instance, one woman bought a photo album and 
began paying for studio photography sessions with friends from Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, 
and other Sudanese communities in her Khartoum neighbourhood ‘for memory,’ as she said 
that ‘we know that in future we are going to scatter in different places and we need to 
remember ourselves.’23 
 
States and nationalism in the Sudans 
 
Current histories of Sudan – that is, of the former Sudan, as it existed from the nineteenth 
century to 2011 – generally describe violent, extractive and exclusionary central state 
regimes acting upon and against marginalised peripheries, based on histories of racism and 
slavery that span at least two centuries across Sudan’s vast and diverse geographies and 
societies. Sudan’s heterogeneous topographies of language, skin colour and social 
                                                
21 This colloquialism appears to be fading in usage in areas of mass settlement, such as in Gudele in 
Juba, having been a common local name from roughly 2008 to 2010; “New Khartoum” remains in use 
in other places, particularly in specifically-made returnee villages and suburbs, such as the New 
Khartoum outside of Kuajok. 
22 See the conclusion for more discussion of these retrospectives. 
23 AMJ, 16 July 2013. 
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organisation have been drafted by successive colonial and post-colonial governments into 
national racial and cultural hierarchies and extractive economies since at least the 1800s, 
particularly through histories of slave raiding, slave armies and slave labour.24 Slave armies 
and their large supporting communities have been fundamental to the creation, centralised 
power, and national imaginaries of the state in Sudan, from 1820s Turco-Egyptian 
conscriptions to private armies in southern Sudan and Darfur in the 1850s, which formed the 
basis for the Mahdist slave army in 1882; these armies extended into Uganda and Kenya 
under colonial rule.25 The understanding of these slave/ry histories, racial discrimination and 
state marginalisation among the people of these “peripheries” will be discussed further on in 
this introduction, and forms the backbone of the thesis. 
 
This political geography of Sudan’s centre versus its peripheries, most explicitly set out by 
Douglas H. Johnson, is a reconfiguring of older ideas of the Sudanese civil wars as a self-
contained “north-south” conflict, specifically in 1955 to 1972 and 1983 to 2005: the 
twentieth century Sudanese civil wars as a whole are now widely understood as multiple 
manifestations of a centre-periphery conflict, based on failures of power- and resource-
sharing underpinned by these racialised histories of state weakness and violence.26 This is 
also the geography of dependency theory, and now makes up the standard, and statist, 
approach to analyses of Sudanese political history. 
 
However, the “north-south” conflict remains a powerful idea in both politics and research, 
encouraged by a focus over at least the last two decades on the apparently essential binary 
                                                
24 There is an extensive literature on 1800s and early 1900s slavery in Sudan, written particularly since 
the revival of the slave trade in the 1980s. For example: Jok Madut Jok, War and slavery in Sudan 
(Philadelphia, 2001); the early chapters in P. M. Holt and M. W. Daly, A history of the Sudan from the 
coming of Islam to the present day (New York, 2011); Ahmad Alawad Sikainga, ‘Military slavery and 
the emergence of a Southern Sudanese diaspora in the Northern Sudan, 1884-1954’, in Jay Spaulding 
and Stephanie Beswick (eds.), White Nile, Black Blood: War, leadership, and ethnicity from Khartoum 
to Kampala (Lawrenceville, NJ, 2000), pp. 23–37.; Douglas H. Johnson, ‘The structure of a legacy: 
military slavery in Northeast Africa’, Ethnohistory, 36:1 (1989), pp. 72–88; Douglas H. Johnson, 
‘Recruitment and entrapment in private slave armies: The structure of the zarä’ib in the southern 
Sudan’, Slavery & Abolition, 13:1 (April 1992), pp. 162–173. 
25 Douglas H. Johnson, ‘Sudanese military slavery from the eighteenth to the twentieth century’, in Léonie 
J. Archer (ed.), Slavery and other forms of unfree labour (Oxford, 1988), p. 143. 
26 This summary is both the mainstream political analysis of the civil wars, and a political ideology that 
underpinned the SPLM/A. For a detailed discussion of this approach, and the SPLA’s use of it, see 
Edward Thomas, South Sudan: A Slow Liberation (London, 2015), pp. 27, 115. 
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choice between “southern secession or south-north unity”, reified by the CPA in 2005.27 The 
landscape of Sudanese political discourse has been narrowed and flattened further by the 
nature of research on Sudan, and now on South Sudan. Secession in 2011 singled out South 
Sudan as an “exceptional” case in African geopolitics,28 and has quickly separated “South 
Sudan” studies from “Sudan studies”; more broadly, limited academic study in the south, 
because of conflicts and problems of access, has encouraged a kind of exceptionalism in 
research on Sudan.29 This study links Sudanese and South Sudanese political history to 
wider current questions of nationalism and popular political cultures in African studies: what 
makes up potential national communities? How do political communities find and articulate 
moral content and emotional power beyond anti-colonial resistance? And (how) does a 
broad territorial nationalism exist alongside other, potentially more powerful, personal 
identifications? 
 
Southern Sudan has commonly been described as a product of statist outsiders and their 
interference.30 These external agents have generally been credited for producing the idea of 
southern Sudanese identity in the first place, as ‘an external identity imposed upon the 
region and its people’ based upon the region’s apparent distinctness, at least from the 
outside,31 as a environmentally and personally hostile area only touched by militarised 
slaving parties, and with racially “African” physiognomies. These ideas – of hostility, 
lawlessness, African backwardness, and cheap labour – were continued by the British 
authorities under the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, who maintained the area as closed 
districts under a “southern policy” from 1930.32 
 
                                                
27 See, for example, Xan Rice, ‘Nearly all southern Sudanese voted for secession’, The Guardian, 30 
January 2011; LeRiche and Arnold, South Sudan, pp. 23–56. For a critique of this approach, see 
Douglas H. Johnson, ‘Federalism in the history of South Sudanese political thought’, Centre for Peace 
and Development Studies, University of Juba (2014), pp. 24–5. 
28 For example, Peter Woodward, ‘South Sudan: exception or precedent?’, Royal African Society (2011). 
29 Thomas argues instead for the exemplary nature of South Sudan as a postcolonial state; Thomas, 
South Sudan, p. 278. 
30 For example, see Gérard Prunier, Darfur: the ambiguous genocide (London, 2005); Jok, Sudan. 
31 Johnson, ‘Sudanese military slavery’, p. 4. 
32 Ibid., p. 4. 
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Southern Sudanese nationalism is thus broadly seen as the product of these external 
delineations; most studies of nationalist movements since the 1940s have approached the 
above questions of the structure and content of southern nationalism through the common 
postcolonial African narrative of “resistance,”33 based on a zero-sum reaction to Sudan: ‘the 
state’s use of violence to assert itself produc[ed] greater commitment among the 
marginalised populations to break away.’34 Even when the idea of a “southern Sudan” is 
problematised in academic literature, the term itself is restrictive, and there is often a basic 
circularity to its coherence: “southerners” fight together because of their similarities, and 
build similarities through fighting together. Many academic studies, while emphasising the 
geographical and ethnic heterogeneity of the “southern” population, generally conclude that 
 
the one real similarity that is shared amongst the people of what is now South Sudan 
is a history of neglect and exploitative incursions associated with the slave trade and 
imperial economic exploitation.35 
 
These broad characterisations of a loose collectivity born of “resistance to common 
oppression” capture an important truth. But they also actively assert that there is a dearth of 
“national” content to that collectivity; that South Sudan is a nation based only on mutual 
experiences of suffering.36 Most texts that deal with a national Sudanese or South Sudanese 
history, including those by regional political leaders, begin with a disambiguation of the 
plurality of the – implicitly or explicitly more operative and important – local and ethnic 
identities that together constitute “southern” Sudan.37 For instance, discussions of the 
constitution of southern Sudan have struggled, since the 1990s, with ideas of a “nation of 
                                                
33 Emma Hunter, ‘Revisiting Ujamaa: Political Legitimacy and the Construction of Community in Post-
Colonial Tanzania’, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 2:3 (October 2008), p. 472; Bruce J. Berman, 
‘Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Modernity: the paradox of Mau Mau’, in Stephen C Lubkemann, 
Christopher Burghard Steiner, and Roy Richard Grinker, Perspectives on Africa: a reader in culture, 
history, and representation (Chichester, 2010), p. 498. 
34 Jok, Sudan, p. 48. 
35 LeRiche and Arnold, South Sudan, p. 3. 
36 Theoretically, ‘resistance’ is, as Tymoczko says, restrictive because it is a reactive concept. Maria 
Tymoczko (ed.), Translation, Resistance, Activism (Amherst, 2010), p. vii. 
37 For example: Heather J. Sharkey, ‘Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan: The Politics of Language, 
Ethnicity, and Race’, African Affairs, 107:426 (2008), pp. 21–43; Ann Mosely Lesch, The Sudan: 
Contested national identities (Oxford, 1998); Francis Mading Deng, War of visions: conflict of identities 
in the Sudan (Washington D.C., 1995); Joseph Oduho and William Deng, The problem of the southern 
Sudan (London, 1963); Lam Akol, Southern Sudan: Colonialism, resistance, and autonomy (Trenton, 
N.J., 2007). 
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nationalities” and “unity in diversity”, but also with fears of exacerbating inter-ethnic 
confrontation through promoting “ethnic federalism.”38 This approach implies a segmented 
regional population, ethnically distinct and delineated, and which privileges ethnicity above 
other forms of identification and differentiation. 
 
In this sense, South Sudan suffers from the same idea of zero-sum politics found in 
postcolonial Africa since the 1960s: that ethnic loyalties had to die away in order to create a 
united nation, and tribalism was a retrograde step in the postcolonial march towards 
progress, modernity and state-building.39 The last decade of South Sudanese politics has 
reflected this idea of an “either/or” between ethnic and territorial nationalisms: ‘the ethnic 
identities so many fall back on hamper the creation of a strong sense of a common South 
Sudanese purpose and identity.’40 Much recent discussion of the problems of independent 
South Sudanese “nation-building” has centred on getting people to identify primarily as 
South Sudanese, as President Salva Kiir exhorted in his Independence Day speech in 2011: 
‘remember you are South Sudanese first!’41 
 
This thesis is part of new African intellectual histories that do not necessarily see ethnic 
groups and nations as separate spheres of social, cultural and political imagination, and do 
not privilege ethnicity as an alternative frame for personal and political action. Ethnic 
communities are powerful forums for debate, providing the linguistic and cultural tools, 
histories, and context for discussions of power, responsibility, and mutual futures,42 but they 
are not sole – or separate – ‘communities of argument.’43 Political imaginations are 
inherently pluralistic: monolithic ethnic “peoples” are one part of overlapping personal and 
political affiliations in South Sudan and abroad. Various political projects and imagined 
                                                
38 These ideas have been most clearly put forward by Jacob Akol, and supported by Riek Machar; for a 
summary of this, see Leonardi, Dealing with government in South Sudan, p. 187. 
39 Bruce J. Berman, ‘Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism’, 
African Affairs, 97:388 (July 1998), p. 306. 
40 Copnall, A Poisonous Thorn in Our Hearts, pp. 25–6; see also Jok Madut Jok, Diversity, unity, and 
nation building in South Sudan (US Institute of Peace, 2011). 
41 ‘President Kiir’s Independence Speech In Full’, Gurtong, 14 July 2011. 
42 Luise White, ‘Colonial States and Civic Virtues in Africa: Essays in Honor of John Lonsdale’, The 
International Journal of African Historical Studies, 37:1 (January 2004), p. 2. 
43 Richard Waller, ‘Ethnicity and Identity’, in John Parker and Richard Reid, The Oxford Handbook of 
Modern African History (Oxford, 2013), p. 103. 
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communities share contents and concepts, and cannot be neatly categorised as ethnic or 
territorial nationalisms.44 
 
A recent literature on nationalism has centred on intellectual histories of discourse and 
examined the embedding of ideas of potential collectives into common, comprehensible 
metaphors and practices.45 This scholarship has focused on the development of common 
literary worlds in shaping horizontal political communities,46 particularly emphasising the 
power of missionary education and the spread of literacy and print media in imagining a 
common public. This produced what Meredith Terretta has called “village nationalism,” the 
hybridisation and domestication of multiple political ideas in local terms.47 
 
This new literature is the grounding for this study, which draws on political theorist Warren 
Magnusson’s critique of the statist ontology of “the political.”48 Most current academic work 
on Sudan continues to analyse conflicts in terms of a multitude of Sudanese states, including 
the colonial administration, the “guerrilla governments” of rebel movements, and Khartoum’s 
regimes; but this focus on state and anti-state action does not necessarily engage with the 
                                                
44 Jonathon Glassman, ‘Africa’s Homespun Historians’, The Journal of African History, 51:02 (July 2010), 
pp. 249–251. 
45 For example: Hunter, ‘Revisiting Ujamaa’; Hunter, ‘“The History and Affairs of TANU”: Intellectual 
History, Nationalism, and the Postcolonial State in Tanzania’, The International Journal of African 
Historical Studies, 45:3 (2012), pp. 365–383; Hunter, Political Thought and the Public Sphere in 
Tanzania (Cambridge, 2015); James R. Brennan, Taifa: Making Nation and Race in Urban Tanzania 
(Ohio, 2012); Brennan, ‘Blood Enemies: Exploitation and urban citizenship in the nationalist political 
thought of Tanzania, 1958-75’, The Journal of African History, 47:03 (2006), pp. 389–413; Derek R. 
Peterson, Creative writing: translation, bookkeeping, and the work of imagination in colonial Kenya 
(Portsmouth, N.H., 2004); Derek R. Peterson and Giacomo Macola (eds.), Recasting the past: history 
writing and political work in modern Africa (Ohio, 2009); Harri Englund, ‘Anti Anti-Colonialism: 
Vernacular Press and Emergent Possibilities in Colonial Zambia’, Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, 57:01 (January 2015), pp. 221–247; Englund, Human Rights and African Airwaves: Mediating 
Equality on the Chichewa Radio (Bloomington, 2011). 
46 For example: Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse 
(London, 1986); Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge, 
2012); Adrian Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism 
(Cambridge, 1997); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread 
of Nationalism (London, 2006); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, N.Y., 2008). 
47 Meredith Terretta, ‘“God of Independence, God of Peace”: Village politics and nationalism in the 
maquis of Cameroon, 1957-71’, The Journal of African History, 46:01 (2005), p. 75; see also Sara 
Berry, Chiefs know their boundaries: essays on property, power, and the past in Asante, 1896-1996 
(Portsmouth, NH: Oxford, 2001). 
48 Warren Magnusson, Politics of Urbanism: Seeing Like a City (London, 2013). 
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ways in which people ‘made claims on new possibilities.’49 Similarly, the state has been 
central to much of the recent literature on marginal and marginalised communities – even 
where these studies are of explicitly anti- or extra-state survival. While I do not want to 
downplay the extensive suffering of Khartoum’s urban poor, and the state-driven economic 
and political violence they were forced to negotiate, this dissertation is not focused on the 
rights demanded by the marginalised from the state as citizens, or leveraged through 
manipulation of the state’s structures and language.50 Magnusson argues instead for seeing  
 
a multiplicity of political authorities in different registers, ones that are there for 
different purposes and heed the call of different drummers. Many of these authorities 
claim that they are not political – only cultural, economic, religious, communal, or 
whatever – and such a move often enhances their autonomy. … The proliferation of 
forms of political authority reflects the diversity of human purposes, only one of 
which is to achieve good government.51 
 
Recent literature has focused on these authorities on the margins of the state and on the 
intermediation and translation of state power and citizenship.52 New work by Cherry 
Leonardi, Simon Simonse and Ahmed Sikainga has demonstrated the intellectual productivity 
of this historic engagement with state and government in Sudan, particularly on urban 
fringes.53 Chiefs and churches were (and still are) some of the most visible actors in this 
brokerage in Khartoum since the 1940s, and the position of “traditional authorities” as 
interlocutors has lately been powerfully explored by Leonardi. This thesis builds strongly on 
Leonardi’s work: many people described the intermediation of parastatal community 
                                                
49 Englund, ‘Anti Anti-Colonialism’, p. 243. 
50 Examples of literature with this focus include Ruba Salih, ‘From bare lives to political agents: 
Palestinian refugees as Avant-Garde’, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 32:2 (2013), pp. 66–91; Mark Fathi 
Massoud, Law’s Fragile State: Colonial, Authoritarian, and Humanitarian Legacies in Sudan 
(Cambridge, 2013); Vered Amit-Talai, ‘The Minority circuit: identity politics and the professionalization 
of ethnic activism’, in Vered Amit-Talai and Caroline Knowles (eds.), Re-situating identities: the politics 
of race, ethnicity, and culture (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 89–114. 
51 Magnusson, Politics of Urbanism, pp. 2, 4, 8. 
52 Hunter, Political Thought and the Public Sphere; Englund, ‘Anti Anti-Colonialism’; Brennan, Taifa; 
Leonardi, Dealing with government in South Sudan. 
53 Leonardi, Dealing with government in South Sudan; Leonardi, ‘South Sudanese Arabic and the 
Negotiation of the Local State, c. 1840-2011’, The Journal of African History, 54:03 (November 2013), 
pp. 351–372; Simon Simonse, Kings of Disaster: dualism, centralism and the scapegoat king in 
southeastern Sudan (Leiden, 1992); Ahmad Alawad Sikainga, Slaves into workers: emancipation and 
labor in Colonial Sudan (Austin, 1996). 
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authorities in Khartoum suburbs, working to ‘secure spaces where “the soldiers never go.”’54 
But this work negotiating access and protection to/from the state was explained to me as 
primarily important for its overall outcome: they 'managed to keep people safe,' creating 
community-governed spaces at a distance from state powers, that could give room for ‘real 
work.’55 
 
 
Village nationalism and political education 
 
This “real work” was explained generally in interviews in South Sudan as “education”, and 
this study uses education as its central metaphor. Education has long been both a political 
issue and a topic of academic study in Sudan, but most research has focused on formal 
schooling, despite the fact that informal, local, adult self-organisation has characterised 
intellectual and educational life, particularly in southern Sudan, throughout the post-colonial 
period.56  
 
Education is both a core demand and progenitor of anti-colonial nationalist movements,57 
and Africanist academia has produced a wealth of literature on the interplays of literacy, 
nationalism and ethnogenesis.58 The study of educational and intellectual activity is a fertile 
way of engaging with internal explanations of inclusion, behaviour and ideals: what debates 
                                                
54 Leonardi, Dealing with government in South Sudan, p. 220; also pp. 87, 79. 
55 LLAA, 15 August 2013. 
56 Sommers notes both this lack of information and the extensive politicised educational work of local 
communities; Marc Sommers, Islands of Education: Schooling, Civil War and the Southern Sudanese 
(1983-2004) (UNESCO, 2005), pp. 226, 250. The only major resource is by Lilian Passmore Sanderson 
and Neville Sanderson, Education, religion & politics in southern Sudan 1899-1964 (London, 1981). 
Education is noted as a major reason for people’s involvement in conflict in the 1990s and 2000s, by 
Mathew Haumann, Travelling with Soldiers and Bishops: stories of struggling people in Sudan 
(Nairobi, Kenya, 2004), p. 15. 
57 Not least in South Sudan: the SPLA mobilised many of its recruits through education, and many of its 
soldiers worked as teachers. Haumann, Travelling with Soldiers and Bishops, pp. 41, 51–2, 62. 
58 For example, Adrian Hastings, The Church in Africa: 1450-1950 (Oxford, 1994); Berry, Chiefs know 
their boundaries. There is also a wealth of research on subversive education in African American 
scholarship, for example Heather Andrea Williams, Self-Taught: African American Education in Slavery 
and Freedom (November 2009); Shevaun E. Watson, ‘“Good Will Come of This Evil”: Enslaved 
Teachers and the Transatlantic Politics of Early Black Literacy’, College Composition and 
Communication, 61:1 (2009), pp. 66–89. 
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are encouraged, what terminologies are used, what worldview should be taken to heart, and 
what actions and ideas are beyond the pale. In Khartoum, this “real work” was a broad 
debate over the meanings and practice of liberation, responsibility, and rights in the 
broadest sense of the term: both for contemporary practical problems of community order, 
and in preparation for a theoretical better future.59 Examining this intellectual history 
complicates the general characterisation of southern Sudan’s broad (if vague) popular desire 
for self-determination and independence, instead evidencing complex discussions over the 
meanings and possibilities of these terms, beyond “unity versus secession.” 
 
This study is thus situated within a renewed academic focus on vernacular political 
imaginations, part of a long-running concern with agency in Africanist scholarship.60 Building 
on the early work of Peel and Feierman, this turn towards intellectual history has focused on 
‘pioneers’, particularly those engaged in vernacular literacy projects, newspapers, books, 
histories, autobiographies and auto-anthropologies.61 This scholarship, particularly that of 
Derek Peterson, has increasingly looked beyond English-language middle-class intelligentsia 
and missionary schools, towards the work of vernacular historians and local intellectuals, 
their research projects, teaching, and the critical reception of their own work.62 This thesis 
argues against any clear contrast between Peterson’s tribalist and traditionalist ethnic 
patriots, and his innovative and potentially supra-ethnic iconoclastic nationalists: instead, it 
                                                
59 Hunter and Thomas have both recently argued for this approach; Hunter, ‘Dutiful Subjects, Patriotic 
Citizens, and the Concept of “Good Citizenship” in Twentieth-century Tanzania’, The Historical Journal, 
56:01 (March 2013), and Thomas, South Sudan, p. 27. 
60 Peterson, Ethnic Patriotism and the East African Revival; Brennan, Taifa; Barbara Trudell, ‘When “Prof” 
speaks, who listens? The African elite and the use of African languages for education and 
development in African communities’, Language and Education, 24:4 (June 2010), pp. 337–352; Jane 
C. Sugarman, ‘Imagining the Homeland: Poetry, Songs, and the Discourses of Albanian Nationalism’, 
Ethnomusicology, 43:3 (October 1999), pp. 419–458; Kerry Taylor-Leech, ‘Language and identity in 
East Timor: The discourses of nation building’, Language Problems & Language Planning, 32:2 (June 
2008), pp. 153–180; Marissa J. Moorman, Intonations: A Social History of Music and Nation in Luanda, 
Angola, from 1945 to Recent Times (Ohio, 2008). 
61 J. D. Y. Peel, Religious encounter and the making of the Yoruba (Bloomington, 2003); Steven 
Feierman, Peasant Intellectuals: anthropology and history in Tanzania, (Madison, Wis.; London, 1990). 
See also John Lonsdale, ‘Editorial: Agency in Tight Corners: Narrative and Initiative in African History’, 
Journal of African Cultural Studies, 13:1 (June 2000), pp. 5–16. For a summary of this turn in African 
intellectual history, see Peterson and Macola (eds.), Introduction, Recasting the past. 
62 See Peterson and Macola (eds.), Introduction, Recasting the past, pp. 6–7; Peterson, Ethnic Patriotism 
and the East African Revival; Derek R. Peterson, ‘The intellectual lives of Mau Mau detainees’, The 
Journal of African History, 49:01 (March 2008), pp. 73–91. 
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aims to depict a varied field of what could be termed southern Sudanese “civil society” in 
Khartoum, from militias and street gangs to church football associations and comedy 
groups.63  
 
Delineating these “actors” is problematic: teachers, government employees, traditional and 
state court workers, market traders, and army or militia members are not discrete categories 
in a socio-economic setting where many men and women had multiple occupations and 
projects. The most artificial category was that of “student”: while the title was a political 
marker for the tiny minority of southerners at Khartoum universities, arguably most people 
in Khartoum could be described as students, including working women who studied their 
children's textbooks and engaged in evening classes. One man who discussed this project 
with me over the course of research is a representative example of this plurality of 
affiliation: a former rebel fighter in the first civil war from the mid-1960s until 1972, he 
moved into the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), then retired to Khartoum in the late 1980s 
during the second Sudanese civil wars, having briefly fought against the SPLA. In Khartoum, 
he worked as a private driver, a church committee member, a vernacular school teacher in 
the evenings, and a local multi-ethnic southern court member; he became a formal member 
of the SPLA’s political wing, the SPLM, in 2005 when a Khartoum regional office opened.64 
 
This work was not purely theoretical or philosophical. Practical versions of various shapes of 
collectivities were already in play in Khartoum, from the development of multi-ethnic, 
federalised customary court systems and more exclusionary ethno-regional militias to 
subversive pan-regional political organisations and pan-Sudanese artists’ collectives.  These 
vernacular and context-specific trials of a variety of local and international political 
philosophies were made accessible, and were critiqued themselves, through  place names, 
jokes, slurs, and caricatures.65 
                                                
63 For similar approaches, see Moorman, Intonations; Elizabeth Tonkin, ‘Writing Up Imaginatively: 
Emotions, Temporalities and Social Encounters’, Outlines. Critical Practice Studies, 12:2 (2010), pp. 
15–28; Peterson, Ethnic Patriotism and the East African Revival. 
64 MMD, 14 April 2013, 3 August 2013, 15 August 2013 and 17 August 2013. 
65 Much like in James Brennan’s studies of popular articulations of political philosophies in Tanzania, 
creating what he calls ‘a shifting discursive field consisting of international and indigenous concepts 
and terms.’ Brennan, ‘Blood Enemies', p. 390. 
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This study focuses on networks of these self-taught educators, community and school 
organisers, part-time literati and artists in Khartoum, particularly since the late 1980s. These 
men and women constituted what Trudell calls a vernacular-language ‘counter-elite’ which 
incorporated international and national elite literature and radio political discourse into 
common languages, older vernacular stories and local histories, and neologisms.66 This work 
extended beyond print. Much like Moorman's recent work on Angola, the most referenced 
“political parties” in interviews in Aweil and Juba were music groups, particularly the work of 
Akut Kuei (“Eagle Group”).67 Khartoum residents were usually at most semi-literate, and 
songs (and their composers and singers) were the most referenced form of this intellectual 
debate during research. Angela Impey’s recent work on songs argues for their interpretation 
as the ‘active mediation… of ideas, opinions and ideologies.’68 The most memorable of these 
songs were recounted by men and women throughout research – including across ethnic 
lines, as translations and re-writes – emphasising their ability to condense, articulate and 
mobilise, while remaining open to individual interpretation.69 
 
 
 
Blackness, Sudanese-ness, and southern-ness in Khartoum 
 
This thesis asks: what type of “South Sudanese” community, what structures and concepts 
of being “southern”, were people imagining and articulating in Khartoum – in theory, as 
ideals, for a future state, and as practical working lines for Khartoum living? This study 
demonstrates how people were striving to fit parameters, emotional value and detail to a 
specifically southern political community, through discussions over the limits of who and 
what was considered “southern”, how being southern should be articulated, and how 
                                                
66 Trudell, ‘When “Prof” speaks, who listens?’, p. 248; see also Sugarman, ‘Imagining the Homeland’, p. 
429. 
67 Moorman, Intonations. 
68 Angela Impey, ‘The Poetics of Transitional Justice in Dinka Songs in South Sudan’, UNISCI Discussion 
Papers, 33 (2014), p. 60. 
69 See Impey, ‘The Poetics of Transitional Justice’, p. 61. 
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southern community should be structured; overall, the practical content of an imagined 
alternative national community. 
 
This vernacular cultural work did not necessarily indicate clear-cut parochial and patriarchal 
ethno-nationalism, demanding adherence to the homelands and chiefly authorities: one 
section of a pamphlet produced by a Dinka cultural group in Khartoum was titled ‘The 
advantages and disadvantages in Dinka culture.’70 Many people rejected the idea that their 
ethnicity was the essential or sole basis to their personal and political identification, and 
grounds for their actions.71 Work in the ethnic vernacular – the textual basis for the majority 
of this thesis – was practical, tactical, and less narrow than it necessarily appears: these 
men and women prided themselves on their multilingual skills and translation of ideas across 
ethnic and regional lines. Working in vernacular languages provided multiple benefits: 
fundamentally, it allowed these workers to situate their activity in the comparatively 
apolitical arena of “ethnic culture and tradition”, a space relatively uninteresting to Khartoum 
government security agents, and commonly seen as unintellectual, primordial, and thus 
unthreatening, a field for “elders” and reminiscence rather than for political activism. 
Vernacular languages were practical, and at least superficially private, for instance through 
the use of local metaphors and references to old stories – of elephants and hunting, or of 
lions and monkeys – that provided subtle ways of communicating political points or even 
news on the progress of the war. 
 
These workers also drew upon broader political and racial registers from the violent history 
and geography of Sudan. Race is likely an inappropriate translation of vernacular 
terminologies: black was the most common shorthand in vernacular and English-language 
discussions during research, and was the primary marker of self-identification in many 
people's accounts of community structures in Khartoum. Blackness as used in these 
explanations needs disaggregation; it has served both as a summary of political and global 
racial consciousness following Fanon, and also a marker for understanding and participation 
                                                
70 Magazine of Dinka Culture, sections 26 and 13, my emphasis. For details on this magazine, see chapter 
four, p. 175. 
71 Brendan R. Tuttle, ‘Life is Prickly. Narrating history, belonging, and common place in Bor, South Sudan’ 
(January 2013), p. 323. 
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in local affiliations, experiences and behaviours in the close Khartoum context, beyond being 
“southern”.72 As Jemima Pierre has emphasised, race is a relational and malleable concept 
that can only be understood in the context of its deployment.73 This study thus attempts to 
document and explore this work of relating “blackness”, Sudanese-ness, southern-ness, 
ethnicity, regionalisms, and political ideology as a means of mobilising a new nationalism. 
 
This racial content of southern nationalism has remained relatively unexplored. Racial 
expression has often been written into “southern identity” without question, as with Howell, 
who argues that south Sudanese saw themselves as “southerners” by 1970 because they 
were self-describing as ‘we black people.’74 Academically, discussions of race in literature on 
the Sudans have stalled at racism.75 This is despite the fact that, as Edward Thomas recently 
noted, ‘the whole of Sudan was organised around race in the nineteenth century,’ and ‘race 
and racial oppression are references to a system for explaining and justifying dramatic new 
forms of inequality that emerged then.’76 But in one of the few discussions of race in the Nile 
valley, Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban and kharyssa rhodes have commented that in scholarly 
discussion ‘race has been underrepresented, submerged, or ignored.’77 Racial discourse and 
terminologies are old weapons in the moral and social geography of Africa, even if being 
“black” in Africa seems axiomatic. 
 
                                                
72 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (London, 1967); also see Harry Garuba, ‘Race in Africa: four 
epigraphs and a commentary’, PMLA, 123:5 (2008), p. 1645; Brennan, ‘Blood Enemies’, p. 389. 
73 Jemima Pierre, The Predicament of Blackness: Postcolonial Ghana and the politics of race (Chicago, 
2012), p. 4. 
74 J. Howell, ‘Political leadership and organisation in the southern Sudan’ (Ph.D., University of Reading, 
1978), p. 256. Thomas notes the continued ‘accidental constructivism’ of most accounts of ‘African’ 
and ‘Arab’ race issues; Thomas, South Sudan, p. 31. 
75 For example, Sharkey, ‘Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan’, p. 40. Older literature on Sudan does 
engage with race more directly, for example, Sondra Hale, Nubians: A study in ethnic identity 
(Khartoum, 1973); More broadly, Africanist academia has only recently re-engaged with race and 
blackness within African communities themselves, outside of southern Africa and colonial histories: 
see Jemima Pierre, ‘Race in Africa Today: A Commentary’, Cultural Anthropology, 28:3 (2013), pp. 
547–551; Pierre, The Predicament of Blackness; Garuba, ‘Race in Africa.’ 
76 Thomas, South Sudan, p. 17. 
77 Fluehr-Lobban and rhodes, ‘Introduction: The Study of Race and Racism in the Nile Valley,’ in Carolyn 
Fluehr-Lobban and kharyssa rhodes (eds.), Race and Identity in the Nile Valley: Ancient and modern 
perspectives (Trenton, NJ, 2003), pp. xiii–xiv. 
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The reintegration of blackness into histories of southern Sudanese political consciousness is 
important: histories of blackness, racism and slavery were at the core of this educational 
work in Khartoum. Sondra Hale calls this the ‘backdrop’ to Sudanese history:78 there are 
significant historical, social, and political tensions over who the “black people” are in Sudan, 
the variants of being black, and who is not black in Sudan.79 This racial topography is linked 
fundamentally to histories of slavery and other exploitations of Sudan’s people by external 
and Sudanese state elites. Through the 1800s and early 1900s, slave-raiding was a state 
activity, fuelling the expansion of extractive state authority from Khartoum and northern 
regional economic power, patronage and violence: experience of extensive, systematic slave 
raiding for fuelling Sudanese labour markets were widespread across Sudan and continued 
into the British-Egyptian Condominium period from 1898 to 1956.80 Extensive forced 
recruitment throughout the 1800s in various Turko-Egyptian, Mahdist, and private armies 
across Sudan underpinned both state power and state understanding in the communities 
who were drawn on for slaves and support, in Southern Darfur, the Blue Nile, Nuba 
Mountains and southern Sudan: areas that by the 1910s ‘had a long history of dependency 
on the periphery of state systems.’81 The British “abolition” of the slave trade in this period 
did not fundamentally change Sudanese economic structures which relied on enslaved 
labour. The fundamental need for a cheap mobile labour pool both sustained slavery in the 
central regions of the Sudan through the 1930s, and maintained old ideas of labour control. 
A “Sudanisation” process enlisted ex-slaves into the army and agricultural schemes, and the 
Central Labour Bureau was established in 1907 for, as Sikainga put it, ‘reconciling reluctant 
                                                
78 Sondra Hale, ‘Nationalism, “Race”, and Class: Sudan’s gender and culture agenda in the twenty-first 
century’, in Fluehr-Lobban and rhodes (eds.), Race and identity in the Nile Valley, p. 174. 
79 Sondra Hale, ‘Nationalism, “Race”, and Class’, p. 181. Hale notes a continuing broad hierarchy of racial 
terms: blue-black (azrag, or aswad for black), green (akhdar, for a dark northerner), brown (asmar), 
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hierarchy. See also AI-Baqir al-Afif Mukhtar, ‘The crisis of identity in Northern Sudan: A dilemma of a 
black people with a white culture’, A paper presented at the CODSRIA African Humanities Institute 
Tenured by the Program of African Studies at the Northwestern University, Evanston, (2004) for a 
discussion of this racial terminology. 
80 Wendy James, ‘Perceptions from an African slaving frontier’, in Archer (ed.), Slavery and other forms of 
unfree labour, p. 133. 
81 Douglas H. Johnson, ‘Recruitment and entrapment in private slave armies: the structure of the Zara’ib 
in the Southern Sudan’, Workshop on the long-distance trade in slaves across the Sahara and the 
Black Sea in the 19th century (1988), pp. 143, 147, 149. 
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liberated and runaway slaves to regimented wage-labour.’82 Slaves became “servants” under 
both domestic slavery and in cheap labour markets:83 people from these enslave-able areas 
continued to be socially, economically, and racially positioned as cheap wage labour; the 
term abd (slave, pl. abiid) was, and is, still commonly used by many self-describing Arab, 
non-black, and/or better-off Khartoum residents to describe people in this racial, political 
and socio-economic position, in what Jok calls a ‘self-perpetuating’ system.84 Twentieth 
century Sudanese society has developed many slurs and shorthands for these historical 
identifications. For people on the edge, or outside of, this racial, regionalised and 
increasingly religious definition of Sudanese identity by Sudan’s independence in 1956, being 
“black” was in many ways a shorthand for an historical, political, experiential position within 
Sudanese history – without clear boundaries, and both a slur and a statement of politico-
historical experience.  
 
This history underpins tensions over national identification as Sudani. The term Sudani (the 
Arabic for Sudanese) has a similar racialised legacy as a generally derogatory word for those 
of slave descent, and therefore collectively for all black people.85 Claiming to be Sudanese – 
as a national marker – has thus been problematic for the many elite, Arab self-defining, and 
“non-black” ethnic communities living in the riverain state centre of Sudan, particularly 
around the juncture of the Niles at Khartoum; for many people, being Arab, Muslim and 
Sudani (derived from the Arabic for ‘black people’, and associated with servility) were 
mutually contradictory.86 These associations were not resolved by the developing imagining 
of a Sudani national identity among the growing nationalist movement, particularly among 
the small Khartoum elites incorporated into the colonial state in the 1930s and 40s: by the 
early 1960s and 70s, where this study starts, there was – as Al-Baqir al-Afif Mukhtar 
                                                
82 Ahmad Alawad Sikainga, ‘Slavery, labour, and ethnicity in Khartoum: 1898-1956’ (c. 1980s), 
SAD.307/6/1-65, pp. 7–8. 
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84 Jok Madut Jok, ‘Post-independence racial realities’, p. 193. 
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from an African slaving frontier’, p. 130; Sharkey, ‘Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan’, p. 29. 
86 Sharkey, ‘Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan’, pp. 28–29. 
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observes – ‘a wide consensus among Sudanese, Northern and Southern alike, that the 
country is in a state of crisis of national identity.’87  
 
However, as Hale notes, ‘Southerners and westerners have rather dropped out of this 
analysis.’88 This unwritten history – of how those living in the southern, eastern, and 
western areas of Sudan articulated, claimed, and used this historically-rooted racial 
vocabulary – is too large for this thesis, but is the conceptual basis for the work of the 
“southern” Khartoum residents examined here, and the background and terminology used in 
many interviews with men and women in Aweil and Juba. This thesis thus moves away from 
a tight focus on a history of popular expressions of specifically “South/ern Sudanese” 
identity, to include other claims on African, ethnic, regional, and Sudanese belonging 
instrumentalised in the broader detailing of a new nationalist cause. By the 1950s and 60s, 
some Sudanese men – particularly those from southern Sudan – increasingly claimed a 
specifically “African” identity, articulating this alongside broader African nationalist 
movements and, later, the rise of apartheid, and compounding their other ideas of a clear 
binary between themselves and the “Arab-Muslim” Sudanese elite. Alex De Waal emphasised 
the role of global and regional pressures for the simplification and binarisation of essential 
identities, by the 1970s onwards, in the resurgence of “African majority” languages in 
Garang and the SPLA’s rhetoric.89 Maybe more popularly, many people from eastern, 
southern and western Sudan have long laid claim to being “truly” Sudanese – drawing on its 
old, black, slave history meanings, and its old Arabic definition of the “lands of the blacks”: a 
theme throughout this study is this continued claim to being the real Sudanese people, 
autochthonous and invaded, as well as laying claim to a distinct, potentially new national, 
“Southern” identity. 
 
These multiple registers of identification and discrimination are a theme of this study, and 
are never quite disentangled. This is reflective of these Khartoum residents’ own struggles in 
                                                
87 Mukhtar, ‘The crisis of identity in Northern Sudan’, pp. 207–208. 
88 Hale, ‘Nationalism, “Race”, and Class’, p. 180. 
89 As well as the use of the terms zurug (“blacks”) or abiid (“slaves”) by northern Sudanese about Darfuri 
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their complex and ambiguous linguistic, literary, educational and cultural work: “black 
people” is used alongside “Dinka”, “Equatorian,” or “southern”, for example, in interviews 
with a variety of residents and in texts from Khartoum, and “black”, southern, ethnic, clan, 
and regional identifiers and descriptives were scattered throughout texts and interviews. 
Explanations and translations of the literary, artistic and educational canon for this study 
have also been subject to a continual struggle, not least between interpreters, translators 
and informants, over the overlapping and ambivalent use of racial, ethnic, political and 
geographical terminology; the translations used here are unresolved and still subject to an 
on-going debate. This code-switching heightens the plurality and ambiguity of these 
categories, and emphasises the importance of personal interpretation and opinion. This 
study tries to be reflective, insofar as possible, on the use of these shorthands, most 
obviously the term “southern”, increasingly used by the late 1970s to indicate a bundle of 
ideas and identifications. 
 
 
Brotherhood, and a federal moral community 
 
This work articulated these plural layers of affiliation, social solidarity, and mutual political 
hopes formed amidst the intense political and practical pressures of living in Khartoum. This 
solidarity was explained by many men and women across the various socio-economic and 
ethnic communities in Aweil and Juba as “brotherhoods”, and maybe best articulated 
academically as a kind of moral federalism. These brotherhoods are plural versions of 
Anderson’s mutualities and horizontalities, both across people identified by the speaker as 
“southerners”, and with wider circles of black, peripheral, marginalised Sudanese-ness, 
especially people from the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile, and southern Darfur: people who 
were also defined by successive Sudanese states as black, enslave-able, and either non- or 
not-the-right-type-of-Muslim, and who lived in, or came from, areas that were similarly 
exploited and ignored by the central Khartoum state. The most well-known attempt to spell 
out this more inclusive Sudanese political philosophy is John Garang’s idea of “New Sudan”, 
a Sudan that would be ethnically plural and representative of its multiple African black 
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“nationalities”, articulated most explicitly in the 1994 SPLM national convention.90 The limits 
to New Sudan were perpetually unclear, partly because the idea was – as Johnson put it – 
as much a tactical position for approval of Ethiopian backers as a principle.91 Who would be 
included in this self-determination, the position of other Sudanese “marginalised peoples”, 
the ultimate aims of self-determination, and the form of “federal” political self-government 
this New Sudan – or New South Sudan – would take, remain unresolved questions.92 
 
The term federalism is used consciously, with reference to the long history of debates over 
federalism within Sudan and South Sudan. Federalism has been used to describe many 
different political ideas over the last seventy years: it has been both an alternative to 
southern secession, and a fundamental part of it. The term is probably best described as an 
acronym for various discussions of how to structure and represent Sudanese communities, 
and how these communities could or should relate to each other politically and personally as 
a national unit, and as part of broader attempts to delimit the content and aims of southern 
and Sudanese political community.  
 
There were limits to this collective relationship as “marginalised black Sudan”: being black 
Sudanese and southern Sudanese were never interchangeable ideas, and definitions of 
southern-ness were not necessarily positive. They included calls for retribution and 
recollections of collective suffering that were aimed not at the "grand other" of “Arab” 
Sudanese elites, but at the peripheries of this “southern” community, particularly those 
classed as sell-outs, and - secondly - at communities, particularly from Darfur, that had 
engaged in violence against fellow peripheral, “marginalised” and southern communities as 
“stooges” of the regime.93 
 
                                                
90 Leonardi, Dealing with government in South Sudan, pp. 186–7; Øystein H. Rolandsen, Guerrilla 
government: political changes in the southern Sudan during the 1990s (Uppsala, 2005); Sharkey, 
‘Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan’, p. 28; Johnson, ‘Federalism’, p. 20. 
91 Douglas H. Johnson, ‘New Sudan or South Sudan? The Multiple Meanings of Self-Determination in 
Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement’, Civil Wars, 15:2 (June 2013), p. 145. 
92 See Johnson, ‘Federalism’, pp. 24–25. Until very recently, discussions of federalism were a “red line” 
for President Salva Kiir, and debating federalism is still often interpreted as “disloyal” to the current 
government. 
93 For a Tanzanian comparative, see Brennan, ‘Blood Enemies’, p. 413. 
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Similarly, there were many much more restrictive conceptions of the constitution of 
“southern Sudanese” moral and political community. An ethnically-based federal idea of 
southern Sudan was, for many, a fundamentally pragmatic project, based on longer histories 
of vernacular, regional, and ethnic associations in Khartoum, when migrants from Sudan’s 
southern regions were a tiny and mobile minority. These men, and some women, 
emphasised ethnic groupings as the fundamental unit of “southern” federal identity, 
clarifying and uniting what many would call pan-ethnic groups such as the Dinka and Nuer 
through community associations and re-imagined (or, to their agents, re-created) systems of 
traditional authority. It provided practical self-protection and day-to-day administration of 
ethnically-organised court systems, clan and familial arbitration, and cultural and linguistic 
self-preservation. This “traditional” or “customary” ethnic associational life was inducted into 
existing political systems of local sultans and neighbourhood committees in the early 1980s 
– as detailed in chapter one – and provided a practical form of political intermediary to a 
variety of local and national state actors in Khartoum. This was underwritten politically – and 
for some, financially – by Bashir’s regime from 1989, with some of these Khartoum 
community chiefs being co-opted, or co-opting themselves, into the regime’s systems of 
“customary” authority, in exchange for some social and political protections and powers, and 
for many the chance of a salary: the most successful of these men gained significant 
political power, such as Deng Macham, who established the fundamentally ethnic federalist 
“southern” umbrella court system called Ashara Wilayat (Ten States) in Khartoum in the late 
1980s, with the recognition, and thus associated legal powers, of the Khartoum government. 
By the 2000s, Bashir’s partly co-opted southern militia leaders, including Paulino Matip and 
other various militia commanders collected under the umbrella of the “Southern Sudan 
Defence Forces” under the Khartoum Peace Agreement of 1997 had positioned themselves 
at the highest levels of these Khartoum “southern” political-ethnic structures, with their own 
court systems, police, administrations, and ability to enforce decisions and punishments for 
“their” southern communities. This particular imagining of a southern Sudan federally united 
as a specifically ethnically-composite “nation of nationalities” also has a long history: the 
idea of representing, and giving political power to, Sudan’s plural “nationalities” as discrete 
ethnic units under a national umbrella was most clearly articulated by Riek Machar and other 
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proponents of the idea of a ‘House of Nationalities’ in the early 2000s.94 This regional, ethnic 
system was a form of ethnic federalism, with its citizens identifying and participating 
primarily as “ethnic groups”, from specific “home areas,” and being represented communally 
as such, in what is best described as a communitarian worldview.  
 
The tensions within this thesis, then, are over the ideals and practical necessities of the 
southern Sudanese residents in Khartoum, demonstrating not just a discussion of a future 
post-war, and what was being “fought for,” but also the various imaginations of the war’s 
outcomes, and the limits to personal agency as “rebel nationalists” in Khartoum. This study 
thus emphasises the creativity and opportunity within emergent nationalisms, as well as 
their xenophobia, violence and prejudice. Personal beliefs, hopes for the future, ethnic and 
linguistic ties and broader political ideas can be held in tension. Individuals’ ideas and 
actions could be deeply conservative, aggressive, and exclusionary, often on the basis of 
ethnic group and clan; but they could also be creative, inclusive, and ambitious. This thesis 
explores these Khartoum residents' complex vernacular discussions of this emotional and 
social content of this "nation of nationalities,” and the limitations on this creativity and 
brotherhood. These men and women’s explanations of their potential and practical 
community does not necessarily resemble a coherent, single, or bounded “southern 
nationalism” or even “southern people”, but may also lend substantially more emotional and 
critical depth and weight to popular academic and South Sudan state nationalist definitions 
of essentially “reactive” and negative South Sudanese nationalism. 
 
As such this thesis is a history of praxis: this intellectual work was not just a rhetorical 
hobby, but required practical application through systems of political action and social 
control, from revolutionary political subversion to ethnic self-protection militias. As Johnson 
recently said, self-determination is more than achieving independence, but ‘also means 
choosing a form of self-government’; this study demonstrates, however, that communities 
from the southern areas of Sudan have been testing out various forms of Sudanese 
                                                
94 For further detail, see Leonardi, Dealing with government in South Sudan, p. 187; Rift Valley Institute, 
My mother will not come to Juba: South Sudanese debate the constitution (Juba, South Sudan, 2013). 
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brotherhoods and ethnic nationalisms well before 2011.95 This intellectual experimentation 
demanded that people put themselves and their personal and familial suffering in political, 
social and historical context, in what Peterson calls ‘self-possession’:96 emphasising, as a 
Nuer young man in Juba put it, that ‘it was up to you, to be smart – and research for 
yourself, or be defeated.’97 
 
 
Terminology, methodology, and apology 
 
This thesis also departs from the terminology of studies of “Internally Displaced Persons” 
(commonly called IDPs). Research produced on these Khartoum communities – largely 
undertaken during the peace processes from 2003 onwards because of renewed academic 
and international aid access to Khartoum – has focused primarily on these populations as 
“returnees”: this literature generally measures the desire, and requirements for, what was 
by then “repatriation,” and these returnees’ basic livelihood needs pending and post-return. 
This study avoids the term “internally displaced” or any attempt to delineate categories of 
“squatters”, “refugees”, or the geographical limitations of “southerners.” IDPs have a 
dubious position in migration literature anyway, challenging legal categories and 
programming, and much of recent migration studies literature is practitioner-centric, full of 
what Ferguson calls the ‘conceptual apparatuses’ of development.98 Pre-determined legal 
and geographical categories work against the premise of this thesis, which is interested 
instead in these communities’ own definitions of “southern” and “displaced”, and their use of 
these terminologies. Using these terms post-independence also implies distinctions between 
north and south, their boundaries and histories, and makes the idea of “return” apparently 
inevitable. The people I met during research were fully aware of the political baggage of 
their label, and of research produced under this category.99 
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I was very much a student of these South Sudanese historians and teachers, including my 
interpreters and a group of female friends near my temporary home at the edge, then, of 
suburban Aweil. This thesis is built on networks of texts, photographs, people and ideas, as 
I tried to trace writers, teachers, organisers, fellow students and participants both in Aweil 
and across Juba, talking, for example, to Kuajok-based authors of texts I had found in 
markets in Juba, Aweil and in Kampala and to Juba-based songwriters cited in discussions in 
Aweil. More broadly, I tried to explore where their work had reached, hunting graduation 
certificates, posters, music tapes, MP3s, photographs, textbooks and pamphlets, both in 
people's personal collections and in markets across South Sudan and in Kampala. These 
genealogies are only partly explored here, but form what Jan Blommaert has called an 
ethnography of travelling texts.100 
 
The cross-referencing I aimed at during research mimicked the practice of Khartoum 
intellectual life. Abandoning distinctions between literary or oral cultures gives room for the 
reciprocity of academic and elite writing, church, curriculum and vernacular self-written and 
published texts, poetry, and music of all kinds, and national, rebel and international media 
and radio. All were cross-referenced, repeated, creatively edited, copied and re-written. 
People cited everything from Dickens' Tale of Two Cities, to Holt and Daly's seminal book A 
History of Sudan from the Coming of Islam to the Present Day,101 and – more commonly – 
songs, texts, curriculum books, quotations and political speeches. This historiographical work 
was not just oral, but included reference to what David Zeitlyn terms ‘radical archives,’ 
personal libraries, notes, photograph albums and music catalogues.102 
 
‘I brought and I wrote [out] many copies in that book, but they have been burnt. … I 
copied the situation of Southerners in the North, and even [made notes on] some 
                                                                                                                                                       
online edition; Nicki Kindersley, ‘Southern Sudanese Narratives of Displacement, and the Ambiguity of 
“Voice”’, History in Africa (March 2015), pp. 1–35. 
100 Jan Blommaert, Grassroots Literacy: Writing, Identity and Voice in Central Africa (London, 2008), pp. 
5, 12. 
101 Holt and Daly, A history of the Sudan. 
102 David Zeitlyn, ‘Anthropology in and of the Archives: Possible Futures and Contingent Pasts. Archives as 
Anthropological Surrogates’, Annual Review of Anthropology, 41:1 (2012), p. 461. 
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political rallies… I wrote something [in a diary], so that I can remember it when 
peace comes.’103 
 
Most people explained that they had lost, seen destroyed or were unable to bring many of 
their personal possessions from Khartoum, and so had edited their most important 
belongings into a curated personal collection; this loss and reconstruction were a form of 
trope in these accounts of experience, return and remembering. While the extent of original 
collections may have been exaggerated, many people were willing to show me what they 
had brought, and were also engaged in on-going editing, re-writing and dissemination of 
this work, particularly of photos uploaded to Facebook, and the photocopying and typing-up 
of books, documents, songs and poems. 
 
The texts and songs used here are thus not “relics” of Khartoum community thought from 
the 1970s to 2000s, but were often repeatedly reproduced – as are the texts of today – as a 
form of “Best Of” collection, an edit in themselves of earlier discussions and notes. These 
unstable songs raise methodological challenges: for instance, in translating several well-
known songs from Khartoum, my group of interpreters argued that they knew “better 
versions” of the lyrics despite the fact that they had been provided, in written form, by the 
original artist. The song group Akut Kuei is still invoked on South Sudanese message boards, 
in news commentary, and on Facebook: ‘Shame on you [- it] seem[s] you have never been 
listening to Akut Kuei.’104 These songs, and their artists, are key reference points in 
continuing political debate, in what Impey calls a form of abbreviated ‘vox pop that is 
invoked to validate or criticise.’105 
 
                                                
103 DKLK, 21 August 2013. 
104 Daniel Malual Nhial, comment, Sudan Tribune Facebook page, 18 June 2013; Biar Yaak, Board thread: 
Bring back Akut Kuei, Mading Aweil Discussion Board, 16 November 2004; comment on ‘Bona Malual’s 
letter to Sadiq Al Mahdi: “I don’t accept Political Lying by SPLM”’, Pachodo.org, accessed on 16 July 
2015. 
105 Impey, ‘The Poetics of Transitional Justice’, p. 65. 
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This study therefore contains ‘truths of various sorts.’106 These personal accounts of the 
intellectual history of Khartoum were and are continually open to negotiation and 
reinterpretation, not least during discussions between informants, interpreters, translators 
and myself. Based on retrospectives, the research was shaped by them: interviews 
conducted for this study were also discussions amongst informants, and with myself and my 
interpreters, of what was, and what is now, important to remember and talk about. But the 
result is not simply creative writing; the depiction here of the political landscape of 
Khartoum is built on hundreds of discussions over 2012, 2013 and follow-up meetings in 
2015, including discussions of previous interviews, translations, and notes, cross-referenced 
insofar as possible to older versions of these conversations in the diaries, letters and other 
marginalia of archival records. The result aims to be a study of a collective intellectual life in 
Khartoum, which is still under debate; as a history teacher noted during a methodological 
discussion in Aweil, 'you will get very many histories.’107 
 
My hope is that this study’s focus on the intellectual politics and activism of southern 
communities and individuals in Khartoum redresses some of the imbalances in how “IDPs,” 
“returnees,” and, more broadly, “ordinary people,” are engaged with and seen in South 
Sudan today. I also hope that my translation of and emphasis on the work of these local 
scholars and organisers goes some way towards redressing the imbalances of power and 
privilege in this study. The errors and assumptions in this thesis are my own. 
 
 
Structure  
 
This thesis is broadly presented chronologically, but this chronology is rooted in the 
idiosyncratic folk chronologies laid out by Khartoum residents, rather than the standard 
political chronology of the Sudans: the second civil war, for instance, formally declared to 
                                                
106 Luise White, ‘True Stories: Narrative, Event, History, and Blood in the Lake Victoria Basin’, in Luise 
White, Stephan Miescher, and David William Cohen (eds.), African Words, African Voices: Critical 
Practices in Oral History (Bloomington, 2001), p. 295. 
107 DKLK, 4 July 2013. 
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begin in 1983, was dated by people in Aweil, Kuajok and Juba as beginning, variously, from 
1976 up to 1992. 
 
Chapter one takes up from this introduction's discussion of the category "southern", 
examining the history of migrant populations from Sudan’s regions and their political activity 
in Khartoum since the 1800s, and the construction of “southern” politics by a tiny elite in the 
1920s to 1960s. The chapter interrogates the apparent ‘physical and ideological isolation’ of 
these elites from their constituency in Khartoum, and looks for the loci of political discussion 
for the regional residents of Khartoum until the 1970s, emphasising political organisation 
and collaboration that survived the closing down of formal and elite political space under 
Nimeiri from 1972.108 
 
Chapter two focuses on the creation of what might be called the “black” geography of 
Khartoum during the massive expansion of the city, mainly from 1986 to 1992. It examines 
attempts to control and make safe the peripheries of the city - both by state agents and 
local government forces, and by the new residents themselves - through community 
organisation, demolitions, competing names, and alternative social centres. 
 
This community “resistance” is disaggregated in chapter three. Successive Khartoum 
regimes have been engaged in what many academics have seen as acculturation, 
collectively called “Arabization and Islamization”, particularly of poorer residents in the 
capital. This chapter examines what these “policies” meant in practice, particularly from the 
NIF coup in 1989, for local black and southern residents. It argues that the Khartoum 
regime aimed not at the assimilation of these communities, but at maintaining distance from 
them. Similarly, local residents were not primarily focused on resisting Arabization or 
Islamization as “Christian Southerners”, but on broader projects of civic and moral education 
in the face of multiple urban challenges. This chapter integrates the Sudanese and broader 
eastern African literature on gender and community politics, looking at these projects' ideas 
                                                
108 Sharon Elaine Hutchinson, Nuer Dilemmas: Coping with Money, War, and the State (Berkeley, 1996), 
p. 281; Leonardi, Dealing with government in South Sudan, p. 7. 
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of responsibility, responsibility, and belonging within the complex racial, ethnic and urban 
context of Khartoum. 
 
Chapter four examines the content and production of these projects, focusing on the 
creative networks and historiography of the texts, songs and curriculums produced as part 
of this community work.109 These many projects were fundamentally internal, focused not 
on the Grand Other of the Sudanese regime, but on the various politically dubious or 
ignorant edges of what was considered as the community. This chapter explores the plural 
definitions and moral limits of “southern” social solidarity and brotherhood as discussed 
among these projects and intellectual networks in the 1990s and 2000s. 
 
Chapter five looks at the political action encouraged by these projects, and the nature of 
“Southern resistance” until the death of John Garang in 2005. Political subversion, even 
personal, private and psychological “resistance”, was a testing ground for practical future 
communities and brotherhoods within and beyond the “southern” Sudanese in Khartoum. 
This chapter details accounts of these diverse practical projects in the 1990s and early 
2000s, from radical black political activity to exclusive and conservative projects of ethno-
regional parastatal authority under the South Sudan Defence Forces umbrella (SSDF), and 
discusses the practical limits to pan-Sudanese imagination.  
                                                
109 Following Blommaert, Grassroots Literacy, p. 165. 
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Chapter One 
 
 
When did South Sudanese nationalism begin? Most histories of southern Sudanese collective 
political consciousness have a common timeline, focusing on the struggles of a small number 
of early politicians in the 1930s to 1960s, their attempts to articulate a “southern” identity, 
and their struggles to mobilise popular support for “self-determination”. This chapter argues 
that this picture gives a skewed idea of “southern politics” as a coherent agenda for elected 
elites. The effort to trace a specific “southern Sudanese nationalism” back in time obscures 
broader urban histories of popular political and political identifications since the 1930s. The 
focus on elite politicians has over-emphasised an apparent gap between these elite 
politicians’ political philosophy, and the “politically unconscious,” ethnicised and parochial 
masses they were supposed to represent, and failed to discuss the extent to which these 
ordinary people had come to identify as “southern”, and how these people understood the 
term. 
 
This chapter explores an alternative history of the development of a “southern” identification 
from the 1930s to the 1970s, through a history of urban and peri-urban migrant settlement 
within Khartoum. It draws this history from letters, student pamphlets, notes, diaries and 
other marginalia from archives in Birmingham, Rome, Durham, London, and Juba, as well as 
contemporary scholarship by Hale, Howell, Rehfisch, Barclay and others.110 This chapter thus 
sets the terrain and approach for the rest of this thesis, putting vernacular debates over 
“southern Sudanese-ness” in Khartoum in the context of the longer and wider history of 
migration to the city. 
 
Khartoum grew massively through the 1930s to 1960s, fuelled in part by increasing numbers 
of new residents and cyclical migrants from southern and western Sudan. The early 
southern population of Khartoum grew from a combination of army recruitment, the 
                                                
110 The Church Missionary Society archives, Birmingham (CMS); the Save the Children Fund archives, 
Birmingham (SCF); the Comboniani mission archives in Rome (Comboniani); the Sudan Archives 
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movement of servants, drivers and low-ranking government agents, and particularly the 
demands of growing agricultural labour markets. Although there is no formal data before the 
1955/6 census, a 1921 population count of Omdurman found in Khartoum University Library 
by Rehfisch in 1965 showed a southern population of 3.2 percent, and a western population 
of 2.4 percent; by the 1955/6 census, Omdurman had grown by 260 per cent, but 
southerners still made up 3.9 per cent of the population (out-paced, though, by the western 
Sudanese population at 5.5 per cent).111 After Sudan’s independence in 1956, and the 
removal of travel restrictions for southern residents, there was a widely recorded 
exponential increase in southern populations across Khartoum, particularly in 1962 due to 
flooding and famine in Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal; this growth was not only from Nilotic 
regions, but included significant numbers of Equatorian migrants.112 
 
This chapter argues that by the mid-1970s, the collapse of formal party politics in Sudan 
after the first civil war expanded space for substantive internal and vernacular political 
debate, particularly for the many people who moved northwards to Khartoum by this period. 
While electoral and representational politics was shut down for elites, who were restricted to 
being rebel or exile “southern leaders” on increasingly militarised terms, most of Khartoum's 
growing southern migrant population were engaged elsewhere: migrant associational, 
educational networks had long been the normal forums of political expression for southern 
and other marginalised groups in Sudan, rather than political parties. 
 
This chapter summarises the pre-1970s practical foundations of this urban organisation, 
which involved complex racial, socio-economic, regional and political lines and 
commonalities. This alternative forum of urban migrant political and social associational 
culture articulated complex relationships between blackness, southern-ness, and Sudanese-
ness up to the 1970s. This chapter seeks to put this urban history of “southern identity” in 
the context of wider histories of urban othering and the making of political identifications 
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from the 1930s to the 1970s, building on earlier research on particularly northern Sudanese 
Nubian migration to the city in the 1960s and 1970s, and on broader work on migrant urban 
identifications in Khartoum.113 This political space came into its own with the closing down of 
formal political space in the 1970s. The pressures of massive peripheral in-migration to 
Khartoum and the growing civil war in the southern regions by the mid-1960s fuelled (and 
was fuelled by) these more everyday experiences of local, ethnic, and historical frustrations 
and violent oppressions; the label “southern” emerged as a more common personal 
shorthand from the early 1970s onwards. 
 
 
The “Southern” problem: elite ideas of “southern Sudan” 
 
Many writers have argued that, by the 1970s, there was no general political consciousness 
as “southerners” among ordinary people in the southern parts of Sudan, and that this 
southern nationalism was only articulated by an elite minority: first by a tiny southern 
Sudanese leadership in the 1940s to 1960s, and then by their militarised successors in the 
early 1980s and 1990s. Roughly, this work has identified a cycle of “southern politics” in 
Sudan, in which the political and electoral optimism of the 1950s and 60s collapsed in the 
late 1960s and 70s, due to combinations of external pressures, internal failings and a lack of 
popular support, leaving leadership of the south in primarily military hands in the 1980s 
onwards. Studies have therefore asked questions of the failings of this civilian leadership, 
and how political discourse was restricted and undermined.114 
 
This “southern” intellectual history has particularly focused on its political elites: a tiny 
minority of men who had a monopoly on a limited-access missionary education system in 
                                                
113 For example: Sondra Hale, Nubians in the urban milieu: Greater Khartoum (1972); Hale, Nubians: a 
study in ethnic identity; Hale, The changing ethnic identity of Nubians in an urban milieu: Khartoum, 
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the southern regions – under the colonial policy of closing off the southern regions from 
northern Sudan –  and who thus had a monopoly on access to state jobs;115 these men’s 
work has been well documented, not least by themselves.116 Sudanese politicians have 
produced an array of work on the history of southern Sudan and “the Southern problem” (a 
useful shorthand in Sudanese politics by the 1960s, including for beleaguered regional 
politicians in Khartoum needing a defined constituency); these men took up administrative 
and elected positions in which they were seen by their contemporaries, and often positioned 
themselves, as the first southern Sudanese political leadership.117 The “Southern problem” 
was an idea which worked with prevailing understandings of Sudanese politics amongst the 
northern elites in Khartoum and abroad, while challenging colonial and post-colonial 
depictions of ‘Southerners as antagonistic tribal groups who cannot rule themselves, if left 
alone.’118 
 
Khartoum served as a small hothouse for this intelligentsia after the independence of Sudan 
in 1956. Political figures such as Gordon Muortat, Lam Akol and other products of the 
University of Khartoum saw their intellectual achievements as both a justification and a 
requirement for their brand of political leadership; they were the only people from the 
southern regions who could apparently articulate the “southern problem” on a national and 
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international stage, in the correct language of global politics. They spoke this language to 
their only clear political constituency in Khartoum by the 1960s, the small number of 
students from the south and other peripheral regions of Sudan, as a route to being ‘directly 
accountable’ to ‘southern opinion.’119 Attracting their support, and debating with these “new 
bloods” – who saw themselves as the next generation of these leaders – became a way of 
“representing” the south within a small extraverted community of self-replicating elites. 
Speaking “for the South” gave these few inexperienced and peripheral politicians a clear 
platform of black African regional difference, assuming the “South” as a distinct political 
collective, and providing arguing power in major discussions around political representation 
and democracy; however, it also restricted their ability to act other than as a regional lobby, 
based on a particular broad explanation of the apparently essential difference of “the 
southerners.”120 But the “southern problem” these politicians spoke of – and the national 
community they claimed to represent – was more complex than this rhetorical trap allowed. 
 
These elites have been well-criticised, and criticised themselves, for being unrepresentative. 
Their distance from their alleged “southern” electorate increased through the 1960s as they 
were cut off from many areas of the south due to localised violence and travel restrictions, 
or forced into “political exile” and relative redundancy in east and central Africa.121 These 
elite politicians’ failures by 1970 to engage their “constituents” – whom Howell identified in 
his research with these men in 1978 as their ‘own [ethnic] communities’ – on these terms 
encouraged a search for alternative loci of political leadership, with either the guerrilla 
groups or ‘the tribal leaders, and not the politicians, as the true representatives of the 
South.’122 As Kwanai wrote to Aggrey Jaden, Joseph Oduho, Elia Lupe and Saturnino Lohure, 
all self-described political leaders with various followings working mostly across the Ugandan 
border in 1965, 
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How can we, for example, know who here in exile is truly a Southern Sudanese 
leader – unless he has been a member of the last Sudan Parliament; or a political 
leader, already noted by his people before his coming out? …what contribution did 
they make to the liberation cause for them to be including [sic] on council of elder 
statesmen? And, who are we to incorporate them, anyway? … Perhaps these bush 
leaders should be given the mandate to chose [sic] their political leaders among 
those who call themselves politicians now out of the country.123 
 
The political researcher John Howell, working in Khartoum with these politicians in the late 
1970s, was particularly critical of their organisational weaknesses, personal rivalries and 
financial ambitions, writing that ‘attempts to build up political organisation in the South, 
although often weakly launched, have foundered on apathy and ignorance.’124 These men’s 
urbanisation, English and Arabic-language education, foreign travel, and involvement in high 
Khartoum politics, according to Howell, ‘set them far apart not only from the ordinary 
villages but also from the partly educated town-dwellers, a gap which continued into Sudan's 
period of independent parliamentary rule.’125 
 
This distance between these politicians and their constituents was apparently unassailable: 
regardless of who were the true representatives of “the South”, these men were confident in 
their collective understanding of their “southern” electorate, as an uneducated, illiterate, 
rural, parochial, and tribalised constituency, who were not aware of their own political 
identity because they had not yet seen the bigger picture, and who should ‘look to the 
educated Southerners for moral encouragement and direction.’126 As Gordon Muortat 
asserted in 1966, 
 
it is the educated people who understand the wrongs committed against the South 
and it is they who can point out and speak against the sufferings of the Southern 
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people. It is they who are the eyes of the illiterate masses in seeing that their 
political rights are secured and preserved.127 
 
An anonymous letter to Father Saturnino Lohure – by then a rebel leader in the Anyanya 
anti-government movement on the border of Uganda – in 1964 summarised this general 
perspective on the makeup of the southern political sphere: 
 
The Southerners form two major groups: one which includes 99% of the inhabitants; 
these are still in the stage of intellectual infancy after they were damaged by 
colonialism; they were left in a primitive state; they do not understand what is good 
and what is noxious in life, politics and rule. As for the other group, it consists of 1% 
most of whome [sic] are old pupils of churches and perhaps what comes out from 
them does not reflect their own opinion and life, but they bring the view of what the 
Church … the [remainder] is suspected to bring a wrong opinion, unreliable, not 
speaking out of its own. Besides, it is too small and represents a negligible minority. 
If I want to listen to the true opinion of the Southerners, I must wait for a long time, 
until the majority will attain maturity and can speak for themselves, what they like 
and what they hate.128 
 
These elites’ dominant understandings of “the southern problem” have been cemented as 
two standard starting points for writing about southern Sudanese political history. Firstly, 
“the southern Sudanese” as articulated by these politicians has been taken as a working 
starting point and an accepted rough territorial, racial and historical definition in most of the 
literature on Sudan. This idea of the south’s delineation as a de facto political unit has been 
consistently used across academic literature, with “the Southern people” or “peoples” neatly 
defined in an introductory paragraph or chapter, summarised on essential racial, religious, 
geographical, historical and psychological grounds, encouraged by the quasi-academic 
political literature of these “elite political intellectuals”, who themselves produce reams of 
definitive histories of the Southern conflict.129 
 
Secondly, it has been widely accepted in this body of work that the vast majority (the “99 
per cent”) of these southern Sudanese people had, and still generally have, only a limited or 
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latent understanding of their regional commonality as “southerners.” Though, to many 
political elites, their constituents should apparently somehow know themselves as African, 
black, exploited, and marginalised as a clear collective, there has been a broad concern over 
the apparently under-developed national “political consciousness” among these local 
southern communities. This approach suffers from its own binaries, implying a lack of 
political debate beyond the local and ethnic within the rural majority, and positioning either 
“southern” or “ethnic” as the only two options for personal engagement. But I argue that 
there was, and is, a popular political discourse over being “southern” in Sudan by the 1970s, 
and that this went far beyond a parroting of the elites. 
 
Urban histories of the “Sudani” and “Janubi” 
 
This chapter abandons “southerners” as the a priori category of analysis, and so allows for a 
history of the popular, vernacular growth of self-definition as a janubi (southerner). It was 
not that there was no “southern” identification in Khartoum by the 1970s; rather there were 
a plethora of local, specific, contextual, and personal identifications, with “southern” 
emerging as a generalised experiential and political collectivity. 
 
In this broader reading, the “southern” political organisations that emerged in northern and 
southern towns in the 1950s and 60s were not the “start” of black, regional or marginalised 
politics, nor did they represent the first southern communities in the north. Collective 
identifications in Khartoum have been shaped by migration, systems of slavery, migration 
and state formation since the 1800s. Migration to Khartoum was not new to the mid-
twentieth century; slaves, slave soldiers and migrant workers had travelled across Sudan, 
particularly the Nuba Mountains and the southern regions, and from the horn of Africa and 
West Africa throughout the nineteenth century, as Sikainga and Ewald have documented.130  
 
                                                
130 Sikainga, ‘Military slavery’, p. 23; Sikainga, Slaves into workers; Janet J. Ewald, Soldiers, traders, and 
slaves: state formation and economic transformation in the Greater Nile Valley, 1700-1885 (Madison, 
Wisconsin, 1990). 
  58 
The slave armies of the early Condominium period formed the foundation for ’Nubian’ 
communities in Egypt and across East Africa, as well as in Sudanese cities. The name Nubian 
was an ambiguous descriptor that had little geographic or ethnic definition but incorporated 
ideas of ancient black Sudanese kingdoms of Nubia and Cush, primitive martial black races, 
and regions beyond state control. It references the Nubian Christian kingdom in northern 
Sudan, which dominated the Nile valley in the 8th century AD and which was subsumed 
within Arab territorial and political expansions by the 14th century.131 Nubia was broadly the 
source of slaves, particularly for 1800s slave armies, and this ‘frontier of enslaveable people 
shifted with political events’;132 by the turn of the century, the “Nubians” were therefore 
whoever was enslaveable.133 As James notes, ‘the slave-holding centre … required a 
boundary, beyond which it perceived its human reserves, and upon whose exploitation it 
depended for its own reproduction. …It would always entail a specification of non-members, 
non-citizens and non-kin without its limits, and would regard predatory violence against 
them as in some way legitimate.’134  
 
Colonial Sudanese job markets were fundamentally structured by this historical landscape of 
power, labour and exploitability. Following the abolition of the slave trade in 1899, many 
slaves stayed in Khartoum;135 by the end of the first world war the estimated population of 
slaves in Khartoum was 20,000.136 Ex-slaves congregated in the al-Diyum slums with other 
migrants, with Hayy al-Dubbat (the Officers’ Quarter) in Omdurman housing West African 
migrants, ex-slaves and others not claiming Arab ancestry; ex-slave soldiers and their 
descendants founded suburbs known as malakiyas in towns across Sudan.137 While 
migration from the South was heavily restricted by the closed district regulations such as the 
Passport and Permits Ordinance of 1922, many people – including wives and children of 
traders, and staff of civil servants posted to the south – moved or were moved to Khartoum, 
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particularly during the late 1940s.138 The second world war prompted, as one contemporary 
observer put it, the ‘enrolment of children of the backwards areas into the army.’139 It also 
brought real financial incentives to move to agricultural schemes and towns at the centre of 
Sudan, because of improved wages after a 1950 ordinance.140 
 
The changing economic context and rapid urbanisation did not radically alter the 
characterisation and economic and social positioning of these non-Arab, less-educated, non-
Muslim or otherwise non-elite new urban poor, but refocused concerns on urban labour 
markets and migrant morality. Moral and social judgements over the Nubian, racially black 
character – ‘the stereotypical slave’141 – continued under the Condominium. Concerns over 
the control of these new urban populations, the moral and social irresponsibility of slaves 
and ex-slaves, and their marginal economic position preoccupied state authorities from the 
1900s.142 Government agents worried about freed slaves ‘inundating towns and forming 
“parasitic communities;” colonial officials believed that any loosening of bonds on slaves 
would lead to vagrancy, prostitution, crime, and drunkenness.’143 New arrivals’ specific local 
and personal identifications and histories were to a large extent subsumed within these 
dominant paradigms.  
 
This combination of moral, social and economic marginalisation and stereotyping resulted in 
particular forms of group identification. For example, Hale notes that Nubian workers 
dominated septic tank cleaning through the 1970s, and anyone else working in the same 
sector was automatically called a Nubian;144 the idea of “becoming Nubi” was still in use as 
descriptor for urbanised rural people in the 1980s, much like the term “malakiyan”.145 
Similarly, southern, western and Nuba Mountains migrants have filled (and continue to fill) 
the low-status menial labour sector in Khartoum since the 1950s. These jobs were 
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‘considered inferior and only for “lower” social groups’, and these Sudanese black and 
peripheral populations ‘were still regarded as culturally inferior and descendants of slaves.’146 
Menial labour was ‘synonymous with slavery.’147  
 
By the mid-century, then, the fast-growing populations of Khartoum drew on a broad and 
deep-rooted spectrum of racial, historio-geographical, politicised descriptors and 
demarcators, in an ambiguous and shifting hierarchy. Barclay’s study of the village Burri al 
Lamaab, then on the outskirts of Khartoum, in 1964 provides a good example.148 In the late 
1950s to early 1960s, during Barclay’s study, about half of the village were of ‘slave 
descent’, most of whom were from the Nuba regions of Kordofan, with some Dinka and 
Fertit from western Bahr el Ghazal, and half of whom were descendants of slaves owned by 
other village residents.149 These people were called muwaaliid (slave descendants) or abiid. 
People from the broad southern regions of Sudan were noted by geographical origin as 
janubiin, or by major ethnic group such as the majority Dinka and Nuer residents. Dinka and 
Nuer residents were divided between slave and non-slave descent, and were generally not 
Muslim.150 Sometimes the term abiid was extended ‘to include anyone from the southern 
pagan tribes whether he has been a slave or not,’ because for other longer-term residents or 
newcomers from other “un-enslaved” areas of Sudan, the southern region was a source of 
slaves, and entirely black. 
 
The term [abiid] may also be applied to anyone who is particularly black in colour, 
but this is often done in jest. A definite preference exists for light skin. …the 
minimization of all Negroid features, especially the skin colour, is most coveted.151 
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This echoes Mukhtar and Boddy’s works on skin colour in northern Sudan; ‘the 
understanding was that the lighter the colour of the skin, the closer the person is to the 
centre, and the more authentic his or her claim to Arab ancestry.’152 Barclay noted the social 
visibility of Nuer, Nuba, western Sudanese and Dinka residents in Burri al Lamaab through 
their physiognomy and lifestyle, not necessarily only identified by their specific regions of 
origin.153 Slave descendants, in Barclay’s study, exclusively married other descendants; 
‘according to the dominant group, “slaves” do not have as good “morals”’, because of their 
beer-brewing and sexual activity.154 Class, social standing, moral character and economic 
success could all temper or override colour;155 but Barclay also noted that people sometimes 
self-referenced as abiid.156 
 
The development of a “southern” identification cannot be abstracted from these histories of 
urban terminologies and collectives – the Nubians, malakiyans, abiid and janubiin, among 
many other more local and ethnic specificities – and their economic, political and moral 
weightings. These markers underpinned the politics of migration to Khartoum by the mid-
century. Their history is ambiguous partly due to the various attempts at appropriation and 
re-ascription made by their constituents: being janubi was increasingly preferential to the 
more pejorative abiid, and self-referencing as Nubian or malakiyan was a form of 
appropriation and reconditioning of older imposed identifications. The same period saw the 
re-appropriation of being Sudani – being Sudanese, and being black, with the term’s Arabic 
roots in the colour. Claiming to be truly Sudani could be both to avoid more derogatory 
terms and to assert claims to equal national status, as Rehfisch observed: 
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There is a growing tendency in the Three Towns to refuse to associate oneself with a 
tribe, since there is a feeling that tribalism is a factor leading to national disunity. 
Many educated and non-educated alike insist that they are not members of any tribe, 
being purely and simply Sudanese. Some of those classed as “Miscellaneous” [in the 
1956 Census] are probably Southerners who were either born in the North or have 
lived there for a long time and do not wish to proclaim their origin, since Southerners 
in the North suffer from some prejudice and social disability.157 
 
 
The 1960s and 1970s boom in Khartoum 
 
With the 1964 October Revolution, the re-establishment of fragile civilian government in 
Sudan, and successive macro-economic plans, people flooded into Khartoum and other 
northern towns – ‘especially [the] Southerners and Nuba’, who travelled ‘“under the 
impression that the streets are paved with gold.”’158 At the same time, the civil war between 
government forces and various rebel factions, united as the Anyanya, intensified and 
widened: while most civil war refugees fled from Equatoria to East and Central African 
countries, the expulsion of Christian missionaries and collapse of the southern regional 
school system and civil service brought large numbers of aspiring students and low-grade 
wage labourers to towns across Sudan. The civil war amnesties declared repeatedly from 
1966 onwards called on refugees and ex-combatants to return to Sudan,159 and many 
people responded from around 1968 onwards, particularly wage labourers, students, and 
those wanting access to towns and jobs in Sudan after working elsewhere in East Africa – a 
worker on 2s. a day in Juba would earn 7s. 4d. a day in Khartoum by 1971.160 The period 
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1969 to 1972 saw urban migration on a far larger scale than before, particularly from 
deprived regions of Sudan and from returning refugees.161 Interestingly, although most 
accounts emphasise that these migrants were overwhelmingly young men,162 contemporary 
small surveys show a significant number of women also moving to Khartoum from the 
peripheries; there was one woman for every two men from Bahr el Ghazal in Abdelrahman’s 
1979 survey, and Rehfisch noted the oddity that 1956 census figures implied large numbers 
of self-described ‘southern’ single women in Omdurman – 33 per cent of women claimed to 
be born in the south.163  
 
For the authorities and urban planners in Khartoum, these experimental migrants were 
deeply worrying – a continuation of older fears over slaves, ex-slaves and other migrants in 
the Condominium period, where ‘any loosening of bonds… would lead to vagrancy, 
prostitution, crime, and drunkenness.’164 Southern newcomers were ‘commonly referred to 
as having come “straight from the bush” to earn money in order to buy cattle and to enable 
them to pay bridewealth.’165 These new residents, particularly those from such rural, 
“backwards” areas, were seen as overwhelmed socially and morally by the civilisation of the 
city: 
the audio visual media has great influence upon in-migrants as something new to 
them. The young are more susceptible to the effect of the Cinema, where they are 
stimulated to violence and crime by the highly coloured episodes which they see on 
the screen.166 
 
But those coming to Khartoum were not only motivated by cattle. The idea of separate rural 
and urban spheres was breaking down in practice by the 1970s. Chain and cyclical migration 
from the south increased with the extension of the railway line to Bahr el Ghazal in the 
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1960s;167 ‘returning migrants… related tales of the glories of life in the North,’ and 83% of 
migrants surveyed by Abdelrahman in 1979 knew something about Khartoum life before 
they arrived, half of them because of previous visits, and the others from returned 
migrants.168 Popular reasons for migration from the south, as recorded by Abdelrahman in a 
1979 social survey, included “life in the rural areas is often restricted by traditions”, “one is 
freer in Khartoum to do what one wants”, and “to be more important and civilised”.169 This 
was made easier by the extension of the train line down to the south in the late 1970s, a 
route many teenage men took in the early 1980s.170  
 
‘You know, we want to escape from the cattles [sic]. …some of my age, you know, 
we planned to escape from the house; and then we travelled farther north. [It] was 
’79… Then we escaped the family, we went to the nearest station where the train 
passed, and climb[ed] on, and went up to Khartoum.’171 
 
Khartoum in particular was a place of freedom, where ‘independence and prestige’ could be 
found, and you could ‘fulfil ambitions.’172 Khartoum was a prestige destination; as Bonsall, a 
chaplain at the Khartoum Episcopal church, wrote to the Foreign Office in 1976, ‘Khartoum is 
the kind of place where you do things you would not dream of doing at home.’173  
 
The dream for many people was education, in the broadest sense. Khartoum was an 
educative space, a place for gaining knowledge and access to opportunities as well as social 
                                                
167 Abdelrahman, ‘Internal migration in the Sudan’, p. 123. 
168 Rehfisch, ‘A study of some southern migrants in Omdurman’, p. 71; Abdelrahman, ‘Internal migration 
in the Sudan’, p. 155. By 1979, most migrants were making one visit home per year on average, and 
most Khartoum residents from southern Sudan had visitors at least once a year: Abdelrahman, 
‘Internal migration in the Sudan’, pp. 189, 192. 
169 Abdelrahman, ‘Internal migration in the Sudan’, p. 157. By 1980, al-Din noted that ’there are more 
and more migrants whose attitudes and aspirations are increasingly out of keeping with the 
opportunities available in an essentially rural economy.’ Din, ‘The Nature and Causes of Labour 
Migration’, p. 433. This was also noted by DCS, 11 August 2013, and by Hassaballa Omer Hassaballa, 
‘Displacement and migration as a consequence of development policies in Sudan’, in Eltigani El Tahir 
Eltigani and Hatim Ameer Mahran (eds.), The Displacement Problem in the Sudan: Essays on the 
Crisis, draft manuscript, June 1991, SAD.940/5/2, p. 46. 
170 Including men interviewed in Aweil: DCD, 15 July 2013; WMT, 17 August 2013. 
171 GMM, 11 August 2013; WMT told a similar story, 17 August 2013. 
172 Abdelrahman, ‘Internal migration in the Sudan’, p. 157. 
173 C. H. B. Bonsall, chaplain to the English speaking congregation of the Episcopal church, Khartoum, to 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 11 December 1976, SAD 737/3/4. 
  65 
financing in the forms of a bicycle and a wife.174 In 1962, Rehfisch noted the large numbers 
of people from Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile trying to get into schools: 
 
These have had to be satisfied with attending night classes given in so-called Cultural 
Clubs, as well as Mission Clubs. A real effort is being made in the Three Towns to 
combat illiteracy and to give some education to those who wish it. Many school 
teachers and other Sudanese are contributing much time and effort without pay to 
educate their fellow citizens.175 
 
This is particularly seen through traces of a comparatively large number of southern, south 
Darfurian and Nuba migrants attempting to access education since the 1940s in Khartoum, 
mostly in mission sources. The Church Missionary Society (CMS) Bible Society, formed in the 
early 1950s, was a catalyst for self-education, and was quickly taken over by Nuba 
Mountains priests (and later political leaders) Butrus Tia and Philip Abbas Ghaboush in their 
early careers. 176 The Omdurman Christian Club was built by 1968 specifically to provide 
classes, and, at an elite level, the University of Khartoum noticed that it was taking a lot 
more students from Southern provinces: from no students in the 1955-6 academic year to 
forty in 1959-60.177 William, a Dinka man who had previously lived in Khartoum from the 
late 1970s to the early 1980s explained, in English: 
 
‘It happened [a] long time ago that when your family have cows, then they cannot 
allow you to go for study. By there, we escaped to Babanusa in order to find the 
opportunity to go to school. … [Before going north in 1982, we] were just cattle 
keepers. [We] don’t even know what’s so called literature. … [We went] because of 
the studying. … [Brothers] were taken to the Khartoum by those who went there 
before… after [I went to] Babanusa, [my] friend came from Khartoum … this man 
was bilingual, he [wrote] in English, and [his] mother tongue. And [I felt] interested 
– that [I would] like also to learn like him. … He told [us] that I’ve studied English 
and Dinka language, and the guy used to speak [a] different language every time! 
[Laughs] after that I said that also, I can go and study. 
 
… The time I went to Khartoum, I go and spend only one night in the morning, I buy 
my exercise [book], and go straight to school. … We save our lives, because 
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[Khartoum] is where you work for the daily wage. …I was working in [a] sweet 
factory. And by there, we made our schedule to be evening classes, because in the 
morning everybody [goes] for work. By there, that’s how we get our power.’178 
 
These intellectual labourers were Howell’s “in-betweeners,” the part-educated southern 
interviewers Rehfisch employed to conduct his research in 1962.179 
 
 
Social and political associations, and emerging urban politics 
 
The new migrants of post-independence Sudan entered into the organisational life of the 
peripheral populations of Khartoum, forming social organisations and seeking self-
improvement in a variety of informal ways, including cultural clubs, mission schools and self-
run evening classes.180 These were part of long-standing associational models: ex-slave, ex-
army, and seasonal labouring communities maintained patterns of self-organisation 
established since at least the 1920s, including rotational credit associations, both on a small 
scale as sanduk (“box”) saving schemes, and larger village, regional and clan or ethnicity-
based organisations.181 In the credit-based, highly mobile suburbs of Khartoum in the 1950s 
to 70s, this mutual aid and social support, which many people remembered including labour 
unions and sports clubs, helped people with shelter, advice and employment 
opportunities.182  
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For the smaller populations from the far south, the various churches of Khartoum acted as 
these social centres, particularly with the growth of young male labour migration by the 
1940s.183 This was not necessarily due to specifically Christian beliefs or high rates of 
conversion among southerners. A large majority of southern Sudanese residents had little to 
no church connections: Hillman, an Anglican missionary, estimated that among the roughly 
300,000 southern residents in northern Sudan, the Anglican Church associated with maybe 
300.184 The various Churches in Khartoum focused on catering to these new populations, 
particularly with the expulsion of missionaries from southern Sudan in 1964.185 The 
associations and clubs the Catholic and Anglican churches housed and encouraged by the 
1950s provided a site for educational opportunity outside of formal schooling, through 
religious training, libraries, night schools, games clubs, reading and debate clubs, which 
were often only nominally religious.186 They also provided space and security in a variety of 
ways, for southern and Nuba Mountains migrants who spoke often poor or regional variants 
of Sudanese Arabic;187 Rehfisch’s 1962 survey found a fifth of southerners in Omdurman 
kept their savings in church offices or with missionaries.188 
 
This did not create a coherent "southern community”, with tensions particularly between 
previously-settled residents and newcomers.189 Nor did it create a particularly political or 
religious community: outside of churches and night schools in the 1960s and 70s, beer 
drinking is the most cited migrant activity, although this is generally by outraged northern 
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sources. Rehfisch recorded that the beer houses were generally owned or operated by ex-
slaves or their descendants, and were 
 
the closest things to tribal associations found in the city. In quite a number of houses 
the clientele is almost exclusively made up of members of one tribe. In one, visited 
by the author, those present were almost all Dinka, and the unofficial leader of some 
of the Dinka tribes in the town makes this place his headquarters. He can be found 
there at almost any time of the day or night. On Fridays and Sunday afternoons and 
evenings many, many Dinka congregate there, drink, sing, dance and in other ways 
attempt to recreate as far as they are able their tribal environment. These houses act 
as a refuge where the Southerner goes to escape from the antagonism he 
encounters in the workaday world, and to forget that he is living in a hostile 
environment… very few Northerners visit the Merisa Houses.190 
 
Ten per cent of Rehfisch’s southern migrants spent their spare time at mission clubs, and 
another ten per cent went to night schools; other activities included libraries, the cinema, 
window shopping, visiting sex workers, and football.191 One man recalled, 
 
‘There was a club in which people played dominoes, and others playing cards.  In the 
night also you can go for cinema. … At that time there were no women… there are 
just those who rejected to make their own houses, those like street girls, but we 
don’t consider them as women. There was no shisha at that time… There were some 
local brews, the bangi, which is opium. … people stay according to groups, and 
according to the certain area in the South, whom they know themselves … mostly 
people separate themselves according to groups and according to tribes. … Like in 
Aweil here – if you find that I’m from Aweil, you have to stay with me. Like also the 
Greater Bahr el Ghazal in general has to stay as Bahr el Ghazal. And for those of 
Upper Nile also who interact with Bahr el Ghazal, they have to come also and join 
you. … Within the group of young men, there are already grown up people who are 
old enough, and they know most cultural activities and Dinka social life, so they have 
to inform those young men. And for that, we organize the social and cultural 
activities; like on Friday we used to practice a different dance, according to tribe. The 
Luo can dance alone, the Dinka Malwal, they dance alone, and the rest of the tribes, 
they also practice their traditional dance.’192 
 
Political discussion grew out of the social lives and self-organisation of these migrant 
communities. As Bedri Omer Elias and Hassan Yassin Bedawi observed in 1972, 
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‘The squatters themselves began to acquire some political momentum and became 
more established. They formed social organisations, political parties, and group 
leaders.'193  
 
The various membership criteria of these small socio-political associations from the late 
1950s to early 1970s is a demonstration of the complex interplay between “black”, ethnic, 
regional, Sudani, and “southern” collective identifications throughout Sudan’s history, and 
characterise the rest of this thesis. Among the earliest of these socio-political organisations 
were the White Flag League, established in the 1920s, and the Black Cooperative Society in 
the late 1930s, supported by many ex-soldiers and ex-slaves from Darfur, the southern 
regions and Nuba Mountains, as well as northern urban communities.194 The White Flag 
League’s insurgency in 1924 has been described as an ‘insurgency by “slaves”’; several of its 
leaders, including Ali Abd al-Latif, were self-described “black” officers of slave ancestry from 
the Mahdist or Muhammad Ali armies.195 Among many small and provocatively-named 
“groups” emerging in the 1930s and 40s, the Black Bloc (al-Kutla al-Sawda), a social 
organisation, campaigning group and nascent political party, gained prominence in the early 
1940s. It was led by Dr Muhammad Adam Adham, whose father was an army officer from 
Daju in Darfur,196 and demanded northern political change as well as ‘economic and social 
equality for southern Sudanese in the northern Sudan,’ as well as for the Nuba Mountains 
and other peripheral regions.197 There is no standard history of this inchoate organisation. At 
the time, British intelligence recorded the Black Bloc as having about four thousand mostly 
southern supporters in 1948, but Howell later said it was made up of nas malakiya, or old 
slave soldier families, with little connection to more recent southern immigrants – an 
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assertion matched by Stanislaus Paysama (a contemporary politician); Sikainga later 
emphasised its support from western and eastern Sudan.198 The colonial government 
responded by closing the Black Bloc’s social clubs, restricting its activities to social affairs 
and refusing to grant it political party status. It became an “underground” organisation by 
1954.199 
 
Setting the "southern politics" of the Sudan African National Union (SANU) and Southern 
Front (SF) parties in this broader history of competing Sudanese political philosophies and 
racial, regional, Sudani black slave histories demonstrates a broader church of "southern" 
political thought into the 1960s. More recently arrived residents were more likely than older 
residents to associate under ethnic or regional banners such as the Southern Sudan 
Emergency Political Committee, Nuba General Union, or Darfur Union, organisations which in 
themselves had various membership terms: for example, the small 1950s group "Chairmen 
of the Committee for The Committee", led by the Legislative Assembly member Michael 
Watta, used the term abiid in describing its membership and constituency, and members of 
the Southern Social and Political Club limited their membership to ‘“genuine southerners” 
whose homes lay south of the fourteenth parallel.’200 These lines of membership, and thus 
definitions of "southern", evolved over the 1960s and early 70s, as debates over the 
"blackness" of nas Sudani (Sudanese people) incorporated contemporary anti-colonial and 
post-independence black African politics. As one new migrant to Khartoum in 1976 
explained: 
 
‘I said why SANU? Because, [they said], in Kenya, it’s KANU. In Tanzania, it’s ZANU. 
And – in other [places], even in Zambia, [it's] ZANU. So I say: why SANU? He said 
because we are African; that’s why it’s called Sudan - African - National - Union.’201 
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These racial and African ideas were expressed beyond SANU by student newspapers at 
Khartoum University in the 1960s,202 and by various small-enterprise "political parties" often 
found in embassy records in this period, for instance in a note on the arrest of members of 
'the Free Negro Movement (Arabic: Harakat az-Zunuj al-Ahrar)' in Khartoum in 1969.203 
Some, like Philip Abbas Ghaboush, a prominent Nuba politician and proponent of Sudanese 
black solidarity, argued that this broader political vocabulary of political action – beyond a 
separate "southern politics" – was a demonstration of a clear, if not necessarily coherent, 
“Sudanese Black Movement” from 1948 to the 2000s.204 
 
By the late 1960s, the growing numbers of Khartoum residents from southern areas of 
Sudan were developing concepts of being “southern” as creoles of old and new Sudanese 
and international ideas. This discourse was not controlled or conditioned entirely by external 
or state forces – such as national narratives of "the southern problem", or exiled rebel 
politicians. While these organisations generally had a very small reach – particularly in 
southern Sudan – their history emphasises that there was a far broader market of political 
ideas and engagement beyond the forms expressed by the specifically “southern” political 
elites in the 1950s and 60s.205 Increasing numbers of urban residents may not have been 
politically engaged primarily as “southerners” in the 1960s and 1970s, but this did not 
necessarily mean their affiliations were always either primarily or only to rural localities, 
ethnicities, clans and cattle camps. Instead, southern residents were not just “locals” to 
isolated villages and rural areas, but generally had extensive familial and historical 
experience, political understandings, and detailed “local” knowledge of wider and often 
geographically far-ranging networks of blackness, slavery, urban migration and exploitation. 
Talking exclusively about the emergence of “southern political consciousness” obscures and 
homogenises this pluralism of ties. 
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Southern political elites, their constituents, and political space in Khartoum 
 
By late 1960s – at the same time as this mass migration to Khartoum – the intensifying civil 
war in the south, particularly in greater Equatoria, cemented the idea of a discrete “southern 
problem” within high politics, at the same time as closing down formal political space. By 
1967, many prominent “southern political leaders” had gone “into exile” in various ways – 
remaining in state civil service in Khartoum, going abroad to Europe or Cairo for education 
or refuge, or to Kenya, Uganda, Congo and the Central African Republic, establishing various 
independent movements on behalf of “the south” (including, for example, the Azania 
Liberation Movement, the new country of Alwa, the Kush Republic, Southern People’s 
Progressive Party, the Immatong Republic, and the Nile Provisional Government).206 The 
1965 elections were so disrupted by insecurity that forty-three southern constituencies did 
not return candidates, and the remaining twenty seats were taken by mostly northern-origin 
MPs,207 who again took more southern seats in the 1967 and 1968 elections than the 
supposedly regionally powerful SANU and the Southern Front.208 Following his coup in 1969, 
Nimeiri banned party politics by the early 1970s under his new socialist national project, 
rendering these foundering parties and their politicians relatively redundant. Other forms of 
open organisation – like university unions, trade unions and the Communist party – were 
shut down or restricted in the early to mid 1970s.209 
 
Howell argued that this political marginalisation of the “southern” elites within Sudan, and 
the increasing migration of rural masses to the towns, contributed to the ‘large gulf between 
the educated elite and the great majority,’ with the new migrant worker populations ‘largely 
ignored by the politicians… beyond limited contact along clan lines.’210  But the alternative 
history of Khartoum migration, the growth of peripheral Sudanese urban communities, and 
vernacular political pluralism presented here challenges this apparent divide between the 
‘urban elites’ and ‘rural masses’. This closing down of political space in the late 1960s and 
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early 1970s did not necessarily mean that these political elites were cut off from their 
"southern" constituents, or that political parties entirely “fell apart.”  
 
It is hard to see what banning political parties actually stopped. The major “southern” 
parties, the Liberal Party, Southern Front and SANU were by the late 1960s – as Howell put 
it – ‘only marginally “parties” in the strictest sense of the term.’211 The family homes of 
prominent men in Khartoum were not only political party headquarters, but employment 
offices, dosshouses, schools and social clubs for others from his local or ethnic community in 
the south.212 Toby Maduot Parek, then a SANU MP, complained from his own experience 
that ‘we may find 20-30 dependants in the house of an MP in Khartoum: refugees who have 
nowhere to go in the North.’213 Government officials were apparently ‘hard pressed 
economically because their homes are overflowing with relatives who have come from the 
South.’214 Gordon Muortat Mayen, one of the founders of the Southern Front, petitioned for 
church financial support in 1967, as the Southern Front offices became overwhelmed with 
requests for help from southerners seeking ‘temporary safety’ in Khartoum.215 The SANU 
youth newspaper reported later that year, 
 
many Southern young men and girls are today thrown to extreme poverty, especially 
those deprived of parents... more than 200 of these children have approached SANU 
Office for recommendation, help, and many of them are still roaming about in the 
Northern towns without jobs.216 
 
Personalised politics and the increasing possibility of travel northwards through rail and 
steamer boat meant that these connections were reinforced, such as the Dinka men of Aweil 
district who lost 1500 cattle to a government army raid in September 1969 and travelled to 
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Khartoum to report it to Joseph Garang, then Minister for Southern Affairs in Nimeiri's new 
government.217  
 
It is questionable whether these workers in Khartoum even followed, rather than just 
respected, this “southern leadership.” Connections between “political elites” and “ordinary 
people” were also not necessarily hierarchical. Howell was unable to explain the violence of 
the mid to late 1960s in Khartoum from the supposedly politically “unconscious” masses. 
The violence of the Black Sunday protests on 6 December 1964, set off by rumours of the 
Southern Front leader Clement Mboro’s detention or murder, were not “led” by elites. Mboro 
was due to return from a fact-finding tour in the south on 6 December 1964 when the 
Southern Front organised a parade and demonstration in his support. 
 
Several thousand southerners, mainly labourers, paraded to the airport… according 
to an eye-witness, the bar filled up with southerners demanding liquor which they 
declared would be paid for by the Minister. … [By the time they heard of Mboro’s 
delayed arrival,] many of the crowd were fighting drunk and insults were exchanged 
with the airport staff. … Somebody started a rumour that the Minister had been 
delayed by foul play; … the crowd set off in a mood of irrational bellicosity [through 
the city] … overturning parked cars, throwing stones through windscreens, molesting 
northerners and foreigners, and breaking into houses.218 
 
The protesters were attacked by crowds from the Coliseum cinema and football stadium, 
and ‘a general man-hunt ensued,’ with southern or black people attacked through the night 
and on Monday morning, and bodies thrown into the Nile.219 By Monday afternoon, southern 
residents were camping at the Omdurman football stadium and at a camp on the Blue Nile 
railway for safety, with many Dinka people leaving, although it was also reported that most 
of the Nuer workers and students returned to work by Christmas.220 In riots the following 
year, Howell noted that ‘it was clear that anger and resentment among southern labourers, 
army and police ranks, and townspeople generally, was not instigated by the political 
leadership.’221 The violent demonstrations over the death of the Dinka politician William 
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Deng Nhial on 12 May 1968 were similarly uncoordinated: a large group gathered at the 
SANU club throwing stones at police, who used tear gas. Twenty people were injured and 
six killed, including one policeman, and over a hundred were arrested.222 Much like Howell, 
southern politicians appeared to be at a loss to explain the violence, even those who claim 
to have helped organise similar protests before, such as the journalist Bona Malwal; ‘the 
‘Sunday incident’ 'was not a plan by anyone at least not by a Southerner … no sane 
Southerner could have planned it.’223 There were broader high-stakes debates and decisions 
being undertaken among the southern communities in Khartoum, beyond the reach of these 
elite politicians. 
 
 
An alternative political sphere 
 
This period has been commonly characterised as the collapse of formal Sudanese party 
politics: Lesch stated that this then led to ‘violence, non-participation, and alienation.’224 The 
rest of this thesis questions these dualisms – between violent conflict and formal politics, 
and between these intellectual elites and their impoverished and apparently inarticulate 
constituencies – and asks what “southern” politics was in practice. 
 
The Khartoum context provided a hothouse for alternative political action. Khartoum political 
debate had never really centred on elected elites, but with open party politics shut down by 
1972, a variety of older options - such as associations and social unions - and new 
organisations, such as student groups, began to boom. This growth was encouraged by 
increasingly large numbers of migrant labourers travelling northwards in the 1970s and early 
80s, particularly as southern secondary schools and universities operated increasingly from 
Khartoum. The African National Front was founded sometime in the early 1970s, along with 
social organisations of the Nuba Mountains and Darfur, and other more short-lived groups 
including the Pan-African Socialist Society, Democratic Front, and the African Thought and 
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Cultural Society.225 These groups were a mix of politics and mutual support, much like 
previous political parties, but with an emphasis on social and cultural activities. Philip Abbas 
Ghaboush called this ‘a legal front’ for ‘underground… black organisations’, where ‘instead of 
encouraging open resistance’ they ‘paid the poll tax of an impoverished member, helped at 
times of bereavement, arranged funerals and mourning parties and so on,’ as well as 
financing secret meetings.226 The term “southerner” (janubi) began to be used more widely, 
as part of the terminology of the growing idea of a “war of visions”. It was encouraged by 
international appeals to solve “the southern problem”, the regional terms of the Addis Ababa 
Agreement and the creation of the Ministry of Southern Affairs, which was inundated by 
petitions for assistance from individuals presenting themselves as “fellow southerners.”227 
But “southerner” continued as only one term of reference in an arsenal of personal 
definitions and collective affiliations in this political sphere. 
 
This “underground politics” – whether practical or conceptual – had long been the normal 
form of political expression for southern and other marginalised groups in Sudan, rather 
than political parties. The complex racial, political, historical and regional foundations of 
these familiar forms of organisation prioritised inward-looking work: their non-statist and 
often introspective focus was on community preservation (with the creative aspects this 
entails), political education, and moral integrity. The following chapters look at the 
alternative spaces opened up by this closing down of formal public politics and the growth of 
a self-consciously “black, southern and marginalised” population in the three towns of 
Khartoum. 
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Chapter two 
 
 
From the 1980s, Khartoum expanded massively, growing from the 1973 census figure of 
800,000 residents to around 1.8 million in 1983, and to an estimated 4 million people by 
1990.228 This chapter focuses on this huge in-migration from the mid 1980s, mainly 
comprised of Nuba, Darfur and southern populations. 
 
This is also when historical literature on the roots of southern political organisation and on 
southern communities in Khartoum fades.229 The boom in Khartoum’s marginal and mostly 
black migrants from around 1978 until 2005 is relatively undocumented. By 1989, after 
massive displacement northwards due to repeated famines particularly in Darfur and 
Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Ryle and Yai Kuol wrote: 
 
The largest number of displaced southerners, and possibly the most needy, is in 
Khartoum itself. The size of the problem is daunting… basic information about the 
social composition of the shantytowns is lacking. Generally they are described as 
being composed of ‘Southerners,” “Dinka,” “Westerners,” or “Mixed.” … Aweil Dinka 
form a majority in at least three Khartoum shantytowns (Col Macar in Omdurman, 
Kalakala and the Bentiu section of Bagiar).230 
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This lack of information was compounded by a particularly flattening terminology, as Ryle 
and Yai Kuol also noted: 
 
Migrants of very diverse origins and backgrounds, speaking different languages, 
practising different religions and having different modes of livelihood become, 
collectively, “the Displaced.” They are thus characterised only by their present 
condition, homeless, without identity, in limbo. This terminology tends to homogenise 
and dehumanise the inhabitants of the south. It conspires inadvertently with a strain 
in northern discourse about non-Muslim and non-Arab inhabitants of the Sudan which 
lumps all southerners together and defines them thus with negatives, as non-
believers, without real religion, not fully deserving of moral respect.231 
 
This chapter details the history of this intensive and highly political settlement from the mid-
1980s to the early 1990s, as violence, armed raiding and famines served to depopulate large 
areas of southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and Greater Upper Nile. This period 
saw an intensification of the long struggle for control over Khartoum's geography and public 
character which had been underway since the 1910s. New residents made fundamental 
changes to Khartoum’s social and political geography between 1988 and 1992, marking out 
and protecting new political space in a period many people called the “establishment” of 
Khartoum. 
 
This chapter introduces several ideas that run through the rest of this thesis. The pressures 
of Khartoum’s complex political geography by the late 1980s, as well as the escalation of the 
war and the organisation of the SPLA into a significant force in the south, encouraged 
intense political and racial self-consciousness and social stress on Khartoum’s new, southern, 
poor residents. As force of circumstance, Khartoum attitudes and stereotypes, international 
observers and aid programmes lumped these new arrivals together into a collectively racial-
regional category, so too did the self-organisation of settlement, social support and security 
among previously geographically and socially disparate new neighbours. Creating living 
space and negotiating the city as self-consciously black januubiin demanded significant 
mutual support; this chapter lays out these communities’ work to construct safe space. 
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Khartoum’s geography, 1960s-1980s 
 
Greater Khartoum has been heavily planned since 1899. The systems of first to third-class 
land designations, which were ordered on racial and class lines, were maintained throughout 
colonial and post-colonial periods.232 Particular groups – slaves, soldiers, specific trades, and 
ethnicities – have long been associated with particular areas of Khartoum’s Three Towns,233 
such as Hay al-Dubbat, “the officers’ quarter”, in Omdurman in the early 1900s, and in 
regional Sudanese settlements in Omdurman, Bahri, and the deims, “native lodging areas”, 
of Khartoum from 1912 onwards.234 By 1956, Khartoum was ‘perhaps the most over-planned 
city in the world’, with several “master plans” and endless re-planning schemes.235 These 
plans have been consistently challenged, primarily by repeated famines, conflicts and 
economic displacement, as well as state bureaucratic failures. With the rapid growth of new 
unauthorised deims in the 1960s, copying the layout of their more central counterparts, the 
over-ambitious and often contradictory “master plans” were constantly outpaced.236 
 
This rapidly-evolving geography of Khartoum left many other residents feeling under attack. 
Visibly black, poor and rural residents were a challenge to the apparent pre-existing ‘Arab-
Islamic’ integrity of three core identities: of Khartoum city, of the Sudanese state centre, 
and of local elites who felt they had ownership of both.237 A form of moral panic grew 
among local elites, state bureaucrats and suburban residents from the early 1960s, with calls 
for surveys of the new urban populations, and a growing field of urban studies at 
universities in Khartoum focusing on health problems and overcrowding.238 Residents were 
worried about the “ruralisation” of their neighbourhoods, with the cardboard villages ‘a mere 
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transplantation of poverty from the rural areas into the door-steps of our modern centres.’239 
The visible poverty of the new residents served, as Woldemikael put it, ‘almost to legitimize 
a feeling of superiority’ among other non-southern residents.240 These locals feared social 
and political conflicts due to the ‘cultural alienation’ of the displaced – even if this was not 
backed by real evidence.241 As well as noise from new evening churches in houses and 
public spaces in the suburbs,242 the new settlements were ‘generally conceived as a threat to 
health, security, and social order’ and responsible for the shortages and pressure on social 
services.243 
 
Politically, urban refugees from remote areas had long been seen by local and elite 
Khartoum residents as “suspect” “alien elements.” The fear was that these migrants from 
the peripheries – particularly from the south – ‘could be turned into political recidivists any 
time by any dissatisfied person or persons.’244 This was fuelled by the rise of the SPLA and 
rebel alliances: by 1988 and 1989, the southern war was spreading towards northern 
territories, with the SPLA operational in some areas of Darfur, Southern Kordofan and Blue 
Nile, finding broader appeal outside of southern Sudan in part thanks to John Garang’s 
explicit declarations of a pan-Sudanese uprising for a “New Sudan.” Both the NIF regime 
established in 1989 and the non-“displaced” populace of Khartoum felt increasingly 
threatened by the southern and Darfur influx, particularly within their own suburbs.245 These 
attitudes were encouraged by the Sudanese press and northern political parties, as a 
distraction or scapegoating for economic problems or to promote mistrust – ‘with headlines 
such as “Squatters intrude into capital and cause danger” and “Increase of displaced people 
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is part of a whole plan to bring about insecurity”.’246 Oxfam noted that the Khartoum press 
frequently referred to the displaced as “infidels.”247 This was not necessarily media 
hyperbole; in this period, academics and politicians both wrote of the fear of the ‘politically 
dangerous’ ‘destructive physical force’ of the displaced communities, specifically on two 
bases: ‘the threat of superior power’ through their numbers, and ‘a possible fifth column in 
the capital.’248 
 
These attitudes were well understood by the new communities. Southern and black 
residents had contended with hostility and racialised prejudices in Khartoum for decades, 
and often tried to limit contact ‘to fellow tribesmen or fellow southerners’ before the 
1970s.249 In 1980, Kameir explained that ‘in the streets of the cities of the North, the 
Southerners are easily distinguished by their physical features, their clothing, and their 
pidgin Arabic,’250 what James called ‘ethnic visibility.’251 These stereotypes and supposed 
characteristics of what constituted acting as “southern” or “black” were regularly imposed on 
new residents, as Jok observed: ‘the Black student at Khartoum University who is taken for a 
servant looking for domestic work, a non-Arab businessman who gets harassed by the police 
on the assumption that he may be a thief, the common slurs hurled at non-Arabs as being 
lazy, uncivilised, unintelligent, prone to crime, [and] the caricature of southerners or Nuba in 
everyday northern humor.’252 
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‘[Local residents] try to say that - why [arrange that] petrol is to be taken to [the] 
south? Is it [that] they’re going to give it to the cows?’253 
 
Khartoum authorities, already struggling to design the ideal capital city, dealt with this 
apparent social and spatial threat through forcible removal – ideally to areas of origin, but 
when this failed, to “new” (and often remote and un-serviced) suburbs.254 As one Aweil 
resident explained, 
 
‘They don’t want to southerners to [be] inside the city, they want them to go 
outside… because if the number of southerners increased [too much, then] they are 
going to change society.’255 
 
This was not a programme invented by or particular to one government: although 
demolitions and forcible relocations gained international attention in the 1990s, they were a 
popular method of re-planning in Khartoum since the 1930s, particularly of areas of brothels 
and beer houses.256 Demolitions were usually conducted at times of heightened stress on 
Khartoum’s urban and state image; there were evictions in July 1978 as a form of 
landscaping in preparation for a prestigious meeting of the Organisation of African Unity in 
the city.257 These interventions, though, were sporadic. By the 1970s, some technically 
illegal settlements were already decades old, such as Kalakla, opposite Soba, and the 
“Fellata village,”258 named after the collective name for Hausa, Fulɓe, Borno and other 
migrant communities from western Africa, a term with a derogatory association with menial 
and low-status labour and questionable citizenship.259 Umbadda (sometimes called ‘New 
Omdurman’) grew from a small village into clusters of illegal settlements during the 1950s 
and 1960s; attempts at re-planning and legalising parts of it in the late 1960s only 
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encouraged further squatting.260 This overcrowding was compounded by the massive 
dislocation of people from northern Sudan by the Aswan dam, creating new ethnic 
enclaves.261 Governments and local authorities were deeply inconsistent in their negotiations 
with these settlements and associations – for instance, under Nimeiri’s government there 
were increasing collaborations between locally organised neighbourhood authorities and city 
officials, but the central state used false promises of assistance to coerce relocations, and 
blocked UNHCR water holes.262 
 
Erratic and conflicting government interventions, electoral vote-seeking and local 
organisation gave room for local residents to expand and restructure Khartoum’s outskirts. 
Already in the early 1960s, for example, cardboard settlements had developed in the Safia 
area of Bahri, ‘encouraged and condoned by vote-seeking politicians.’263 Many people moved 
to Haj Yousif village, which doubled in population between 1969 and 1976, becoming a huge 
self-contained suburb and a political heartland for black and regional organisations, 
particularly with the growth of its Darfuri population in the 1970s.264 In Haj Yousif, 
 
the community itself has shown a great sense of organisation, and a more than 
average participation in large community and political issues. They were very 
politically aware of their position and their potential, and through the political 
institutions they have erected, they aimed to manipulate the larger community 
institutions to improve their conditions. They also came to realise how important 
were their votes in the competition [in the 1968 election].265 
 
Place names are a useful way of exploring this contest over the practical and political 
geography of Khartoum.266 Popular place names, used instead of “official” ones, have been a 
means of political and class commentary in Sudan for decades. Wealthy areas of Khartoum 
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have borne sarcastic names since the 1960s, like Hai Al-Mazahir (“Appearances” or 
“Exteriors” Quarter), a comment on the pretentiousness and exhibitionism of its resident 
elites. Ar-Riyad, At-Ta’iff, or Al-Mamoura are all satirically-named after richer middle eastern 
city regions, as inferior versions.267 Takamul (“Integration”) was allegedly named in the late 
1970s, ‘meant to symbolise, by analogy and with irony, the integration of all Sudanese 
people.’268 In Atbara, Ishash was named after the straw huts ‘associated with former slaves, 
West African immigrants, and marginal groups, and [which] were considered dens of social 
deviance.’269 This Khartoum practice of multiple alternative and sarcastic place names took 
on new political weight during the massive expansion of the city in the 1980s, most 
obviously for the neighbourhoods taking on violent epitaphs, including Jabarona (“we were 
forced”), Zagalona (“we were thrown/forced out”), and Taradona (“they expelled us”).270 
However, these names have long histories and can be found all over Sudan since at least 
the 1910s. A Zagalona was established before 1920 to the north-west of El Obeid, the 
capital of Northern Kordofan and a major post on the route to Khartoum, and remained on 
maps in 1933 and 1964.271 Another Zagalona was recorded west of Aba Island and north of 
Kosti, among the sugar plantations on the White Nile in 1927; a further Zagalona was 
recorded between 1929 and 1937 nearby at Abu Rukka, and another east of the railway line 
near Atbara town, north-east of Khartoum, in the 1930s;272 another Zagalona appears west 
of Al Fashir in North Darfur in 1961.273 Competing place names demonstrate similarly 
competing powers and agency in Khartoum: the urban poor are displaced, but also move 
themselves; new suburbs gain official names, but unofficial ones often prove more powerful. 
By 1984, when people from western, southern and eastern Sudan began to move to 
Khartoum in far greater numbers and with significant emotional, economic and political 
baggage, due to failed harvests in 1983 and 1984 across Darfur and the increasingly violent 
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southern civil wars,274 these ideas of Khartoum’s geography, its in-migrants, and the 
methods of the often-violent battle for residency were firmly established. 
 
 
Famine, murder, and flight, 1985-1989 
 
‘You know, we were like people who ran to the enemy’s house. You were fighting 
with me, and then I run to you. I’m accused [there] – because they think that I’m 
still having a link with my people who are fighting. [We had to] stay with them, to 
become like – like somebody who is a slave.' 
 
Member of cultural group and local business owner, Aweil, explaining his feelings 
about arriving and living in Khartoum after fleeing from a Sudan government-
sponsored militia attack on his home in what is now Aweil North county, Northern 
Bahr el Ghazal, in around 1988.275 
 
 
For most people arriving to Khartoum from the south, the war ‘[of] murahaleen and the 
hunger’ began around 1985 to 1989.276 This period saw the escalation of localised, sporadic 
and complex conflicts across greater Bahr el Ghazal, southern Darfur, southern Kordofan 
and Upper Nile, and an intense and horrific famine that struck northern Bahr el Ghazal and 
southern Darfur from 1986 onwards. The heterogeneity of experiences of this conflict and 
famine means a concise narrative summary of this period is both impossible and redundant, 
although many new arrivals came with devastating experiences of violence, fear and loss.277 
 
Just as there was no discrete Khartoum ‘southern population’, or clear distinctions between 
motives for moving north, people’s routes away from their home areas were similarly 
diverse. Most of the people interviewed during my research had lived and worked in Darfur, 
Kordofan or Gedaref for long periods since 1987, and many had travelled between these 
places, a few into Egypt and the Middle East. Many people described being forced by 
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violence or necessity into bonded labour or slavery – in their words – in households, on 
farms and with cattle herds in Kordofan and Darfur, and many had to leave their children as 
unpaid labourers and slaves with farmers and herders in the region.278 One man related how 
he was sold by his family as a boy to a chief in Meriam for his safekeeping, while his parents 
moved on to Khartoum.279 Violence and famine did not entirely override personal choice and 
experience. Some people chose to move on to Khartoum to access education,280 because of 
their previous work there,281 or because of relatives’ Khartoum experience282 or residence 
there.283 Other people claim to have been ‘heading the people’ in group movements north in 
1987 and 1988.284 
 
Khartoum’s authorities and elite residents were unwilling to host these wartime migrants, 
and the city’s few aid organisations were unprepared and overwhelmed. The first attempts 
to survey and assist the displaced populations had begun in 1986. This was led by various 
Christian church bodies in Sudan, organised under the aegis of the Sudan Council of 
Churches (SCC), led by the Catholic Cardinal Gabriel Zubeir Wako and acting partly through 
the Catholic body SudanAid (now Caritas) and various other international Christian partners. 
Only a few other international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) had started small 
projects by 1988.285 Initial SudanAid surveys, conducted in July and August 1986 in 
Khartoum and extended to other northern towns by September, noted the near-collapse of 
existing networks of mutual support among the ‘already marginal’ southerners in the north 
as a result of these new arrivals.286 SudanAid successfully petitioned the World Food 
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Programme (WFP) for an initial feeding programme of two months’ food rations for those 
who needed it on arrival, organised by local area committees who knew the applicants.287 
The first government-sanctioned report on displaced people in Khartoum was the maternal 
and child health survey in February 1987.288 This survey noted specific locations with ‘high 
concentrations’ of displaced people, including entire suburbs - recorded as informal “camps”; 
‘to the surprise of the surveyers [sic], the women respondents reported that 70 per cent of 
their husbands are also in Khartoum, 85 per cent of whom have found some form of 
employment.’ Two thirds of the people surveyed were from the south, with another third 
from the west of Sudan.289 By September 1987, SudanAid’s immediate food aid was 
extended to over 30,000 families, which coincided with a significant increase in the number 
of people travelling to Khartoum from Darfur, Kordofan and the south before the 1988 rainy 
season, mostly as a result of famine and insecurity particularly in Bahr el-Ghazal and Upper 
Nile.290 According to a CONCERN note in early 1988, ‘their condition... gave rise to extreme 
anxiety amongst governments officials, International Donors and NGOs alike.’291 But despite 
some work in 1987, most of these initial “emergency humanitarian” interventions date from 
the catastrophic August 1988 floods. August storms devastated the clay and cardboard 
houses of Khartoum’s poorest populations, leaving hundreds of thousands of people 
homeless and attracting international media attention.292 While the floods receded, the 
destruction highlighted the huge “hidden displacement” of the newly-categorized “Internally 
Displaced Persons” of Sudan for international humanitarian agencies.293  
 
This did not necessarily improve information on Khartoum displaced populations. Most 
reports from the 1980s into the 2000s begin with a proviso: ‘note: all Sudan statistics, 
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estimated, should be treated with caution!’294 In June 1986, the Archdiocese of Khartoum 
recorded official government figures of at least 250,000 people displaced to Khartoum, 
though they believed it was much higher.295 By the end of the year, the Sudanese 
government were using the figure of 65,000, which SudanAid used for their feeding 
programme; however, their records showed food aid registration for 48,474 people from 
October 1986 to February 1987, which ‘indicates a startling influx of more than 12,000 
people per month or 3,000 per week’: 
 
…if an influx of 12,000 displaced persons per month is assumed during the period 
from Nov 85 to April 87, this would result in 216,000 displaced people. However, this 
may exaggerate the numbers, especially as the influx appears to vary over time, 
depending on specific events related to the civic unrest or to the schedule of trains 
and barges. 
 
SudanAid settled on a working figure of 150,000 people.296 But by January 1988, SudanAid 
were estimating 1.5 to 1.8 million southern and Nuba Mountains migrants in Khartoum, 
amounting to over half of the total urban population.297 The city government’s Commission 
for the Displaced was using a figure of 1,621,200 people by 1989.298 At the same time, its 
government partner the Commission for Relief and Rehabilitation was using a figure of 1.8 
million displaced people in Khartoum; the UN were using a figure of 1.25 million; the 
National Dialogue Conference held in the same year put the Khartoum displaced population 
at 3 million; MSF Holland were using a working estimate of 1 to 2 million people; and the 
massive UN and NGO consortium aid project Operation Lifeline Sudan II estimated 1.8 
million people.299 Another government office estimated 600,000 displaced people in 
Khartoum in February 1989, and a small government census the same year counted only 
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175,000 “displaced.”300 By 1990, estimates of the number of displaced people in Khartoum 
spanned from 600,000 to 3 million. The wave of displacement that year overwhelmed these 
surveys: throughout the 1990s and 2000s, displacement totals were recorded as rounded 
millions.301 
 
Counting the Khartoum displaced was problematic primarily because categorisation of these 
migrants was so political in all senses. National and Khartoum state governments had long 
been factionalised, ineffectual and internally contradictory,302 particularly in the later years of 
Nimeiri’s regime and under fragile post-1985 parliamentary democracy. By 1990, aid 
assistance to Khartoum was overseen by a combination of the Commission for the 
Displaced, the Commission of Relief and Rehabilitation (RRC), the Ministry of Social Welfare, 
Zakat and the Displaced (MSWZD), regional governments, local popular committees, and the 
Khartoum Commission.303 The Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), established in 1995, 
was the tenth institution created by the government for “the displaced” since 1984.304 This 
obfuscation was arguably intentional: in 1986, the Archdiocese of Khartoum noted that 
‘officially, the Commissioner for Relief declares that Khartoum is not a relief area.’305 The 
fragile parliamentary regime of the later 1980s was anxious to minimise both the war and 
the scale of poverty and suffering on the edges of Khartoum, which would demonstrate 
visible failures of governance at the heart of Sudan state, and admit to the scale and 
devastation of war and famine in the south and Darfur.306 Throughout the mid-1980s, the 
Khartoum state and national government termed new arrivals ‘seasonal migrant labour.’307 
Work in Khartoum with the “displaced” was only legalised in May 1987 under the RRC – but 
the government refused to define Khartoum’s new urban poor as “displaced”, with Dr 
Rahman of the RRC emphasising that ‘we cannot just treat it as an emergency situation... 
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otherwise more and more people will come to the capital for handouts. Rehabilitation 
includes self-sufficiency.’308 The Khartoum authorities also stressed that action was being 
justified primarily on the grounds of health hazards.309  
 
The 1989 coup and National Islamic Front regime hardened rather than changed this 
general establishment approach to both Khartoum urban control and the state narrative of 
the war. The regime avoided defining a “southern” population in Khartoum, increasingly 
using the homogenising, a-politicising and generalising term “displaced”, whose plight was 
explicitly due to “natural causes”, officially designating those arriving in the city after 1984 
as squatters and thus also justifying their forcible relocation.310 The humanitarian problem 
with these new residents was re-emphasised as one of “culture”, poverty and integration, 
not of the outcomes of political violence. The Former Minister of Construction, Housing and 
Public Utilities for Khartoum State (and according to Human Rights Watch in 1996 the 
‘government czar of slum clearance’)311 Dr Sharif Bannaga explained: ‘it is a fact that the 
displaced are from the poor layers of the community, unable to administer life affairs… the 
most immediate impact of the misconduct, malpractice and ill behaviour of the displaced 
was on public health.’312 
 
The NIF regime also took a harder-line approach to international presence in Sudan. By 
1990, NGOs were fighting a monthly battle to stay in Khartoum.313 The constantly changing 
government agencies responsible for registration of aid work controlled permits and visas, 
and were increasingly difficult to contact over 1989 to 1991.314 By the early 1990s, NGOs 
had to re-register every year, with visas and permits expiring annually around January, 
forcing international staff to leave for around three months each year, while also being 
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expelled seemingly at random.315 The high staff turnover, of around six months’ experience, 
meant that ‘planning for displacees is currently taking place without any adequate 
foundation of objectively derived data.’316 The UN Secretary-General’s urgent humanitarian 
appeal in October 1988, which emphasised ‘a programme of assistance for the Khartoum 
displaced,’ faced what were euphemistically called logistical and political ‘constraints’ and 
‘delays’ well into 1990.317  
 
Despite this antagonism, international humanitarian organisations’ approach to displaced 
people was very similar to the Khartoum regimes’. International aid organisations were also 
focused on defining both “the IDPs” and their location. Operational decisions stuck – as they 
often do today – on ‘how displacees are defined and how long a person is considered to 
remain a displacee.’318 The NGO and multilateral community, like the regime, based their 
approach on a specific (homogenising and flattening) understanding of the IDPs in 
Khartoum. This was specifically a “traditional rural” homogeneity, and this kind of 
representation presented these new populations of urban Khartoum as vulnerable, 
emphasising their fracture and disintegration.319 Aid reports focus on the ‘profound 
adaptations’ facing the ‘non-literate’ and ‘nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoral’ displaced 
people.320 Most NGOs worked from lists of chiefs, focusing on populations’ ‘clan’ 
structures.321 There was apparently little effort to approach other southern representatives, 
and the closure of southern provincial “co-ordination offices” in late 1987 further reduced 
any “non-rural” representation in the city.322 Most NGOs in Khartoum either did not work 
with Catholic agencies like the Sudan Council of Churches, and those that did – such as the 
international staff at SudanAid – were either expelled in the early 1990s or had little 
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operational contact beyond their offices and “the chiefs.”323 This reinforced the operational 
understanding of “southern IDPs” in Khartoum as parochial victims.324 
 
Humanitarian aid’s dependency theory approach in this period aligned with Khartoum 
government discourse and planning. Many aid agencies considered their energies better 
spent in the southern or “transition” region, where people were “worse off” and also where 
populations could be controlled and aid distributed in an apparently more systematic 
manner. CONCERN re-focused on South Kordofan and Blue Nile partly because those places 
offered less stringent government restrictions and had settled camps to manage.325 NGOs 
struggled to partition Khartoum into operational zones as they had done in the south, 
unfamiliar and unhappy with programming within ‘urban sprawl communities’ that ‘look like’ 
other areas, and the ‘refugee camp-like’ but “not-camp” nature of urban living.326 
Emergency programming in the late 1980s and early 1990s focused on food hand-outs to an 
apolitical “civilian” population, and many Khartoum programmes closed in the early 1990s 
because (specifically “emergency”) feeding programmes were not considered necessary in 
the urban context.327 This preference for formal “IDP” sites unfortunately reinforced the 
government’s strategic creation of formalised and securitised Dar es Salaam (“peace”) 
camps on the outskirts of Khartoum, partly to maintain a dependent and impoverished 
labour pool for the city whilst removing unsightly and politically difficult populations from the 
city’s suburbs: for UNICEF and Operation Lifeline Sudan, 
 
the reinstallation of some of the displaced persons in environments where they can 
recover self-sufficiency in basic food production and can have access to essential 
social services, the improvement of logistical facilities, should be among the top 
priorities of any rehabilitation and recovery programme.328 
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Dependency theory thus chimed with Sudanese governments’ longstanding strategies of 
creating and maintaining a cheap labour class sourced from its peripheries, and acted as a 
form of re-packaging of colonial and post-colonial labour exploitation: for example, food for 
work programmes lasted into the late 1990s providing monthly food assistance to 
impoverished camp residents ‘as they do work useful to their communities.’329 The aid 
community was also worried that their efforts would undercut local enterprises like the 
donkey-drawn water carts.330 ‘Relocation to the Transition Zone or to other areas where 
income-generation opportunities exist is to be encouraged and facilitated providing that it is 
completely voluntary.’331 
 
By 1993, the hard-line Bashir regime and the escalation of the war in the south conspired to 
eliminate many distinctions between international aid provision and state intervention in 
“displaced” areas of Khartoum. Multilateral aid programmes were stopped or wound up in 
Khartoum by 1992, with the Ministry of Health frustrating project proposals, and the 
Commission for the Displaced actively disrupted food deliveries and tried to blackmail aid 
agencies for vehicles in exchange for access to forcibly-relocated camps.332 Most remaining 
aid funds and programming were left to the Sudan Council of Churches or funnelled through 
local Islamic agencies. This did not mean that the Khartoum state or national governments 
had designs on directly controlling these peripheral populations: instead, the NIF/NCP 
regime ‘treated the outskirts of Khartoum as if they represent a national border’, reflecting 
‘the limited ambitions of the state and the prejudices of its agents.’333 
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Dar es Salaam:334 the fight for space in Khartoum, 1988-1992 
 
There was ‘a state of shock’ among southern communities moving north in 1988.335 The 
situation was bleak for most new residents of Khartoum, as an anonymous (likely church 
aid) report noted at the time: 
 
new arrivals usually try to find relatives, friends or those from the same tribal group 
to stay with until they can get established. … In “unplanned areas”, the displaced 
build huts from cardboard, twigs, scrap cloth, metal and plastic on any waste ground, 
unused land or rubbish dump, and will be constantly at risk of eviction or 
harassment.336 
 
In the years of famine and mass movement between 1986 and 1992, there were almost no 
social or basic services; newcomers were unaware of official processes, and held no 
documentation; overcrowded housing put family life under huge strain; labour markets were 
over-saturated, while labourers attempted to support usually dozens of relatives and friends, 
often while coming to terms with the loss of their old homes, possessions, farms and cattle: 
‘some people can even feel shock, and die of feeling shock.’337 In a 1990 research project 
about survival in the new shantytowns, ‘two of the 60 interviewed women reported that 
their husbands [had] become insane in Khartoum.’338 
 
The Catholic Church’s Khartoum Archdiocese office is the main source of the very little 
information on this period written from the perspective of southern and Nuba aid workers in 
the city,339 although these records echo the problematic NGO and state discourse about the 
culture shock, poverty, social collapse and disintegration of southern communities in 
Khartoum. The Khartoum Archdiocese education programme, starting in 1986, was titled “To 
Save the Saveable,” and stated: ‘there is simply no base from which to start… the Southern 
children… today can be called a threatened species, physically, morally and intellectually.’340 
                                                
334 lit. “Peace village”. 
335 ‘Sudan’s secret slaughter,’ SAD.985/6/40. 
336 Ibid., SAD.985/6/46. 
337 APA, 22 July 2013. 
338 Ibrahim, ‘The conditions of the Southern Sudanese Women Migrants’, pp. 253–4. 
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Parents ‘watch[ed] the family unit disintegrate.’341 The communities themselves were ‘well 
aware’ of their own challenges, compounded by the ‘atmosphere of helplessness and despair 
about the war’: ‘if the war continues there will be nothing Southern to speak about.’342 
 
These assertions are hyperbolic and political, but also emblematic of contemporary fear and 
stress. “Disintegration” was not necessarily an accurate description of the immediate 
community response to the Khartoum context. While people were deeply afraid of 
‘alienation… extraction and abstraction from all… cultural roots,’ this period was neither one 
of total societal collapse or of community “preservation.”343 This period of massive 
dislocation and re-organisation was remembered very differently by these “rural unskilled 
IDPs”, as a time of vital community self-preservation that was only partly about food aid. 
What occurred in this period was less disintegration and dependency than an intense battle 
for space and control. 
 
Between 1988 and 1992, this was a physical battle. Old colonial and post-colonial practices 
of violent urban planning were intensified under the al-Mahdi government until 1989, and 
then the NIF regime. Forced relocations were relatively uncoordinated and determined by 
combinations of local gentrification and political pressure from residents, demands for the 
land, and social cleansing. Machar Col (sometimes known as Zagalona) and Mawela, both in 
relatively central Omdurman, were demolished in 1988, and their populations created 
Jabarona, Mandela and further parts of Haj Yousif.344 Demolitions stepped up in 1990.345 
                                                
341 Jubara and Tawolde, Displaced Southerners in the Three Towns, Comboniani 6734.21.1/8167-8179; 
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1992, p. 24. For the legal background to this displacement since 1990, see Rone, Behind the red line, 
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Under Bashir, camps were formally created for those “arrested” during mass police and army 
actions in poor urban areas scheduled for re-development, for having anything other than 
full identification papers permitting residence in Khartoum.346 Ibrahim Abu Ouf, Deputy 
Minister for Relief and Displaced Persons, told aid agencies in 1990 that all of the displaced 
in Khartoum would be ‘out of the city within a year.’347 Other people arrived in Jabarona 
from Souk Manthaga and Izzba, which was created after the destruction of Kilo, and some 
30,000 residents of Hillat Shook were forcibly relocated to Jebel Aulia, 25 miles south of 
Khartoum centre, in October 1990.348 
  
                                                
346 Anon., “To Save the Saveable”, Comboniani 6734.21.1/8152-8156/47. 
347 Perlez, ‘Sudanese Troops Burn Refugee Camp.’ 
348 JG, 30 June 2013; Rogge, Relocation and Repatriation, p. 28. 
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Figure 3: Bassan’s hand-drawn map of Khartoum southern populations, April 1987. 
Bassan, Background information. 
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James Wala Kot [sic], a township resident, described the start of the operation: "The 
army said they would come on Saturday, but they came at 6 A.M. on Sunday. They 
turned off the water outlets. They told people they had to pack up their things or 
they would be burned. We escaped going to Jebel Aulia because we know there is no 
water there." The 28-year-old Mr. Kot and the 16 members of his extended family 
dismantled their canvas home and lugged it, two beds and cooking pots to a dusty 
back alley in the city.349 
 
By 1992, there were five “official” camps, made partly from the demolition of relatively 
settled areas, such as Kermuta around the Islamic University in December 1991, which had 
a considerable Ethiopian refugee community.350 Alongside demolitions, there were a few 
manipulative “returns” programmes: in early 1990, the government began a “return 
program” aimed at moving 50,000 displaced people to the south,351 aided by military 
intimidation and promises of assistance from some aid agencies.352 
 
These demolitions were, for their victims, an explicit part of the long Sudanese state history 
of black slavery and racism. In Khartoum Arabic, police sweeps were called kasha, 
colloquially meaning “search,” and this term was also increasingly used for large-scale 
relocations.353 But this term was often reinterpreted in a variety of languages and linguistic 
fashions, linked fundamentally to Sudanese racial discourses. In 1985, Matthew Obur, a 
prominent southern politician, explained the term kasha as coming ‘from an Amharic 
“Kushasha” which means dirt or filth or garbage.’354 The term was also translated to me in 
Aweil as a corruption from English: 
 
                                                
349 Perlez, ‘Sudanese Troops Burn Refugee Camp.’ 
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‘In 1983 there is what is called kasha, for the blacks. … Nimeiri, he said - why are 
gathering all these people [sic], they will make you problems, they will give you a lot 
of problems! Why don’t you catch them, and take them back to their homes. So … 
that [was] called kasha in Arabic, catching black people! And taking them to their 
areas… Nimeiri is telling people that you go to the bush! Don’t stay here! It’s just 
where this [idea of] separation happened. It’s Nimeiri who introduced it! Who 
[introduced it] to the southerners, to the blacks!’355 
 
As these angry re-translations imply, relocations were not un-resisted, particularly if they 
were violent or done without prior warning.356 Most stories of raids and demolitions included 
points of negotiation or resistance.357 Shelters were built with flexibility and ease of 
transportation in mind, and people hedged their bets by building cheap rakubas (wooden 
shacks, often open-sided) and spreading family members between sites. In 1990, Rogge 
recorded, ‘the fear of relocation to Jebel Awlia or elsewhere is currently causing considerable 
movements within Khartoum as people seek out locations where they perceive themselves 
not at risk from relocation programmes.’358 As in previous forced relocations in the 1970s 
and 80s, the evicted transported old beams and building materials to new sites.359 People 
also physically resisted unannounced demolitions, generally aiming for either a delay or a 
warning period before eviction. For example, in 1988, police and members of Khartoum 
District Council were stoned and threatened with knives for attempting to burn down 
squatters’ houses in central Khartoum.360 A news report recorded the relocation of Zagalona 
in 1988: ‘“We are prepared to die here,” said John Jok, who serves as chief of the camp, 
advised by traditional tribal elders.’361 In Machar Col, a major settlement particularly for 
Dinka Malwal from Aweil, residents also initially resisted demolitions: ‘they brought a 
bulldozer here… the following day the bulldozer came. We all, men and women, gathered 
before the bulldozer and said “you first crush us before you destroy our houses.” Thus twice 
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we frightened them.’362 After later clashes with police resulted in deaths, locals then 
successfully negotiated, partly through the advocacy of George Kongor Arop (a career police 
officer, Dinka ex-Governor of Bahr el Ghazal State, and at the time Vice President of Sudan), 
for the installation of water points at the new site in Jabarona, and for a guarantee that their 
relocation to a new site would be permanent and they would be undisturbed there.363  
 
The rapid growth of suburbs to accommodate these huge new communities between 1986 
and 1990 created community heartlands around Khartoum, particularly in older-established 
migrant neighbourhoods of Haj Yousif, Eshash, Arkawit, Mayo, Umbadda and Thawra.364 As 
W. J. Berridge noted, Umbadda had only a very small and practically defunct police station 
by the mid-1980s, and the entirety of Haj Yousif had only two police officers in one police 
post; the central and city governments encouraged self-policing via vigilantism.365 Khartoum 
became more strongly segregated. 
 
‘Even in Khartoum there are some places where there are no Dinka totally. [Like] 
Amarat… it’s totally Arab. [But] Haj Yousif; Jabarona; and Wad el Bashir; and Mayo; 
Jebel Aulia and Soba, and Jur as-Shaab [and] Izba. These are all places [for black 
people]. …Those Arabs, that were not cowards, can stay near these people. But the 
coward Arabs cannot come near them. … [The] poor Arabs, and some drunkard 
Arabs, they do stay with the Dinka there, because they don’t have much concern with 
what is going on! [Laughs]’366 
 
The ‘ethnic map’ of Khartoum that was ‘imprinted’ by 1990 in the minds of the new residents 
was not purely ‘a small-scale copy of the South,’ as Ibrahim puts it in the same year, but a 
complex geography of plural, politicised affiliations and sites of aggregate strength and 
experience.367 
 
This can be seen through the common names of the expanding circle of settlements around 
the city. Sites such as Jabarona, Zagalona, and Mawela - meaning ‘things have been 
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363 MDWR, 21 August 2013. 
364 See SudanAid, Maternal child health activities among the displaced populations in the Khartoum region 
(Khartoum, 1986), MEDU 17/4/AID/124. 
365 Berridge, ‘“Nests of criminals”’, p. 244. 
366 AT, 8 August 2013. 
367 Ibrahim, ‘The conditions of the Southern Sudanese Women Migrants’, p. 251. 
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scattered’ in Arabic - were mixes of residents, from Blue Nile and Darfur as well as Nuba and 
southerners.368 Local, darkly humorous names developed fast from 1988 to 1990: Hillat 
Kusha, “the settlement of garbage,” Hillat Alkawaja Dagas in Mayo (“the foreigner who was 
fooled”), Karor (“rubbish”), and Ras Satan (“head of Satan”) in western Jabarona were all 
names that amused informants in Aweil.369 Hillat Shook in Mayo meant “the village of 
barricades,” but was also called Bentiu (a border area of southern Sudan) and, in the 2000s, 
“Abu Ghraeb” by some of its inhabitants.370 Similarly, Khartoum North had a settlement 
called Jonglei, a reference to the southern Jonglei region, by 1986.371 
 
Despite on-going government attempts to rename these sites after their own nationalist 
symbols, such as Hai Mayo (in memory of the May revolution) and Hai el Baraka (Blessings 
Quarter, known to most people instead as Karton Kassala), these names are popular, more 
specific, and used with a full awareness of their emotional baggage.372 The multiplicity of 
names, one man explained, 
 
‘came as a result of sadness… each one [would] call [it] according to his own 
atmosphere [sic] …that could satisfy [his] sadness. [Laughs]’373 
 
Names and self-descriptions were, simultaneously, expressions of situational anger and 
sadness, snide political jokes, and self-aware references to common slurs against the “IDPs”. 
The words nazihiin – internally displaced, or internal refugees – and al-ashwai – informal – 
were self-employed pejoratives.374 The central Comboni school and grounds were commonly 
called Comboni Majaneen, meaning ‘just people who are staying without work… the 
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drunkard people stay there, and people who are just conversing and what, they just 
overcrowd [sic]… It was named by Dinka.’375  
 
‘And they have [the suburb of] Mandela. This Mandela means they are suffering, they 
are in prison like Mandela, who had been imprisoned by the British government in 
South Africa so that he can give up the country, the rebel leader. So all these 
names… they name the place according to their grief for the situation that they were 
[in].’376 
 
Names were often communally used, but some places like Abu Adm and Zagalona also 
developed vernacular names, such as Kowic, meaning “thorns” in Dinka.377 Zagalona was 
called Machar Col by many Dinka, although the origin of the name is disputed – some 
women believed it to stem from a founder’s cattle, and others believed it to refer literally to 
“Black People.”378 Either way, these names were assertions of spatial control.379 When 
Machar Col was forcibly removed to a barren area outside of Khartoum, to create the 
government-named “Dar es Salaam” (“Peace Village”), it became known as Jabarona, 
specifically named in colloquial Arabic ‘so that the government can hear.’380 This 
“vernacularisation” of disputed land, as with much of the settlement work in this period, was 
not new: the Jabarona down at Yei was translated phonetically as “Jah ba rau”, ‘they come 
alone’ in Juba Arabic, in 1969.381 
 
The most essential claiming of the city through suburban names was the common assertion 
of historical ownership of Khartoum itself, now a popular refrain among returned residents in 
the South. For many people, Khar Tuom meant, in Dinka, the meeting of two rivers; 
Omdurman was similarly re-interpreted as meaning “boy calling for his mother.” Tuti Island 
was named after the Nuer name Tut, and the name of Bahri came from the Dinka bahr, 
“come here.” Shendi developed from the Dinka name Chendit, and Burri from Burrij, a 
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fisherman.382 These roots are often disputed - there are many options and interpretations - 
but fundamentally they claim that ‘even in the far north is our land. …When we talk about 
the Sudan, we don’t mean the southern part. No. The whole Sudan.’383 
 
These communities thus had a very different conception of dynamics of power and authority 
in Khartoum, demonstrated by the common explanation of kasha – ‘the blasting out of the 
southerners’ from central Khartoum – as the expropriation of the residents’ hard work and 
co-ordination in ‘cleaning’ the original area: a defiant inversion of government rhetoric.384 
The residents had done what the government was apparently structurally incapable of 
doing, in physically and communally urbanising barren or polluted tracts of the city. ‘When 
[the government] saw that you have created the land well, and the land is well organised, 
then they can allocate you forcefully to another dirty place for you to go and clean it’;385 
then 
 
‘after we clean it… the Arabs come and demolish that area. They don’t like the Dinka, 
[the] blacks, to stay in a clean place. … If you have been there in Khartoum, the 
camps you have been passing – there’s Mandela, Jebel Aulia, Jabarona, Machar Col, 
Haj Yousif, Gereif Akaba; all these were established by Dinka, and they were just 
pushed away by Arabs.’386 
 
 
 
Organisation, solidarity, and mutual space 
 
1988 to 1992 was a time of massive organisation within these new Khartoum 
neighbourhoods that is barely recorded in any literature, but which provided the backbone 
for community order, secure social and political space, and neighbourhood integrity. These 
new residents were organised, resilient and resourceful under pressure, part of a long 
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tradition of black Sudanese urban migrants, and more broadly, exemplary of subaltern 
populations and refugee communities worldwide.387 
 
In marginalia and footnotes, the few aid reports now available note these self-arranged 
systems of chiefs and elders that organised the local logistics of relief projects and aid 
distributions.388 The few articles written on this period in Khartoum focus on the re-
establishment of this “traditional authority”, but this was not a sudden or simple “re-
structuring” post-transit: this organisation was partly based on the long history of 
neighbourhood and community associations detailed in chapter one, given renewed energy 
and wider focus. This local organisation was part of Khartoum life for all of its residents by 
the 1980s, as city government also collapsed for permanent residents due to economic 
constraints and political stagnation, and organisation at the neighbourhood level became 
crucial.389 ‘The associations were actually [there] in the beginning,’ organising settlements 
around road patterns and managing the influx.390 Southern “traditional authorities”, also, 
were often not newcomers to Khartoum: many men who gained importance in Khartoum in 
1989 (the common date given for the coordinated “organisation” of chiefs in Khartoum)391 
had arrived in the city from 1981 to 1985.392 Many people noted the establishment in around 
1989 of common courts and pan-ethnic groups of chiefs, who would (in theory) work 
together to solve inter-ethnic and local issues in their suburbs. Many of these local leaders, 
including men who also held low-level civil service, police or army positions, formalised their 
position in local and neighbourhood government in the mid-1980s, when ‘the gate [was] 
open to everybody [to] be given your permission to go and work [as a chief].’393 
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These “traditional authorities” were not just relocated rural elders, but a heterogeneous mix 
of organisers and arbitrators. The “lists” of chiefs held by aid agencies by 1990 disguised a 
local confusion of “chiefly authority.”394 The social and political knowledge required to 
negotiate food and relief distribution encouraged the rise of younger men and broadened 
the idea of “chief”; similarly, the dislocation of the local – the creation of multiple 
communities of the same clan, village or local area across Sudan – created options and 
tensions within these new communities. 
 
‘I met the local people and let them organise themselves according to [their] tribes. 
So that whenever food is [found], or whatever is given to them, then their own 
people will be responsible for distribution, instead of bringing these items and putting 
it down and people have not organised themselves. So that was the beginning of 
making [the] so called now “chiefs”. They were called chiefs, but – the problem was 
that, customarily, the chief is somebody who selected by the tribe, to head in the 
area, but how do you have a chief, in Juba or in Wau – and another chief in 
Khartoum? Or El Obeid? So this was the question. But we said – you, these chiefs 
who are selected in these displaced areas, as soon as we get peace, the moment you 
return to the south, you don’t go as a chief, because it will bring problems with your 
original chief.’395 
 
As well as the newly displaced chiefs and gol (Dinka clan) leaders, there were new 
claimants: 
 
‘They were so many [chiefs], because every time, when there is food distribution, 
and a group feels that they were not properly provided, then they can break away 
and form another, their own chief. It was something for them to get food.’396 
 
These new chiefs were not only opportunists, but also often brought skills, contacts and 
particular social profiles necessary to negotiate the new urban geography, for example the 
knowledge of how to bribe, and being a “known” and socially accepted Muslim.397 
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This history of organisation laid foundations for mass management in late 1980s. Way-
stations, reception teams at bus and train stations, and mutual funds for transport had been 
organised since the 1960s by southerners in Khartoum, particularly since the early 1980s.398 
New arrivals were ‘directed towards “their people”’399 by organisations such as the Aweil 
Youth Union (AYU), which was established in 1983 and grew in 1986 with the primary 
agenda of assisting people ‘pouring in’ to Khartoum, using branches in the northern cities of 
Nyala, Wad Medani, Kosti, Babanusa, where some members were working with Oxfam in El 
Obeid.400 ‘They heard [about family coming to Khartoum], even sometimes they came to 
meet people at the border and they take them… they just meet in Daein or Babanusa [and 
Nyala].’401 As well as information, these organisations collected clothes, food and money in 
Khartoum for new arrivals, funded partly by tithing from members; for AYU, this was made 
easier once the association gained a rare government permit to operate, organised by civil 
servants from Aweil still working in the government in the mid-1980s.402 This transit network 
included Cairo, where AYU worked with CONCERN, giving details of new people, their health 
conditions, and their time of arrival to help them get NGO assistance.403 At Shajjara, the 
railway station area, AYU members would divide new arrivals by the names of their local 
executive chiefs in their villages and areas in the south, which they would record - ‘wherever 
we get Dinka – even from Bor, from wherever – we take them all, we take them, we record 
them.’404 AYU members would then call contacts and other associations in areas they knew 
had people from the same communities, asking for help in receiving them;405 food aid from 
OLS and UNICEF was organised through the chiefs’ and AYU’s registers.406 Other 
organisations were also working at the bus and train stations to assist arrivals, including 
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403 AB, 12 August 2013. 
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Nuer and Shilluk associations among others;407 NGOs provided some support, such as 
CONCERN’s emergency shelters along the bus and train routes to Khartoum in 1988.408 
 
The many different connections and affiliations prioritised among these organisations and 
families – from the clan to sub-tribe, regional linguistic or pan-ethnic categories such as 
among the Bari, to provincial ties and the complex ideas of the southern, black or 
“marginalised” Sudanese – were reflected in the growing geography of “displaced” 
Khartoum. Linguistic, familial, ethnic and regional origins, as well as a person’s time of 
arrival in Khartoum and ties among transiting communities created in Darfur, grew into 
clustered settlements. ‘You found people of Aweil they are living in one place, people of Wau 
they’re living in one place, people of Rumbek are living in one place.’409 CONCERN’s 
negotiations for siting a clinic in Khartoum North took weeks, as there was no appropriate 
median point between the Nuer or the Shilluk populations in the area.410 By 1990, there was 
already localised conflict, for example clashes in Hillat Shook in 1989, a fight of ‘Nuer against 
Dinka’ in Arkawit in 1997, and between Dinka Parou, Lau Nuer and Murle in one woman’s 
neighbourhood, for example.411 But ethnic “enclaves” were only one visible aspect of a 
massively dispersed new population which was often faced with little to no immediate choice 
in accommodation, and for the most part was mixed together. For people with prior 
connections or experience of Khartoum - which was common – it was possible to live in 
compounds, for example, with Equatorian, Dinka and northern Sudanese residents.412 Initial 
or attempted ethnic and regional enclaves were generally confounded by the realities of 
                                                
407 AMA, 9 August 2013. 
408 Concern, Emergency programme, p. 2. 
409 RRL, 3 September 2013; Miller, Language change and national integration, pp. 48–50; Ibrahim, ‘The 
conditions of the Southern Sudanese Women Migrants’, p. 249. 
410 AM, 6 February 2012. 
411 DCD, 12 August 2013; ADA, 13 August 2013. For recorded inter-tribal violence, see Feiden et al., 
Khartoum displaced assessment and recommendations, pp. 10, 39–40; Amna E. S. Badri and Intisar I. 
A. Sadig, Sudan Between Peace and War: Internally Displaced Women in Khartoum and South and 
West Kordofan (New York, 1998), p. 21; Bannaga, Peace and the displaced in Sudan, p. 131; Millard 
Burr, Khartoum’s displaced persons: a decade of despair (Washington, DC, 1990), MEDU 17/3/REF/5, 
p. 39. 
412 MI, 23 October 2013; lots of people, including women, noted the same. 
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Khartoum life: ‘people were categorised in different places, [but] every tribe was to live 
together, especially the southern tribes, including the Darfurians.’413 
 
If locals lumped together the new arrivals into a racial-southern bracket, this only 
encouraged the already-growing supra-identifications developed through this self-
organisation of in-migration, settlement and safe neighbourhoods in Khartoum. For the new 
arrivals, 
 
‘these small, small organisations became quite big, involving many, many people – 
and for the first time, you would not only get like tribal [associations], but [the] 
whole region or the whole south, in some cases.  [We were] talking about the same 
language – that we are all suffering in the south, you know, and hunger, and they 
just want to drive us out of our land.’414 
 
Despite the ethno-regional names of these organisations, assistance was part of a scale of 
commonality, under which ‘they helped whoever came from the South to the North.’415  
 
‘We talk to our people… so when we see people from [the] south coming, we don’t 
care whether he’s Dinka, Shilluk, Nuer, whatever:, he’s [a] southerner… we have to 
take care of him; we cannot leave him to die and take our own people.’416 
 
Discussions of mutual support involved layers of obligation, group responsibility and social 
image: 'even if you find a Dinka that you never see in your life, you have to contact him and 
greet him to come and drink water, in the north.’417 For one AYU member, his fellow Dinka 
clans of Northern Bahr el Ghazal were the priority, followed by all Dinka, then all 
southerners, then all black people – ‘that’s the order we do.’418 This extended mutual 
obligation was partly in reaction to homogenising and uncivilised stereotypes of black (and) 
southern people in Khartoum. A member of AYU explained: 
 
                                                
413 MDWR, 21 August 2013. 
414 AT, 16 October 2013. 
415 SAK, 3 July 2013. 
416 AMA, 9 August 2013. 
417 AT, 8 June 2013. 
418 AMA, 9 August 2013. 
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‘We don’t need our own people… to come across the city walking naked, and we are 
wearing so smart, because they would laugh at us, say look – these are their families 
walking naked and they’re wearing smart!’419 
 
Many were aware of the deep differences of class, wealth, experience and opportunity 
among the various residents or migrant workers in Khartoum. 
 
‘The life of southern Sudanese in Khartoum, is divided into three sections. A first 
section is the life of those who are living [outside] the state of Khartoum, in rural 
areas, in Jabarona, Mayo, Haj Yousif, [and] Jebel Aulia…; and we have a life of those 
who are government officials and some other traders: they are living inside with 
Arabs, they are living in very good buildings or even they used to rent some houses 
with Arabs inside. And we have [the] life of those who are called Jongo, or the 
agriculturalists, the farmer workers: they used to migrate.’420 
 
This community work was built on fears of “disintegration”, but actively demonstrated the 
opposite. The reinvigorated associational life of various southern families, clans, local 
communities, linguistic groups, regions and ethnicities focused on re-connecting, re-
organising and re-socialising systems of gendered responsibility, family and moral practices, 
for mutual support and “the future.”421 ‘[Haj Yousif] really changed because those who were 
staying as bachelors were reintegrated into their communities.'422 
 
This social activity was focused on the re-creation of the ordinary, organising a sense of 
regularity and safe space for an insecure, criminalised and unstable population – what 
Sikainga terms ‘[taming] the city.’423 The huge numbers of new residents by 1992 ‘occupied’ 
Khartoum, creating an alternative urban geography.424 Entire areas of the city – for example, 
Haj Yousif and Umbadda – were self-contained black urban spaces, with their own markets, 
industries and centres: 'the black only, without Arabs. … You can find Darfurians, you can 
find southerners like Nuba, and the other tribes of southern Sudan.'425 These places were 
                                                
419 PKKM, 9 August 2013. 
420 DKLK, 4 July 2013. 
421 As explained by AD and AD, two women in Maper II, 13 July 2013. 
422 MTL, 10 July 2013; WDAA, 18 July 2013. 
423 Sikainga, Organized labor and social change, p. 9. 
424 APA, 22 July 2013. 
425 PDA, 29 June 2013. 
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often termed “villages” in vernacular and English-language interviews, as opposed to ideas 
of the government-owned “town.”426 
 
‘There are some places that you will not visit if you don’t have reason of going 
[there] [sic]…even if it is near, like this mango tree, you cannot reach [it]. … We 
used to move from the place where Dinka are, to another place where there are 
Dinka, like Comboni ground.’427 
 
By 1990, the huge immigration to Khartoum had created the idea of a critical mass among 
its new residents. “During those times (in the past), we were few. They call you abd [slave], 
there was nothing you can do.  But now when they say it, you beat them.”’428 
 
‘We used to go, but  [now] we collect ourselves and then we occupy one of the 
places for ourselves.  […] and this is how we protect ourselves, because sometimes 
[if] Arabs feel like taking one of our brothers in presence of us, they feared, but if 
they find you alone they will just kill you.’429 
 
The common aim of mutual organisation and self-governance in Khartoum was not 
necessarily to fight the state and re-create ethnicised “southern” order on the edge of the 
city. While these associations and traditional authorities were instrumental in re-creating 
normality in Khartoum, they were not new. “Ethnic associations” are common to histories of 
urbanisation across colonial and post-colonial Africa; in Sudan, these associations’ practical 
and personal support networks date back to at least the 1930s, as detailed in chapter one. 
These associations, built out of ethno-linguistic and regional ties, both sharpened ethnic 
identifications and operationalised them beyond exclusionary tribal lines: regional, ethnic, 
village and clan identifications were used as much for broad practical organisation and 
routes for mutual social support as they were held up as clear moral and political 
collectivities. These identifications were both asserted and blurred by the realities of 
Khartoum life and the proximities of racial and social experience. 
 
                                                
426 Many Aweil informants used the Dinka term ‘baai’. See p. 201 of this thesis, and Zoe Cormack’s 
discussion of the Dinka term: Cormack, ‘The Making and Re-Making of Gogrial’, p. 173. 
427 MTL, 11 July 2013. 
428 Woldemikael, ‘Southern migrants in a Northern Sudanese City’, p. 27. 
429 KDK, 3 June 2013. 
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Nor was their practical organisation the main focus of people's social work in the city; they 
provided a framework and the intellectual space to discuss broader psychological, moral and 
practical problems, particularly those facing their children.430 Many people noted the forced 
self-awareness of re-establishing lives in Khartoum under economic pressures and racialised 
prejudices. ‘I think it has given me how bad is the war. Because a person respected in your 
area, accompanying your people, [is] found… doing jobs which are not – …. then you realize 
[that] within the community, these are the disadvantages, you lose people, you lose home, 
nobody knows who [you] are.’431 A woman who was born in the north said she started to 
‘understand’ her personal political context when Aweil ‘was burnt’ in 1985, and she heard 
details from people moving to her neighbourhood - and her brother-in-law began to 
organise house meetings to discuss the war.432 But this self-consciousness did not clearly, 
directly or passively create a straightforwardly “Southern” consciousness, a 'supra-southern-
Sudanese identity replacing the former ethnic and local loyalties' of the kind Ibrahim argued 
in 1991.433 The economic pressures, racial geography, violence and pluralism of Khartoum 
created a range of complex responses within family and community life. Non-southern local 
residents were not all considered to be “Arabs”, but often ‘their own co-citizens who suffer 
with them from the complete negligence and hostile attitude of the “hakuma”.’434 
 
Conclusion 
 
This practical organisation and critical reflection is the focus of the rest of this study. The 
space gained by both “traditional” mediation with the urban government and the violent 
creation of a less-policed Khartoum periphery allowed for internal community action. This 
fight for space, and the internal community action it was intent upon, was the work of 
teachers, students, ex-administrators, lay clergy and waged workers: the people written off 
                                                
430 This is the focus of chapter three. 
431 RRL, 3 September 2013. 
432 AAD, 14 August 2013. 
433 Ibrahim, ‘The Southern Sudanese migration to Khartoum and the resultant conflicts’, p. 13. 
434 Ibrahim, ‘The conditions of the Southern Sudanese Women Migrants’, pp. 253–4. “Hakuma”, a 
southern Sudanese Arabic term, generally refers to the broad sphere of military, urban government. 
The term is best explained by Leonardi, ‘“Liberation” or capture: Youth in between “hakuma”, and 
“home” during civil war and its aftermath in Southern Sudan’, African Affairs, 106:424 (April 2007), p. 
394. 
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by Howell in his 1978 doctoral thesis on southern politics in Khartoum as unrepresentative, 
apathetic and apolitical, specifically because they worked outside of the two understood 
spheres of “traditional chiefly authority” and formal state politics.435 
 
Educational life in these new Khartoum suburbs was the primary critical arena for political 
organisation, nationalist self-articulation, and debates over post-war Sudanese futures 
among these southern residents. This work had long roots by 1992: many people in 
Khartoum brought experience of teaching, organising local schools, of being students and of 
self-education.436 Khartoum was a chosen destination for many specifically because of its 
possibilities for their own or their children's access to informal or formal education. The 
disruption of state schools in the 1970s under the imposition of Arabic language rules, 
combined with escalating conflict in the 1980s, meant that by the time people arrived in 
Khartoum, education was an urgent priority: ‘we sat down and decided to open our own 
schools in our own mother tongue.’437 These people – including many women – worked to 
establish formal social organisations such as the St Paul’s Community association, church 
benevolent societies and other relief associations that aimed at social and adult education. 
Many of these collapsed by 1990 or were re-founded repeatedly, but survived on 
congregation and personal donations, and operated under the wing (if not necessarily the 
leadership) of Catholic and other churches in Khartoum.438 The three regionally-organised 
secondary schools opened by the state government in 1986 – including Maridi Secondary 
and Immatong – were massively outnumbered by community-run “private” and “informal” 
schools.439 Former teachers, ex-politicians, and ex-government officials ‘joined together and 
established the schools’: at one point in 1986 school registration was doubling by the 
week.440  
                                                
435 Howell, ‘Political leadership and organisation in the southern Sudan’, p. 55; Vezzadini notes this 
organisational work in 1920s Sudan: ‘The 1924 Revolution’, p. 166. 
436 For example: JUA (29 October 2013) was a mid-level politician and primary school teacher; WMT (17 
August 2013) went to Khartoum in 1982 as a worker and student, then became a teacher. 
437 DAA, 13 July 2013. 
438 APA, 21 July 2013, MTL, 10 July 2013; Stockwell (ed.), Displaced persons in the Khartoum 
Archdiocese, p. 4. 
439 DCD, 15 July 2013; see Wijnroks, The displaced people of Khartoum, p. 8. 
440 JUA, 29 October 2013; DAA, 13 July 2013; DCS, 11 August 2013; Gabriel Zubeir Wako, “Meeting of 
the Archbishop and the Director of the Coordination Office of Bahr El Ghazal Administrative Area, July 
24 1986, in the Archbishop’s Office,” 24 July 1986, Comboniani 6734.21.1/8157-8158. 
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This educational work, particularly in vernaculars, has been broadly overlooked by various 
external agents, and often by the Khartoum government itself: but by 1990, USAID 
commented that ‘education is surprisingly widespread and well-organised in the Khartoum 
displaced communities.’441 Education provided defensive physical and intellectual space in 
Khartoum: secure spaces developed from the mid-1980s came into their own as southern 
and Nuba Mountains “educational” domains by the early 1990s, such as the Cinema 
Coliseum near the central bus park, Comboni College and Comboni Ground, and, in suburbs, 
particular meeting houses with radios.442 What aid agencies called “MPCs”, multi-purpose 
centres, operated as churches, schools, courts and social clubs depending on their users, 
and functioned in the evenings as informal schools, debate chambers, and centres for 
informal discussion.443 This was focused on teenagers and adults' political and philosophical 
education as much as on children and basic literacy.  
 
Southern communities in Khartoum looked (as Rogge put it) ‘politically passive’ by 1992 
because their political action was not focused on formally challenging or accessing “the 
state”, but focused instead on creating secure space for explicitly critical educative and 
discursive internal markets.444 This community work – in the broadest sense – and its 
description and debates over common black Sudanese histories is the focus of the rest of 
this thesis. 
 
‘You know, in 1976, my opinion was not clear, but my opinion became clearer in 
1985… Because I was born in war – and I’ve grown up in war – and I thought it is 
[an] unsolvable war. Which means that people have to think [of] something 
alternative. Change minds; find a way out; for making [something] new.’445 
  
                                                
441 Feiden et al., Khartoum displaced assessment and recommendations, p. 18. 
442 AT, 8 June 2013; MI, 23 October 2013. 
443 AM, 6 February 2012; Stockwell (ed.), Displaced persons in the Khartoum Archdiocese, p. 23. 
444 Rogge, Relocation and Repatriation, p. 31. 
445 PKKM, 9 August 2013, his emphasis. 
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Chapter three 
 
 
Academic studies of the Khartoum urban poor and displaced from 1986 to 2003 are rare, 
and have generally focused on stories of social survival under a violent and assimilatory 
“Arab Islamic” state. This understanding is predicated on two dominant ideas: firstly, that a 
“southern” solidarity ‘[replaced] former ethnic and local identities,’ ‘despite ethnic, religious, 
occupational, educational and other differences,’446 growing through ‘daily contact… [with] 
about thirty various languages’ and the ‘one enemy, that is the “hakuma”… represented by 
the so-called “Wlad Arab” [sic] (Sons of the Arabs).’447 Secondly, for these studies, the 
‘enemy’ Sudanese state has consistently targeted these black peripheral migrant populations 
through “policies” of Arabization (t’arib) and Islamization.448 In this analysis, Sudanese post-
independence governments generally pursued homogenising projects based on broad ideas 
of a dominant Arab-Islamic “Sudanese culture.” “Arabization and Islamization” became, by 
the 1980s, a common political and academic shorthand for a mix of policies, attitudes and 
violence.449 
 
This idea – of a clear government assimilative strategy of Arabization and Islamization, and 
a  growing “southern” collective resistance to this – is central to these explanations of life in 
Khartoum during the second civil wars. This approach simplifies, reifies, and homogenises 
experiences of broad and disparate processes of direct violence, political and economic 
impositions, alienation and segregation, social creolisation and internal community stresses. 
Drawing on wider debates on the nature of domination, power, and resistance founded on 
                                                
446 Ibrahim, ‘The Southern Sudanese migration to Khartoum and the resultant conflicts’, p. 13; 
Woldemikael, ‘Southern migrants in a Northern Sudanese City’, p. 30. 
447 Ibrahim, ‘The conditions of the Southern Sudanese Women Migrants’, pp. 253–4. 
448 Sharkey, ‘Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan’, p. 21. 
449 Abusharaf, Transforming displaced women, p. 33. See, for example, see Philip Abbas Ghaboush to 
Prime Minister Heath, titled ‘Arabization and Islamization,’ 27 December 1971, TNA FCO 39.901; and 
the Archdiocese of Khartoum report, ‘“To Save the Saveable”’, Comboniani 6734.21.1/8152-8156/2-3: 
‘We must also point to the fact that some powerful Northern Muslim groups welcome the present 
crisis as an opportunity to Arabize and Islamize as many southerners and westerners as possible.’ 
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James C. Scott’s work,450 this chapter argues against the reduction of this heterogeneous 
landscape to a “African Christian southern community” reacting against “state Arab Islamic 
assimilation.” Instead this chapter firstly asserts that, rather than being an incorporative or 
assimilatory project, “Arabization and Islamization” was in effect a set of practices and 
assumptions that enforced and legitimated difference rather than seeking to erase it, 
marking and policing a marginal space for a subordinate population. Secondly, it 
deconstructs and pluralises the “southern community” that is most often explained as a 
direct antithetical response to violent hegemony. These are Scott’s two false polarities, the 
apparent choice between resistance or acquiescence to assimilation.451 
 
Instead, this chapter aims to return attention to internal community issues beyond “southern 
resistance” to state assimilatory repression: focusing on “southern-ness in reaction” tends to 
reduce or minimise intellectual independence and alternative stressors. While many people’s 
initial and shorthand summaries of life in Khartoum were structured around collective 
opposition – ‘like one community against the north’452 – Arabization and Islamization were 
more commonly discussed throughout research as being felt primarily as an exclusionary 
force, silencing, minimising and superficially pacifying. Rather than acculturation, the 
primary fear in Khartoum in the late 1980s and early 1990s across accounts was a fear of 
loss, of deculturation. Individuals’ accounts of life in Khartoum focused not on state violence 
and ethno-regional resistance, but on the effects of urban creolisation, global acculturation, 
international racism and ideas of black African inferiority, commoditisation and the 
destructive individualism of global capitalism.453 Loss and deculturation were the risks from 
Khartoum’s challenges to social order, morality and safety; from displacement and 
urbanisation’s new demands for self-specificity, through food aid registers, the need for 
identity cards and residence permits, and broader demands for personal origin and 
otherwise ascribed affiliations (like southern, or Christian, or non-Muslim); and from the 
                                                
450 James C. Scott, ‘Everyday Forms of Resistance’, The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies, 4:1 (May 
2008), p. 33; Scott, Weapons of the weak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance, (Yale, 2008); Scott, 
The art of not being governed: An anarchist history of upland Southeast Asia, (Yale, 2009). 
451 Scott, Weapons of the weak. 
452 ADA, 13 August 2013. 
453 For a global discussion of these themes, see Dimitrios Theodossopoulos and Elisabeth Kirtsoglou, 
United in Discontent: Local Responses to Cosmopolitanism and Globalization, (London, 2010); this 
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opening up of new options and freedoms,454 both within Khartoum and from increasing 
access to global cultures through cinema, TV, and phones and internet, over the course of 
the 1970s to 2000s. 
 
All of this demanded management: of cultural creolisation and acts of preservation, over 
new forms of information and knowledge both challenging and necessary, on gender 
dynamics and roles, and on the extent of trust and mutual reliance in heterogeneous new 
suburbs. These displaced populations’ apparent “resistance” to cultural and social changes 
was much more ambiguous, uncomfortable, internal and domestic. As within other 
populations under intense pressures of dislocation and violent authority, these new 
Khartoum residents were arguing about wider issues of responsibility, social values and 
trust, in complex moral projects.455 This chapter therefore looks instead at people’s own 
accounts of these challenges faced in this period in Khartoum; how new stresses and 
opportunities were debated; and the practical management and moral guidance taken up by 
men and women of all socio-economic backgrounds in order to cope, protect, educate and 
organise.  
 
The effects of these mutual urban pressures were often remembered as very positive. 
People in Aweil recalled meeting other linguistic and ethnic communities for the first time, in 
schools, societies and neighbourhoods, and learning bits of Luo, Nuer and Shilluk 
languages.456 Weddings, funerals and dances provided opportunities to ‘[learn] a lot’ and 
observe other regional and ethnic dances and try them out; one Dinka Malual woman 
remembered trying Shilluk, Zande, Nuer, Dinka Bor, Nuba, Fur and Maasalit dances, as well 
as ‘Bob Marley and disco’, primarily with her black neighbours.457 This is not an entirely 
retrospectively imagined commonality; many people emphasised their frustration that they 
had lost phone numbers of friends from other Sudanese regions while returning to the south 
                                                
454 As noted by Wendy James, The listening ebony: moral knowledge, religion, and power among the 
Uduk of Sudan (Oxford, 1999), p. 2. 
455 Much like the Mau Mau detainees discussed in Peterson, ‘The intellectual lives of Mau Mau detainees.’ 
456 MTL, 11 July 2013; AB, 12 August 2013; AAD, 14 August 2013. 
457 APA, 22 July 2013. 
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or with the change in national dialling codes in 2011,458 and several women’s photo albums 
from Khartoum demonstrated their friendship groups of Zande, Dinka Bor, Dinka Malwal and 
Darfur neighbours, particularly with shared childcare arrangements.  
 
As common as intra-ethnic or regional explanations of affiliation and friendship in accounts 
of Khartoum life is the assertion of a sense of racial collectivity. Pan-ethnic commonalities 
expressed through race – or blackness, a term more reflective of the language used by 
people in Aweil and Juba – were constants in explanations of Khartoum community thought 
and everyday life, and an essential means of self-interpretation. The multi-linguality of 
communication even within a single neighbourhood in Khartoum provided plenty of space 
for ambiguity and overlaps in translation and terminology. “Black people”, “southerners”, 
and pan-ethnic or regional terms including Equatorian and Dinka run through accounts, but 
were used and translated between languages and dialects self-consciously, if flexibly; the 
most common term used across accounts in a variety of languages, though, was “black 
people.”459 Many men and women emphasised the historical nature of this black solidarity, 
often with Saint Bakhita as a common example of mutual slaving histories. In coping with 
life in Khartoum, ‘all [the] hard work [belonged] to every black tribe in Sudan,’ which for 
many people included the Ingessana, Nuba Mountains and Darfur residents - 'they were our 
people.’460 One chief emphasised that the Khartoum government saw southern Darfuri 
people as non-Arab “southerners.”461 Some men dismissed “southern” as an accurate marker 
– ‘when I say I’m a southerner, it is a geographical direction’ – but others emphasised a 
collective understanding: ‘when we say southern Sudan, we became one tribe, [the] whole 
southern people. … But [the] Nuba and Fur… we [see as] our brothers, they were colonised 
                                                
458 At the independence of South Sudan in 2011, a national country dialling code was created (+211); 
this apparently resulted in many people’s phone SIM cards failing, forcing people to change their 
numbers and lose contacts. 
459 A note on terminology: in Aweil, most informants spoke in a mix of Dinka and Arabic, using the terms 
ran col (black person), monjiang/jieng (Dinka person/the Dinka, or sometimes translated by the 
person as “people” in general), and januubiin (Sudanese Arabic for Southerners); many Dinka people 
also used Dor as a collective term for Equatorians. In Juba and Aweil, those speaking Bari, Arabic and 
English used the terms (in English or equivalent) “black people” and “southerners” more frequently 
than ethnic categories. 
460 JG, 19 July 2013; PDA, 29 June 2013; MTL, 11 July 2013; MDWR, 21 August 2013; JMA, 12 July 2013; 
DCS, 11 August 2013. 
461 AAY, 11 July 2013. 
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by Arabs, that is why they [got] lost.’462 Women also emphasised a more personal black 
solidarity, meeting with Tishaat, Fur and other Dinka women to discuss their situation, watch 
TV, share childcare, and drink coffee. Schools – particularly smaller community-run ones – 
were often mixed-ethnicity.463 As ever, different people placed different personal emphases 
on affiliations and markers. These multiple affiliations – to neighbourhoods, rural villages, 
clans, ethnic sub-groups, geographical regions, and to pan-ethnic, pan-regional, black, and 
“marginalised” identifications – do not necessarily resemble a clearly emerging “southern 
nationalism”, but have substantially more emotional and critical content than an explanation 
of such nationalism based on “resistance to the North.” 
 
This communal discussion over multiple self-definitions and self-control was most commonly 
articulated through gender roles and expectations, and – particularly for men – through 
policing women’s sexuality, choices, and behaviour. This chapter brings together the 
literature on gender roles in Sudan with recent work in eastern Africa, focusing on 
negotiations of intergenerational and gendered social relationships, roles and the city’s 
challenges to masculinity, and debates over what in Khartoum constituted responsibility and 
respectability – against a background of broader Sudanese popular and political struggles to 
regulate women’s roles, bodies, and sexual relations in this period. These points of tension 
were as much about the extent and limits of cultural and social change as they were about 
young women’s sexuality. The closer to ones’ own ethnicity, clan, regional or other personal 
markers, the more intense was the internal policing, the more clearly articulated and defined 
the need for solidarity, and the specificities of its performance. This debate over moral 
discipline, markers of community respectability and belonging, and how these ideals were 
practically translated to action and organisation in this heterogeneous landscape, are at the 
core of this chapter;464 a process not of “othering” but of “ourselves-ing”, as Lonsdale puts 
it.465 
 
                                                
462 DCS, 11 August 2013; AAY, 11 July 2013. 
463 AMJ, 16 July 2013; AD, over multiple interviews. 
464 Following Paul Gilroy, The black Atlantic: Modernity and double consciousness (Harvard, 1993), this 
thesis places more emphasis on the idea of identifications, rather than on identities. See Rogers 
Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, ‘Beyond “identity”’, Theory and society, 29:1 (2000), pp. 1–47. 
465 Lonsdale, ‘Moral and political argument in Kenya’, p. 76. 
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This was an intellectual project as much as one of regulation and social control. The second 
half of this thesis builds on a new literature on the intellectual projects of postcolonial Africa, 
particularly the work of Derek Peterson, Emma Hunter and James Brennan. Khartoum’s new 
residents were engaged in extensive historical, social, and ethnographic research and 
writing, poetry and arts, political and social commentary, archiving, and educational 
projects. Education was used throughout discussions of Khartoum life as a metaphor for 
these efforts to debate and inculcate ideas of personal moral integrity and political futures. 
Creating commonalities – among them the idea of being “southern” – took discussion, effort 
and mutual education.466 “Pan-Southern" ideas were not merely the organic product of 
proximity in Khartoum, but part of an active debate over forms of Sudanese and “southern” 
moral rules and behaviour.467 In exploring some of the debates among these southern 
residents in Khartoum over the intellectual and ethical basis for cultural rules and common 
moral ground, this study is an example of Wendy James’ ideas of moral knowledge.468 This 
chapter concludes with this discussion of the various aims, debates and administration of 
this internal educational work; chapter four takes up the content of these projects. 
 
 
Arabization and Islamization 
 
A summary of the closing down of Sudan’s national image among its ruling elites is not 
possible in the space here; other summaries do these themes of governance better.469 By 
the early 1970s, President Nimeiri’s ideas of a ‘melting pot’ of Sudanese culture really 
assumed assimilation rather than a two-way process: this was a ‘lopsided… Sudanese 
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nationalism,’470 what the Darfur intellectual and politician Sharif Harir later described as the 
’centrifugal tendencies’ of central Sudanese socio-political elites – with Sudanese and Islamic 
character ‘redefined’ on the grounds of comparative ‘worth’ against apparently 
‘embarrassingly primitive and outdated’ local customs,471 through successive government 
projects of the extension of this Sudanese character to its peripheries. 
 
These ideas were consolidated as part of the NIF/NCP regime from 1989. After the coup in 
1989, NIF government rhetoric was articulated most definitively in the Islamist state vision 
of a “civilisation project” (al-mashru al-hadari). Arabization and Islamization was, for the 
NIF/NCP regime, an explicitly proactive agenda for ‘defence and cultural salvation’ against 
international and internal threats to the integrity of this vision for Sudan.472 Abdelaziz 
Shiddo, then Minister of Justice and Attorney-General, responded to criticism in 1994 by 
complaining of the ‘alarming numbers of conversions to Christianity… [and] the vices wildly 
[sic] spread among children including addiction, pornography, prostitution and sale of 
organs.’473 
 
In literature on Sudan, ”Arabization policy” has become a shorthand referent among both 
Sudanese intellectuals and external commentators for this developing suite of assumptions 
and practices.474 The coherence of this “policy” has been assumed, even as its vision of 
“Arab” identity has been unpacked: many authors have pointed out the complexity of the 
Arabic and Islamic in Sudanese history, and the insecure foundation of an “Arab” identity in 
Sudan.475 Discussions of Sudan’s ‘crisis of national identity’ have focused on northern fears, 
partly around their racial and socio-cultural position in the wider world, but particularly in 
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terms of national character: as Francis Deng has often asked, ‘are we a hybrid? Are we Afro-
Arab? What are we?’476 
 
But while the binary concepts of identity behind Arabization and Islamization have been 
broadly challenged, the terms themselves survive as common descriptors for the content 
and impact of supposedly assimilatory projects, particularly in much of the human rights, 
migration and development studies literature and reporting. Under Bashir, in these reports, 
‘African traditions clash with the strict application of Islamic law,’ and ‘processes of both 
Arabicization [sic] and Islamization [among] Southern Sudanese displaced in the North' 
create ‘alienation, … extraction and abstraction from all … cultural roots.’477 Much of the 
broader theoretical literature supports this approach, with displacement as basically negative 
and destructive, a form of ‘modern alienation, anomie, homelessness… dépayesment [and] 
individual powerlessness.’478 On the receiving end of this, ‘southerners and westerners 
(especially the Nuba) are resisting the attempts at manipulating them into the fold of Islamic 
culture.’479 This idea of the assimilatory application of Islamization and Arabization policies, 
and resistance by target communities, has continued in contemporary popular opinion in 
South Sudan, most generally articulated in daily newspaper opinion pieces about the new 
nation’s citizenry: either the southerners in Khartoum “kept the culture well,” or were co-
opted, and therefore politically and morally suspect, pro-Islamic collaborators. 
 
Was there – as Lesch put it – a ‘systematic [program] of Arabization and Islamization’?480 
Even in Khartoum, the Sudanese state has been vast, incoherent, chaotic and personalised 
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for decades, particularly under the Bashir regime from the early 1990s.481 Abusharaf argues 
that ‘an ethnographic analysis of El-Mashru El-Hadari is ultimately an account of 
domination.’482 But the Arabization and Islamization of al-mashru al-hadari were not a 
coherent project. If anything, the “civilising project” of Bashir’s Islamist regime has defined 
the limits to “acculturation” and emphasised alienation and social distinction: what is 
popularly summarised as “marginalisation” in Sudanese political thought. There are only a 
few studies of what was entailed in the political project of “Islamization and Arabization,”483 
and these do not ask what constituted the ‘attempts at cultural hegemony’ that supposedly 
made up Arabization and Islamization, and whether these impositions were intended to 
assimilate in the first place.484 In practice, the direct efforts most cited as government 
‘civilising’ projects by the early 1990s were explicitly exclusionary and violent: they were not 
intended to build a homogenous nation.485 
 
The beginning of the 1990s saw new intensity to the activities that together constituted 
“Arabization and Islamization,” most obviously those aimed at public spatial control. State 
agents ‘always aggress[ed] people’ in Khartoum.486 The expansion of the Criminal 
Procedures Act and the Law of Public Order in 1991, and their extension in the Public Order 
Act in 1996, supposedly focused on practices considered “un-Islamic” but also extended 
state control over areas of Khartoum considered public (specifically, public for the preferred 
riverain elites).487 These laws were grounded in stop and search policing and identity checks 
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common throughout the late 1980s and 1990s because of paranoia over arms smuggling 
and urban unrest; southern and western people were the main targets.488 By 1992, 
neighbourhoods had become more insular, partly due to collapsing funding for state 
services, but also due to the outsourcing of local policing and security to pro-NIF/NCP area 
committees.489 The public order courts established in this period, according to popular 
southern opinion, ‘[had] no written law’ – ‘so southerners… suffered a lot [in those courts], 
they used to be judged. … they are [basically trying] to correct people according to the 
Islamic sharia, …especially the ladies.’490 Women knew in which public spaces they would 
have to conform to alternative clothing standards, and men knew which neighbourhoods 
they could not walk in.491 Local neighbourhood committees evicted southern residents with 
the justification that they should settle in ‘separate’ areas where they could drink or wear 
trousers.492 This “containerising” of unwanted populations, in Oxfam’s terms, was not just to 
help Islamic agencies in ‘Islamicizing the southerners’, but to remove them from sight.493 
 
This supposedly assimilatory project involved direct violence: street abductions and the 
containment of children in orphanages, forcible Popular Defence Forces (PDF) recruitment 
from the mid-1990s onwards, enforced military training in order to receive secondary school 
certificates, and the regular raids on alcohol brewers – overwhelmingly southern and 
western Sudanese women – and resultant imprisonment, fines and often sexual or physical 
violence from police.494 Night-time raids, supposedly to suppress alcohol-brewing, involved 
looting, beatings, the kidnap of children, rape and planting evidence.495 This gave rise to real 
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fears when moving across or in the centre of Khartoum, for instance when on buses.496 
Arguably, the Arabization and Islamization to state standards enforced by PDF recruitment 
and training was mostly targeted at northern populations, though PDFs did draw on 
financially or physically coerced recruits from elsewhere in Sudan, and many southerners 
experienced forced conscription or obligatory PDF training. From December 1990 onwards, 
all civil servants, teachers, professors and students had to do military training for six week 
periods, which was obligatory for enrolment in university. This was extended to all men 
under thirty by 1995, with youths seized on the streets at “checkpoints”.497 Bashir called the 
PDF a ‘school for national and spiritual education,’ through which the Sudanese citizen’s 
mind can be remoulded and his religious consciousness enhanced.’498 In the words of one 
ex-trainee, 
 
‘Most of it is conduct training. They can train you by brainwashing you, by telling 
[you] that this is Islamic country, [and that] Islam is under threat, and you’re 
supposed to train yourselves to take up arms, and we are going to – even liberate 
Africa, … Islamize Africa.’499 
 
This was not acculturation, but ideological violence. 
 
Similarly, the economic pressures for socio-cultural change in line with “Arabization and 
Islamization” hardly produced assimilation. It has been widely noted that food aid was used 
across Sudan to pressure local and displaced communities into conforming with 
subjugation.500 In light of people’s tenuous living situations, they had limited options: access 
to formal education in the peripheral official camps was through khalwa kindergartens, and 
most forms of paperwork could only be accessed through local government-affiliated 
committees.501 As Bakhit’s study of a Khartoum shantytown in 2011 and 2012 noted, 
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‘mobilizing political support for the government by means of the local committees, along 
with civil society organisations such as youth organisations, and some religious institutions, 
like the Zakat institute, …[aimed] clearly to make political affiliation with the government the 
only way for shantytown people to participate in and influence the provision of government 
services.’502 In the early to mid 1990s, many non-Arab government officials were dismissed 
from service for failing to “prove” their Muslim beliefs; applicants had to provide testimonials 
or confirm their religion in interviews.503 Work in the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and PDFs 
was a financially attractive route for some men, as was working – despite the potential for 
abuse or the regular refusal of pay – on agricultural schemes elsewhere in Sudan, or (for 
children and women) as domestic labourers.504 Many accounts of life in Khartoum include 
periods of forced work or deception into trafficked labour outside of the city.505 Economic 
coercion, by force or circumstance, was generally unsubtle, explained by many people as 
“bribes”, at the very least aiming to encourage a particular type of performance: for 
example, in exchange for publicly acting as a Muslim, or to dress or act in ways socially 
acceptable to Arab riverain residents. The social isolation of individuals as cleaners or 
guards, for example, would ‘absorb’ people like this: ‘those who isolate themselves, are 
those to be lost [to] Arabs.’506 This form of subsumption into politically Islamicized economic 
systems was heavy-handed, explicit and superficial; one Islamic relief group would only 
accept Islamic-named food aid applicants ‘on the understanding that this indicated 
conversion to Islam,’ and most people viewed their Muslim “nickname” as part of living in 
Khartoum.507 
 
For those on the receiving end in Khartoum, this was intellectual vandalism and 
psychological abuse, intended to subordinate through its unattainable promise of inclusion. 
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The most obvious and insidious form of this was the broad use of a particular elite style of 
Khartoum Arabic in government schools, exams, and higher education. This was mostly 
imposed on secondary and university-level students, but also affected local self-run primary 
schools and evening classes through the systematic cancellation of scholarships, the posting 
of non-Muslim or non-Khartoum Arabic-speaking students to Omdurman Islamic University, 
the refusal to endorse school certificates or certify self- or church-run schools under the 
Sudan curriculum, and the unilateral closure of schools by security and police forces.508 
'They said that – it is not good for us… we the northerners, to witness you, you are learning, 
while your brothers are [killing] some people.’509 This rhetoric was taken up in popular 
encounters in Khartoum, and was not the preserve of state officials. 
 
‘[When you] go to the restaurant to eat, you [are] asked – are you also [a] student? 
You say yes! What do you want to do when you finish and when you graduate? 
…some say I will be a politician; some say I need to be an engineer, I need to be a 
doctor, I need to be an officer in the police… how they laughed [at] us! They said 
that – but what about your brothers in the bush now? They are killing people, and 
you are here eating our things. … Why [do] you refuse to join your brothers in [the] 
bush, and you are now affecting us in the market, even [in] the schools? Please, you 
join the bush, and you come with your brother and take this country from [the] 
Arabs, if you are able to do that.’510 
 
Many people remember being forcibly bussed to political rallies, where they were 
“discouraged” – ‘especially on politics, they can say you will not succeed [in] what you are 
doing, even the Darfurians [will not succeed]… you will be sorry if you refuse to become 
Muslims, because we are now going to Islamize this area; they even despair you [sic] by 
saying that the SPLM is not going to succeed.’511 Many ex-residents’ explanations of 
“assimilation” into northern society were often based on acquiescence because of 
insurmountable inequality: 
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‘when you request your rights in the court, …you will not be given your right even if 
you are right. They considered Arabs to be the right person, who can say the right 
[sic]. It will not be possible for you to do a good thing: whatever good thing you do 
will not be considered by an Arab.’512 
 
Khartoum state programming – collectively summarised as a “project” of “Arabization and 
Islamization” – generally aimed to alienate rather than assimilate its incompatible residents, 
and set out geographical, social and behavioural dividing lines. Both locals and recent 
residents knew the limits of assimilation: this was not an ‘open door’, as Nyombe termed it, 
where one could convert, declare a new name and alter behaviour, and be seen by northern 
society as being ‘Arab.’513 ‘Even if you pray in [the] Muslim religion, they are still thinking of 
[you as] being unbelievers.’514 The “upgrading” of squatter areas that had successfully 
petitioned for state recognition just maintained their position as the lowest stratum of 
Khartoum residents, rather than integrating a supposedly “Arabized” area.515 Medics in 
remote or majority-displaced suburbs were allegedly poorly trained or careless, because ‘if  - 
somebody kills three people or four, there’s no problem, because they are not an Arab, it is 
not a loss to them.’516 Dressing in jellabiya, a traditional long garment popular in the Nile 
Valley, the use of henna, co-opted marriage practices, attendance at the mosque, and 
alternative Arabic names did not – as the above demonstrates – equate to an Arabization or 
Islamization that would ever fully socialise a person into Khartoum elite society. While 
southern residents acknowledged some genuine southern Muslim converts, conversion, 
naming, and dress were ‘pretending’: the goal was jobs, as one group of chiefs said, 
although ‘some people [aspire] to be equal.’517  
 
‘They go to the mosque to pray, but after they come back, they build a relationship 
with their brother Dinka. … They just advised their brothers that we are just taking 
care of our lives… it means they are pretending… For these people, they went there 
purposefully pretending to be Muslim, in order to defend themselves and their 
brothers.’518  
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This was not just pretending for some men, though, who saw their rights to dress as they 
wanted, particularly in the very Sudanese jellabiya, as an assertions of their identification as 
Sudanese and a political statement of equality and citizenship: this southern claiming of 
Sudanese identity is arguably as neglected an issue as southern Sudanese nationalism. 
 
‘They don’t need Dinka to enter into their customs like dancing, and dressing, and 
other things. [They say that] there are such things that are different from black 
people [sic] … when you want to [be] involved,… they will tell you that this is not 
your custom.’519  
 
One man described this as a ‘cold war’: after an SPLA advance, public harassment would 
increase, and ‘sometimes if you talk to them in Arabic they can accuse you of being a soldier 
in the south… because [they say] why do you talk wisely in that language that [does] not 
belong to you, it means that you are a soldier.’520  
 
These practices were explicitly aimed at the invisibility and segregation of Khartoum’s black, 
poor, politically suspect and culturally “backward” populations, and – when these people 
were visibly in designated Khartoum public spaces – demanded a cultural and religious 
performance. The Khartoum state in its various forms was always, in practice, keen to make 
and demarcate space for this subordinate but economically and politically useful non-Islamic, 
non-Arab other.521 
 
This explains Ibrahim’s surprise, in 1991, that ‘the influence of the Arab-Islamic majority… 
has proved weaker than one had assumed… The southerners show little interest to integrate 
themselves into the Islamic society of Khartoum. There is hardly any reciprocal acceptance 
of coexistence on both sides.’522 As Abusharaf says, ‘this program was designed not to 
assimilate non-Arab, non-Muslim groups but to dominate them’: but it was also to hold them 
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at arm’s length.523 Domination was already relatively assured by the structural racism and 
exclusions of the Khartoum space, society and economy, but distance and invisibility was a 
more immediate task. ‘They don’t want [southerners] to appear to the world, this 
country.’524 Sommers has described people’s ‘precautions designed to minimise potential 
interactions with government authorities,’ including not looking at landmarks on a commute 
through Khartoum.525 Some men commented that it was better to ‘stay poor’ in order to 
avoid notice;526 ‘we don’t talk strongly… we don’t want to show what we have to Arabs.’527 
Hanaa Motasim terms this ‘camouflage’, ‘hoping at best to be overlooked and ignored.’528 
This self-minimisation created exhaustion – ‘if [they found] people like the way we are 
seated here, they will just …arrest all of us, because they don’t want people to gather and 
share their opinion. … [These people] lose the appetite of staying [in Khartoum, and in the 
community]… when they’re tired.’529 State and non-state pressures in Khartoum, then, 
essentially encouraged southerners not to assimilate, but to conceal their difference in 
central public spaces, remain in peripheral areas of the city, and hide their intellectual, 
political, and cultural interests, to avoid the worst of public abuses.530 
 
 
Civilisation projects: community organisation against “de-culturation”, 1992-
1994 
 
This organised spatial, economic and social subjugation fuelled community organisation in 
Khartoum. The period from 1992 to 1994 is broadly explained by ex-residents as a period of 
“scaling up” in activity and activism in Khartoum, what Pero terms a “transition moment.”531 
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However, this community work was not framed as resistance specifically to Arabization or 
Islamization: popular discourse, in contemporary records and discussions in South Sudan, 
emphasises a fear of loss, a de-culturation rather than a cultural change. De-culturation is 
the (potentially academically counter-intuitive) term used by Duffield in 2002 for the 
‘attempt to ignore, dilute and ultimately suppress Southern cultural histories [in favour of] a 
bounded homogeneity that reflects Northern interests and dominance.’532 But this fear of 
loss was less based on state policies or elite Khartoum-region Sudanese societal pressures 
than on broader fears of their own “de-culturation” due to forgetting, adapted habits, new 
options for socialisation, and local coping mechanisms. Residents from the southern regions 
were well-aware that ‘something that stays in a place will be resembled to the 
environment.’533 Many men and women mentioned their own moments of political self-
consciousness at this time, ‘when… you realise, within the community, these are the 
disadvantages, you lose people, you lose home, nobody knows who [you] are.’534 By 1991 
and 1992, as the massive number of people who had arrived from 1986 to 1988 settled and 
established themselves in the city, managing and disciplining community “loss” and 
‘controlling our language and our culture’ became a priority for many within Khartoum 
“displaced” communities.535 
 
‘I saw some things in Darfur, when I was in Darfur. After I saw all these things, then 
I became a grown up person, then I really became a sound minded person… – and I 
began to realise the bad and the good.’536 
 
This fear of loss structured interviews with men and women in Aweil.537 The adaptations 
necessary in Khartoum meant that ‘since we left this area [Aweil] we were different 
people.’538 There were wider pressures post-flight: trauma, urbanisation, poverty, the 
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collapse of social ties and networks of mutual dependence, as well as socio-cultural mixing, 
particularly with the advent of international media in the 1990s. Forgetting words in your 
own language, picking up other tribal languages, as well as ‘when you learn the languages 
of the people who don’t respect you,’ would mean someone was “getting lost.”539 Children 
born or raised in Khartoum generally became practically monolingual in a creole of southern 
and Khartoum Arabic.540 Adults remember losing the ability to express complex ideas and 
emotions in their mother tongue.541 ‘Everything was mixed’: ‘what happened is even 
neighbours change our culture [sic]. The Dinka language [is] there, the Nuer language is 
there, all our cultures are there!’542  
 
The most obvious of these concerns (for the community and observers alike) was the rise in 
numbers of “street children” or “gangs”, a catch-all term for schoolchildren selling cigarettes 
to fund their education, pickpockets, homeless or destitute children, groups of youths in 
public spaces, and organised adult criminal activity.543 Some children became vagrant or 
self-sufficient on the streets due to the death, abandonment, destitution, or mental health 
and addiction problems of their parents or guardians.544 Poor, unmarried and un- or 
sporadically-employed young men increasingly looked to American black cultures to assert 
an internationalised sense of difference and feeling of power, particularly through the 
frequently-referenced “nigga gangs” of the late 1990s and early 2000s.545 Aside from these 
                                                
539 AD, 5 June 2013. 
540 Miller, Language change and national integration, p. 59. 
541 AMJ, 16 July 2013. 
542 DCS, 11 August 2013; DCD, 15 July 2013. 
543 DKLK, 21 August 2013; In court, DKLK said that these criminal groups were delineated as shamasha, 
small-scale pickpockets; blathajiiya or balathaga, big gangs of burglars, or assaba; and rabathiin, 
night gangs and drug smugglers. 
544 MMD, 17 August 2013; DKLK, 21 August 2013. See also Jubara and Tawolde, ‘Displaced Southerners 
in the Three Towns,’ Comboniani 6734.21.1/ 8167-8179/10. 
545 DCS, 11 August 2013. Many people emphasised that the name “nigga” (or Nigger, or Niggaz) gangs 
developed in the early 2000s, including – in Khartoum – groups called ‘West Coast’, ‘The Blacks’, 
‘Backstreet Boys’, ‘Cash/Catch Money’, and many others. This term, with various spellings, continues 
to be used to describe violent delinquency and immorality particularly among young men in South 
Sudan, but is often described as a post-Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005) phenomenon. See 
Cherry Leonardi, Deborah Isser, Leben Moro, and Martina Santschi, ‘The politics of customary law 
ascertainment in South Sudan’, The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 43:63 (2011), pp. 
58–60; Mareike Schomerus and Tim Allen, ‘Southern Sudan at odds with itself: Dynamics of conflict 
and predicaments of peace’ (London School of Economics, 2010), pp. 64–5; Katarzyna Grabska, ‘In-
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‘youth,’ who apparently suffered ‘alienation… extraction and abstraction from all… cultural 
roots,’ many people emphasised the negative impact of emotional breakdowns, financial 
stress, and the monetisation of relationships on their communities, as people became ‘tired’ 
and ‘lost appetite.’546 
 
However, these changes were not all seen as bad; viewed retrospectively from Aweil and 
Juba they were generally prosaically described as the “advantages and disadvantages” of 
Khartoum.547 Many people were positive about inter-tribal relationships, access to 
international news, and in their relationships with non-southern work colleagues.548 Most 
people’s discussions of Khartoum – including across gender, age and economic status in 
Aweil and Juba – demonstrated a core tension over these positive and negative impacts of 
modernity: for instance, between significant new economic opportunities for many, versus 
economic disempowerment (particularly of men); and over the changing social significance 
and moral weights of particular behaviours and skills, such as the capital gains offered 
through low-status, menial and subordinate work like brick-laying. 
 
While many of these discussions were about the practical challenges and social rebalancing 
required from these new circumstances, at their core they were fundamentally concerned 
with mitigating risks of individualisation from these new activities and options. Khartoum 
offered access to global cultures and – possibly – opportunities for onward movement and 
personal advancement that encouraged the pursuit of individual success and freedom at the 
potential expense of collective obligations and responsibilities to family and communities of 
various kinds. For most people who contributed to this study – including, for instance, 
ambitious young men who headed on to Cairo, and self-described gang members – 
                                                                                                                                                       
flux: (re) negotiations of gender, identity and ‘home’ in post-war Southern Sudan’ (University of 
Sussex thesis, 2010), p. 11. 
546 See Harragin and Chol, The Southern Sudan Vulnerability Study; also Luca Russo, ‘Crisis and food 
security profile: Sudan’, in Alinovi, Hemrich and Russo (eds.), Beyond relief, p. 20. Mental health 
problems were recorded in 1989 in El-Shazali Ibrahim, ‘War Displacement: the socio-cultural 
dimension’, p. 64; and also explained by LLAA, 3 June 2013. 
547 Chiefs’ meeting, 13 April 2013; Chiefs’ court meeting, 14 June 2015. 
548 RRL, 3 September 2013; anonymous woman, 3 September 2013; AAJD, 22 August 2013; DCD, 12 
August 2013; for instance, PCP’s boss in Khartoum changed P’s shift work to accommodate his 
volunteer teaching schedule. 
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freedom,549 as Hunter also observes, is not necessarily via individual autonomy, but a search 
for reciprocity, responsibility and security.550 
 
This was a highly gendered conversation over choice, agency, and responsibility, and gender 
relations were under significant strain anyway from a fundamental shift in economic and 
social balance in migration and civil war. The economic power shift towards women in 
migrant communities has been well-documented: in Khartoum, men had absconded, gone to 
fight or work on agricultural schemes, or were unable to find regular employment, and so 
most families depended on women's incomes, and often on women as heads of the 
household. This presented a serious challenge to male authority: ‘the women were free, 
because they were brewing the local brew, they’re working in Arab houses, and they are to 
be paid – they don’t even ask where the man is!’551 This was ‘difficult’ for men, with women 
finding more opportunities in housework and small trading.552 Ibrahim noted that men were 
deeply ambivalent over their wives obtaining ID cards for work.553 Alternative modes of 
legitimate marriage became prevalent, such as elopement and inter-marriage between 
Darfuri, Nubian, Beja and other eastern and southern broadly “black” residents, and 
between people of different religious backgrounds.554 Both older men and women, and 
younger men, found bridewealth a point of stress, as elopements, intermarriages, and 
marriages through pregnancy undermined older systems555 and in many cases created 
significant social tensions. People remembered internal conflicts across southern, Nuba and 
western populations over dances, fashions, sex, religion, gender norms, beautification and 
intermarriage. The definition of intermarriage varied between families: one woman’s family 
emphasised to her that she was ‘supposed to marry Dinka Ngok or Zande or Shilluk and 
other tribes of southern Sudan,’556 but that ‘even if [the parents] are not happy, they 
                                                
549 Or the more common southern Sudanese political aim of “self-determination”. 
550 Hunter, Political Thought and the Public Sphere, p. 13. 
551 Chiefs’ meeting, 20 August 2013; also AAD, 14 August 2013. See Ryle and Yai Kuol, Displaced 
southern Sudanese in northern Sudan, p. 40; for a more recent detailed discussion of changing 
gender roles, see Grabska, Gender, Home & Identity: The Nuer Repatriation to South Sudan (London, 
2014). 
552 AAD, 14 August 2013. 
553 AMJ, 16 July 2013; Ibrahim, ‘The conditions of the Southern Sudanese Women Migrants’, p. 252. 
554 Miller, Language change and national integration, pp. 53–4. 
555 MW, AD and AD, 13 July 2013; DKLK, 21 August 2013. 
556 AMJ, 16 July 2013. 
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[aren’t] able to stop’ a marriage in Khartoum. Some women remembered others killing 
themselves when families blocked marriages, including marriage to Darfuri and Nuba 
Mountains men.557 
 
Younger women were also blamed more generally by older men and many women for 
making money through sex work, for drinking, and for smoking cigarettes, as well as being 
seen as morally ambivalent for attending picnics and parties.558 Abortion and miscarriages 
were a concern of many men and women of all ages throughout interviews, highlighting 
concerns over the dangers of women’s labour, choice, and familial and moral 
responsibility.559 The tight wrap skirts adapted from the Zande from south-western Sudan, a 
group of women agreed, were believed to cause abortion: ‘for such people who know they 
are pregnant, and they are still adapting that system, [they intend] to make an abortion.’560 
Dress was more broadly a point of tension, primarily for older men and women: some new 
“customs” – including henna designs described as “Darfur style” – were very popular, as 
were tobs and other cheap and accessible fashion, such as kitenge fabrics from East Africa, 
and westernised suits and sportswear; morally and culturally dubious salons were 
increasingly established and run by young southern men and women. By the late 1990s, 
girls would wear trousers and “don’t-sit” skirts, and a few dressed in American-style 
basketball or rap culture clothing – ‘we were pretending like a man!’561 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
557 Ibid. 
558 AAD 14 August 2013; AMJ, 16 July 2013; AND, 29 June 2013; MTL, 11 July 2013. 
559 Many people euphemistically used the term “miscarriage” when discussing abortions in Khartoum. See 
Joyce Kinaro, Tag Elsir Mohamed Ali, Rhonda Schlangen, and Jessica Mack, ‘Unsafe abortion and 
abortion care in Khartoum, Sudan’, Reproductive Health Matters, 17:34 (November 2009), pp. 71–77; 
Jok Madut Jok, ‘Militarism, gender and reproductive suffering: The case of abortion in Western Dinka’, 
Africa, 69:02 (1999), pp. 194–212; Sharon Elaine Hutchinson, Jok Madut Jok, and R. Werbner, 
‘Gendered violence and the militarization of ethnicity’, Postcolonial subjectivities in Africa (2002), pp. 
84–108. 
560 AMJ, 16 July 2013. 
561 Ibid. “Don’t sit” skirts, in common South Sudanese English, are skirts that are too short or tight to sit 
without risking exposure. 
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Figure 4: Youth in Khartoum 
Angelina (front left, crouching), with three male and one female friend (back left, standing), 
c. late 1990s. Photograph provided by Angelina and reproduced with permission. 
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Women’s memories of Khartoum are noticeably different to men’s. Social problems in 
Khartoum were, for many women, ‘administrative issues’: if women worked in brewing or 
domestic service, some women said, men complained that they were really engaging in sex 
work. Men in Khartoum, apparently, ‘cannot decide properly’ about women’s roles.562 
Women, conversely, emphasised their freedoms in Khartoum to ‘go anywhere’, for instance 
to theatres and picnics, with many young married or single-parent women in rural areas of 
Aweil emphasising their desire to return.563 One woman, widowed early in the war, 
explained her ability to refuse re-marriage in Khartoum: 
 
‘Khalas! [Laughs] Khalas intaa!564 [I was] really finished with marriage.’565 
 
 
Assimilation, resistance and self-expression 
 
With a broader Sudanese panic over women’s roles and rights in Sudanese society, 
particularly since the economic crisis in the 1970s undermined the dominance of men in the 
economy, these attempts to shame and control women’s behaviour could be portrayed as 
the appropriation of both policing women’s bodies and morality, and the adoption of 
northern Sudanese cultural practices (such as henna and wearing the tob) as social 
assimilation to the hegemony of dominant northern cultures. This is likely partly true, and 
maybe demonstrated by a common claim to superior social morality and class among 
returned residents of Khartoum across South Sudan. 
 
But this was not just a case of patriarchal and elderly forces clamping down on rebellious 
youth and cultural decay. Residents struggled to articulate the differences between 
necessity, obligation and personal choice in cultural adoptions of northern practices, as 
Abusharaf observed in her anthropological study of displaced southern women in Khartoum 
                                                
562 AAD, 14 August 2013; many conversations with women in Apada. 
563 R, 3 September 2013; AND, and other women, 29 June 2013. 
564 Lit. “Enough! (Completely) enough!” 
565 AND, 29 June 2013. 
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in the 2000s.566 But these struggles were not necessarily a case of negotiating specifically 
northern assimilation versus southern ethno-cultural resistance. Things like the use of henna 
and wearing tobs were both partly dominant Sudanese cultural adoptions and also part of a 
wider cultural expansion and exploration – of north-east African, eastern African, pan-African 
and global black cultures, music, dress and other self-expressions. 
 
A key demonstration of this agglomeration of global and local beauty standards was the 
controversial practice of skin whitening which became common in the early 2000s.567 
Bleaching and lightening dark skin was both a localised part of the racial politics of 
Khartoum’s society, and a global racial-political issue. One young woman explained that its 
users ‘think that you will look good [and] become a light skinned person… it is really bad, 
even some people rejected it,’ including other young women.568 For many people of all ages, 
‘those girls who have chemicalised themselves to be brown [sic]’ were ‘cases of despair'569 – 
although several men and women of various ages said they had tried it, often with 
ambivalence: 
 
‘When they see the ladies, the girls of Arabs, are moving, they are so red, and that is 
why maybe they thought that if you change your colour, you will be loved by your 
boyfriend; so this is how they adapt, they want to change the colour. So changing 
the colour is changing the culture! Because the colour is part of our culture. … I think 
this is one of the cultures in East Africa. You know, even men are doing it.’570 
 
As Pierre notes, it is important to put skin bleaching into global as well as local histories of 
racialisation:571 this practice is not just an aspiration to a lighter-skinned, potentially non-
southern, ideal Sudanese (and potentially more “Arab”) skin tone, but a response to a 
                                                
566 Abusharaf, Transforming displaced women in Sudan. 
567 While there is increasing international anthropological scholarship on the practice of skin bleaching, 
there is little written on Sudan or South Sudan. See Caroline Faria, ‘Styling the nation: fear and desire 
in the South Sudanese beauty trade’, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 39:2 (April 
2014), pp. 318–330. 
568 AMJ, 16 July 2013. 
569 DAA, 13 July 2013; DKLK, 4 July 2013. 
570 DCS, 11 August 2013. 
571 Jemima Pierre, ‘“I Like Your Colour!” skin bleaching and geographies of race in urban Ghana’, Feminist 
Review, 90:1 (2008), p. 12. 
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complex combination of local, Sudanese and international cultural hegemonies, and global 
white supremacy. 
 
These “positives and negatives” were more a form of global and local creolisation than 
deculturation or appropriation, implying more entangled and on-going processes of personal 
agency and broader obligation rather than more static and direct loss or imposition, as 
James observes of “assimilation”: ‘the people themselves appropriate and modify, and they 
respond intellectually, emotionally and politically to some extent within the terms of 
reference offered them.’572 These terms of reference were broad, and the learned ability to 
navigate multiple international cultures of modernity, asserting Sudanese-ness and 
southern-ness while also demonstrating global multiculturalism, was a source of pride to 
many ex-Khartoum residents in Aweil and Juba. Asserting Sudanese-ness, through dress, 
social life and Khartoum’s own Arabic slang, was an explicit appropriation by many, from 
older men asserting elder status to younger and often single-parenting and working 
women.573 
 
                                                
572 James, The listening ebony, p. 3. 
573 Conversations with women in Apada; AMJ, 16 July 2013; AND, 29 June 2013; JG, 30 June 2013. 
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Figure 5: “African women” 
Angelina (left) and friend (from Darfur), dressed in trouser suits, c. late 1990s. Photograph 
provided by Angelina and reproduced with permission. 
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Much like Siri Lamoureaux’s surprise to find classical Arabic poetry exchanged by Nuba 
students in Khartoum – what she described as a Bourdieu-like reproduction of social 
inequality574 - “Arab-Islamic” elite tools and status markers (and what some non-southern 
residents argued was not theirs to wear or employ) were in use to challenge marginalisation 
and social inequality, assert a broader idea of inclusive “Sudanese” citizenship, and 
challenge the exclusion of “southern” residents from Sudanese political and social self-
conceptions, as one young man observed: 
 
‘Whenever you put that jellabiya, …then they will tell you no, this is not your 
dressing. Southerners dress in trousers. … [But] we [want to] wear jellabiya as a 
Sudanese, as Sudanese dressing, but not to [be] Arabs.’575 
 
This demonstration of plural cultural powers could arguably be seen as a direct rebuttal of 
the mono-cultural elitism of upper-class Khartoum, and potentially also of the patrimonial 
ethnic patriotism of some parents and community members.576 Many young women now 
resident in Aweil were continuing discussions and practices, started in Khartoum, about Afro 
hair care and styling, Darfur styles of henna painting, and Chinese-made tight western t-
shirts from the town market, a conscious balance of practical and aesthetic choices, cultural 
and political assertions of knowledge, individualism and experience, and the negotiation of 
social judgement.577 
 
In this context, then – against a background of systemic public abuses and risks, economic 
and intellectual subjugation, and opportunities for cultural innovation – many, particularly 
older residents, felt that ‘we were going to forget the Dinka dignity. We were about to forget 
it.’578 Life in Khartoum was not only punitive and often socially degrading, but fundamentally 
time-consuming, working in what Comaroff calls ‘the “shadow” of the global system’ just to 
                                                
574 Siri Lamoureaux, ‘Message in a mobile,’ pp. 104–105. 
575 JG, 19 July 2013. 
576 This is not specific to southern Sudanese communities in Khartoum, as Lamoureaux’s thesis 
demonstrates. 
577 Having grappled with this challenging cosmopolitan array of socio-political statements is likely the 
source of some ex-Khartoum residents’ sense of exceptionalism, and sometimes also a sense of 
superior morality, skill and experience, back in South Sudan. 
578 DAA, 13 July 2013; also AMJ, 16 July 2013. 
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make life possible.579 Commuting, home-building, negotiating rent, living space, land rights, 
marriages, deaths and burials, healthcare, communications, births and childcare were both 
exhausting and highly politicised in Khartoum. 
 
Of primary concern was a loss of mutual respect, and a loss of social education, through the 
dissolving of family ties and new opportunities for creolisation, as one older man and part-
time teacher explained:580 
 
‘When they come back to their grandmothers, who don’t know this foreign 
languages, and [call them] habooba [grandmother in Arabic].581 They will not 
understand, they will think [it’s an] insult! [They would say] why [don’t you] 
separate, if you are educated in English! When it is necessary, you want to speak in 
English – you speak English! Pure English, with those who want to understand. But 
when you come back to your family, don’t make it as a class for your mother, for 
your father, and then you start pouring some foreign languages to them, they will 
not understand. … That is why we are advising our young men, our young people, 
that [you] have [the] right to assess all the other languages. But when [it’s] time to 
come back to your house: you have to speak with your people in your language. Let 
the young ones learn from you! Don’t let them lose their ways, don’t let them lose 
their culture, through you. Like… these niggas, eh? That is why we were trying to 
control our – our tribe; our people; in order that to maintain our culture, that was the 
final thing.’582 
 
This concern over deculturation, acculturation and re-culturation was articulated through 
these discussions and clashes over individualism, masculinity, women’s sexual and social 
freedom, and the limits to broadening cultural repertoires, particularly from the early 1990s. 
The focus of this “advice”, as the teacher quoted above called it, was not ultimately on 
specific problematic actions, innovations or ideas; these were flashpoints and tools in a 
discussion essentially about what James calls ‘moral knowledge’: the ability to make good 
and informed choices, and thus what constituted the right information and moral basis for 
these choices.583 
                                                
579 Jesse Weaver Shipley, Achille Mbembe, and Jean Comaroff, ‘Africa in theory: A conversation between 
Jean Comaroff and Achille Mbembe’, Anthropological Quarterly, 83:3 (2010), p. 659. 
580 The same concerns are noted in the colonial Zambian vernacular press by Englund, ‘Anti Anti-
Colonialism’, p. 240; and in Tanzania, by Hunter, ‘Dutiful Subjects, Patriotic Citizens.’ 
581 Sudanese Arabic for grandmother. 
582 DCS, 11 August 2013. 
583 James, The listening ebony, p. 3. 
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Social control 
 
This “good” knowledge was negotiated through community projects of discipline and cultural 
entrepreneurship, particularly from around 1991 onwards. Many people discussed the broad 
attempts to “control” friends, family and community in Khartoum from this period: ‘we 
discuss[ed] so many things… we keep on advising people [to be] careful when roaming 
around in the city,’ and many men emphasised the need for a ‘very strict living.’584 This 
organisation was framed by locals as civic and moral education and (self) control, in the face 
of dislocation and urbanisation. 
 
The most visible and discussed forms of this collective attempt to control, resist and advise 
in the peripheral areas of Khartoum were (and are) what are commonly called “traditional 
chiefs’ courts” and local groups of young men often termed “nigga gangs.” Maybe counter-
intuitively, many among both groups were working to the same ends: they were engaged, 
and often allies, in explicit community policing on ethnic and gendered lines.585 As recent 
research has argued of traditional authority in South Sudan, chiefs in Khartoum were 
mediators between their communities and external powers, particularly through negotiating 
or making payments to release women arrested for brewing.586 In establishing government-
recognised alternative court systems, leaders could organise the resolution of local small-
scale legal cases outside of government courts (though robbery and murder ‘belong[ed] to 
the government’).587 Chiefs who knew Arabic could ‘rescue people’ more effectively, working 
with the local police partly in collaboration but also to stymie them.588 Similarly, Khartoum 
gang members’ primary interest was ‘to defend ourselves’ through complex affiliations: 
 
                                                
584 DAA, 13 July 2013; MTL, 11 July 2013; DKLK, 21 August 2013; MTL, 11 July 2013. 
585 Magnusson points out that urban control by gangs and militias is a kind of order in itself; this 
approach does not necessarily separate ‘anomic’ or ‘immoral’ policing activities from those more 
generally considered ‘cultural’ or ‘traditional’, such as chiefs’ courts. Magnusson, Politics of Urbanism, 
pp. 12–3. 
586 AAY, 11 July 2013; MDM, 5 June 2013; LAM, 8 June 2013; see Cherry Leonardi, ‘Violence, Sacrifice 
and Chiefship in Central Equatoria, Southern Sudan’, Africa, 77:04 (November 2007), pp. 535–558; 
Leonardi, Isser, Moro, and Santschi, ‘The politics of customary law ascertainment in South Sudan.’ 
587 MDM, 5 June 2013; NAJ, 8 June 2013; LAM, 8 June 2013. 
588 LAM, 5 June 2013; for examples of this in Bor, see Tuttle, ‘Life is Prickly’, pp. 43, 49. 
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‘Our group was powerful because it included those who served national service, the 
educated class of people, and [other] physically strong people…  [and you know that] 
police cannot afford to come and arrest a person [who has served national service or 
is in the army], because they are soldiers, and that is police – so police cannot arrest 
[them]. … after something is heard over the whole of Khartoum, it brings a lot of 
people from that group, different groups of gangs, to come and investigate why their 
colleague was arrested. … the Dinka chiefs in Khartoum – you know, they were not 
happy [with] our group, [but] they like only that protection we made.’589 
 
This self-policing was generally tolerated in remote areas by local state authorities because 
 
‘…they are taking care of their brothers. You see, if they do something wrong, they 
will not do it to an Arab. The government is not worried for them, because as long as 
they are working, they are working on their southerners. Even if they do it wrong, 
they do it to their people, because they have been isolated.’590 
 
These men were primarily concerned about internal community affairs and social 
responsibility. As with Pratten’s recent research on youth associations in Nigeria, both young 
and old men in southern communities in Khartoum were ‘resisting disorder’: ‘in this sense, 
they may come across as innovative and transforming yet conservative at the same time.’591 
Both courts and gangs reflected the complex racial and ethnic dynamics of their 
neighbourhoods, with individual ethnic courts collaborating formally and informally, for 
instance the Ashan Kom court, established in 1989 for Dinka Malwal, Nuer and Shilluk in one 
area, with local sub-committees formed including Nuba, Baggara and Darfuri members.592 
While many chiefs criticised “the niggas” in Khartoum, they distinguished criminal 
associations from youth gangs: one sub-chief said that ‘the youth… are responsible people, 
that we give orders [to], and they go and practice them. So they are right [haq].’593 For one 
ex-gang member, ‘the youth were aiming to guide themselves against problems that will 
aggress them. … It was youth liberation.’594 One man noted that some chiefs ‘[selected] 
                                                
589 JG, 30 June 2013; the impunity of security forces is noted in Rone, Behind the red line, pp. 4–5. 
590 DKLK, 21 August 2013. 
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some youth to protect - to monitor the situation at night,’ and local gangs were expanded or 
incorporated into neighbourhood militias when camp relocations were imminent.595 
 
Primarily, though, these groups’ work centred on the control of women and marriage, or in 
one chief's words, ‘wrong weddings and committing adultery.’ Gangs were formed partly ‘to 
monitor the situation of the girls… that is why we created this gang, in order to liberate our 
girls from Arabs, because they [the girls] reject us.’596 The majority of traditional court cases 
in Khartoum were about rape, adultery and problems with bridewealth.597 Some men 
specialised in negotiating bridewealth and marriages among their own sub-clans and village 
members in Khartoum.598 The ideal arrangement was part-payment: 
 
‘it was acceptable to pay money, as a dowry in Khartoum, but not all of the money… 
you promise to pay cows when you come back to South. … It was told that a person 
must have to pay an amount that is equivalent to thirteen cows, and the rest of the 
cows will be completed in the South as a promise. …people come always from the 
South, and they are the ones to express the rate of change of cows in the auction 
here. Then people must have to see which price is good for them.’599 
 
The cow-equivalent deposit varied, with most families unable to pay anything more than 
sacks of sorghum at the time: this was a source of frustration to many men and women, but 
also entrenched the expectation of return.600 Some customs were adapted from local 
migrant communities, such as western and eastern Sudanese-style wedding convoys and 
large gifts of sugar, oil and household goods, which fitted the urban context, but other ideas 
were far less welcome: many bemoaned the rates of divorce in the city.601 The Tueny Youth 
Society’s brief in 1992 focused on encouraging young women to go to school, stay at home 
or in Dinka spaces, and ‘get married from our people.’602 Girls who were ‘not steady at 
home’ were forced into marriages so that ‘the man will take the responsibility of the girl.’603 
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Some women worked as matchmakers, with some positive results,604 but much of this 
‘relationship policing’ was controlled by men.605 This was made difficult by women’s access 
to alternative sources of finance, widespread poverty, and the limitations of the “alternative” 
cash bridewealth system in Khartoum.606 Groups of young men, unable to financially 
compete for bridewealth in Khartoum, instead ‘used to separate the girls… whenever [we] 
see that the girl is walking with [an] Arab boyfriend’: 
 
‘They rejected their black people, because they are poor, and they like the Arab 
north[erners] because they are rich. … when we see that a girl [wanted] a good 
dress and a phone, and we have money, we have to buy something and give [it to] 
her, in order to [make her] stay at home. … If you are Dinka, without knowledge of 
[the] Arabic language, you will not be considered as [an] important person. … We 
know that they wanted to adapt the Arab customs, and we don’t like that, we need 
to attract them towards us – such that we stay together, conversing together, 
because we are one. … After the Arabs saw that we have formed our group, the Arab 
youth also tried to form their group in order to control their girls.’607 
 
These men sound like Peterson's patriarchal ethno-nationalists, but their work emphasises 
negotiation as much as ethno-traditionalist “resistance,” including, for example, approving 
elopements within families and communities: the locally-produced book by an early 2000s 
literacy group called The Dinka Customology of Marriage emphasised, ‘don’t force girls to be 
married to people they don’t want.’608 This was not as straightforward as ‘language and 
dress [being] used clearly as signs of resistance, insisting to talk one’s language and 
refusing to assimilate into the “Arab/Islamic” culture,’ as Taha puts it.609 
 
Responses to policies of erasure and marginalisation, and the more extensive pressures of 
urban cultural change, were clearly wider than a choice between passivity or resistance. 
Explaining southern community activism in Khartoum as conservative "resistance" does not 
answer what this resistance was for. As Fletcher argues, 
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‘We know what freedom is freedom from: “inequality”, “exploitation” and 
“oppression,” variously defined. But what does freedom realize? How does one know 
when one has achieved it?610 
 
The same questions were posed by southern Sudanese writers in Khartoum themselves: 
‘how shall we give… freedom?’611 This centred on a tension over ideas of the limits to the 
effects of personal change on moral integrity and community values. While some people, 
both men and women, said that new urban socialisations were fundamental and irreversible 
- ‘when something like rain falls down you cannot collect it again’612 - others argued that 
‘this is a world that can be worn and taken off.’613 As both men and women emphasised, 
what mattered was proving continued moral integrity, mutual understanding, and most 
particularly a sense of self-awareness in political context. This maintenance of internal moral 
strength was, many argued, a way of avoiding compromising too much; the community 
discussions and activities of the early 1990s onwards were focused on what acts of defiance, 
self-preservation and endurance constituted and proved this. 
 
Social work 
 
This was the basis for the long list of organisational, educational and community-building 
projects that started in around 1991 to 1994. As both men and women became ‘sad… they 
discussed how to [deal with] it.’614 These were projects rooted in civic education and moral 
community-building, using a broader understanding of “literacy” in the Gramscian and 
Freirian emancipatory mould, of reading clubs, discussion groups, and mutual adult 
education.615 Associations were based on interlinked ideas of education, political thought, 
moral support, cultural entertainment, record-keeping and social space, with people holding 
multiple memberships. These projects were myriad – in meetings across Aweil Centre, North 
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and West counties, and in Juba, people described too many different organisations to be 
detailed here. Nikkel recognised this plethora of activities in 1994, when he noted that the 
enthusiasm for ideas of “psycho-social activities” for ‘IDPs’ among NGOs was overshadowed 
by ‘the most dynamic systems… which refugees themselves create and sustain.’616 These 
organisations appear to be ethnically based and Christian-oriented, but their affiliations and 
intent are more complicated. 
 
The vernacular language schools, curricula, adult education classes, cultural societies, clan, 
ethnic, and ethno-regional associations, religious groups, theatre and dance companies, 
writing groups, musical troupes and neighbourhood gangs were all on the spectrum of what 
Peterson describes as pedagogical cultural work.617 This was rooted in established societal 
practices for coping with urbanisation in Sudan, for instance the widespread take-up of 
sanduk mutual savings schemes, particularly among groups of southern and eastern women, 
and the continuation and proliferation of ethnic and local associations based on towns, 
payams or villages of origin.618 However, beyond the practicalities of these organisations in 
providing collective funding or basic social security for funeral costs, for instance, their aims 
were remembered as a constant assertion of the temporary nature of people's situation: ‘we 
are people who fled war, this is not our land, and we must keep [our] culture until we go 
back.’619 
  
                                                
616 Dr Marc Nikkel, circular letter, Nairobi, 15 April 1994, SAD.105/91/3. 
617 Peterson, Ethnic Patriotism and the East African Revival, pp. 25–26; see also Peterson, Creative 
writing. 
618 I encountered three groups of women running mutual savings schemes in Aweil. See David Pratten, 
Return to the roots?, p. 11; sanduk saving schemes are also mentioned by Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf, 
Life in Khartoum: probing forced migration and cultural change among war-displaced southern 
Sudanese women (Cambridge, Mass., 2004), p. 19. 
619 See accounts of AAD, 14 August 2013; MTL, 10 July 2013; MDWR, 21 August 2013; LCL, 13 July 
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Wek abii ben we puol guop,  You will come safely, 
Wek mith panda   You children of our country 
Wek abii dhuk wek puol guop, You will go back safely, 
Wek mith panda   You children of our country 
Wek abii reel wek puol guop, You will stay safely, 
Wek mith panda   You children of our country. 
 
Ma aca col Ajong Wieu aca col, My mother called me, Ajong Wieu has called me 
Ku wa Deng aya aca col,  And my father Deng also called me, 
Ye wetda piny   Listen to what we say 
 
Meth apath bii weet yic lueel, Child, it is good to say the right [yic], 
Meth baai pandan   Child of your country 
 
Aa atak apuou,   I am deciding in my heart, 
Aen atak aa nhom,   I am deciding in my mind, 
Pandan Aweil ba puony  To sing about Aweil, my country 
Pandan Wau ba puony.  To sing about Wau, my country. 
 
 
Atak Deng Deng, “You will come home safe, our children”, c. 1991, Khartoum. Translated 
with the artist, 2013. 
 
 
 
This work ‘start[ed] at home,’ with both men and women widely involved in maintaining 
vernacular languages among their children, as well as being personally involved in dance 
groups, church associations, youth groups and adult literacy classes.620 Sommers wrote in 
2005 that ‘the sacrifices that Southern Sudanese have routinely made to provide or attain 
education, often under conditions of considerable deprivation and duress, are so remarkable 
that they are difficult to adequately express.’621 This was not unique to Khartoum: self-help 
schools in extremis are common in records of southern refugee populations from southern 
Sudan across east and central Africa and Egypt, for example an ex-Khartoum University 
                                                
620 DCD, 15 July 2013; AMJ, 16 July 2013; AA, chiefs’ meeting, 13 April 2013; also see ‘Candle-Ends 
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student running a self-help refugee school at Niangara in Congo-Kinshasa in the mid to late 
1960s.622 As Taha has noted, this education was not primarily about finding jobs: 
 
education amongst the displaced is perceived as an essential component to becoming 
“street wise”… people who understand the written word become more oriented and 
confident in their dealings with officialdom. Night schools, to which the older youth 
go, are a centre for the discussion of politics, the discussions act as eye-openers.623 
 
Khartoum had long been a focus for various ideas of intellectualism and literacy in Sudan. 
Formal education in government-run schools had always been for a tiny minority, and this 
continued in the 1990s: by 1991, thirty five government “IDP” primary schools catered for 
just over 19,000 southern students.624 However, as formal education was degraded across 
Sudan under the Bashir regime from 1991, these government “southern schools” were 
closed down by 1994, with only three self-help secondary schools surviving by 2000.625 This 
closing of state space encouraged the growth of older institutions that became central to 
community organisation, such as the evolving collectives called the “Dinka Congregation” 
and “Nuer Congregation” in the Catholic church, with their roots in the 1970s.626 The 
alternative schools – self-help, private, Islamic, or Christian – were ‘parallel education 
systems existing for the same population and in the same location,’ and were ‘surprisingly 
widespread and well-organised,’ and part-recognised or broadly tolerated by local 
authorities.627 While church-sponsored schools were common, they were run primarily by 
southern and western local residents, ‘who speak the students’ own language’ and directly 
recruited their pupils, and the  NGOs’ “multipurpose centres” – rakubas, basic shelters, used 
for schools, meetings, and leisure – were generally built by locals.628 Educational work was 
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organised partly by priests, such as Father Edward Brady, who founded the influential 
Christian Leadership course, but initiatives like the late-night one-to-one teaching at 
Comboni Playground were sanctioned rather than led or controlled by the churches.629 
Sommers claimed that these systems were ‘atomised,’ segregating the population along lines 
of ethnic origin, language, religion and politics;630 however, many people remembered highly 
mixed classes of southern and Nuba populations, with some Darfuri classmates, with 
fluctuating or poor finances a primary determinant of parental or personal choices.631 
 
These associations and their educational projects were most commonly based in churches, 
schools and land owned by churches in Khartoum. This primacy of church space and 
assistance in southern accounts of Khartoum organisation has generally been seen as 
further evidence of a longstanding and essential religio-political feeling of “Southern 
Christian” difference. Since the 1940s, church representatives, observers and government 
officials have all noted, celebrated or condemned Christian “expansion,” as either organic 
conversion to faith, or as a political demonstration of opposition to northern regimes.632 This 
“resistance” narrative was reinforced by the Sudanese Catholic church in the 1980s and 
1990s via educational programmes, orphanage projects and political pressure to recognise 
Sundays.633 However, people’s explanations of the role of the church in Khartoum focus 
more on space. Throughout the twentieth century, conversion to Christianity was a means of 
gaining access to alternative spaces and opportunities across the region. This use of 
Christian safe space and financing was fundamental to southern communities by the 1990s 
partly because of previous migrant generations’ reliance on Christian institutions in 
Khartoum for accommodation, local information in the vernacular, education, job 
opportunities and funding: catechists from all southern communities were crucial in 
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organising arrivals in the late 1980s.634 The pressures of Khartoum’s political geography 
made these spaces more valuable. ‘International security’, as one man put it, was available 
in the Catholic Church-run Comboni Ground in the centre of Khartoum; various other 
denominations also provided space for cultural and teaching activities in the urban 
peripheries, and local communities established their own self-run church spaces in the 
suburbs.635 
 
A focus on “southern Christian conversion” also ignores the plurality of spiritual and social 
beliefs, and the frequent acceptance of Muslim converts in southern families and 
communities. Personal conversion to Islam was not necessarily contentious, even within 
families.636 Conversion ‘is like freedom to a person… for the people who convert themselves 
into Islam… they are not Arab.'637 Most people divided Muslim converts in the community 
into those who ‘joined’ because of jobs, or because of belief.638 What are generally called 
“traditional beliefs” were apparently – in these retrospective accounts – less visible, and 
allegedly less popular, due to a combination of the urban context, formal education, and 
their anachronism to younger generations, and were generally talked about with a sense of 
embarrassment or comedy in interviews (if at all):639 yet many men and women reported 
the presence in Khartoum of, for instance, several Dinka spearmasters, a Shilluk royal healer 
in Fitihaab, a plethora of fortune tellers and witchdoctors, and the common experience of 
possession by spirits.640 Many of these people also attended church, as ‘we know that the 
spearmasters and the church leaders perform the same thing.’641 Witchcraft and possession, 
as ever, reflected the stressors of society: witches created illnesses as a ‘matter of jealousy’, 
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particularly against other women’s children who were performing well at school.642 People 
often relied on traditional medicines and witchdoctors, including across ethnic lines, for 
medical care, particularly after attempting courses of antibiotics.643 One man explained that 
he was bewitched in 1985 while in Khartoum and fell ill with a mystery illness that could not 
be cured by modern or traditional medicine, probably because of his financial success as a 
bricklayer; he was cured eventually in 2000 by the Full Gospel Church, in which he became a 
pastor.644 As ever, though, this was not a society-wide phenomenon: 
 
‘[Laughs] in Khartoum – [we] were internal [sic] displaced people by the war, and 
everybody was busy looking for where to get food, and you cannot stand and shiver 
yourself that you have a spirit! Then you will not get food! [Laughs]’645 
 
All this complicates the idea of a mass Christian conversion among southerners in Khartoum 
in this period. Church spaces were not straightforward sites for conversion and top down 
preaching, but were described as forums of debate, including inter-religious discussions.646 
Aside from encouraging attendance and education, most men said that the international 
clergy ‘[didn’t] know’ about political activism in church spaces.647 Disputes with Catholic 
policies were frequent: the archbishop Gabriel Zubeir Wako walked a fine line, criticising the 
SPLA and attempting – controversially – to replace separate vernacular services with cross-
community Arabic language programmes.648 Catholic church authorities were criticised by 
one literacy association for underrating and undermining community leadership skills.649 
Similarly, nominally “tribal” organisations  generally disguised a more complex system of 
local, regional and specific ethnic, clan and village affiliations: for example, for one man 
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from Aweil, ‘we have unions; we have associations; we have societies… like myself, in Marial 
Bai [village area in Bahr el Ghazal], we have Ayat [Youth] Association,’ then the ‘Tueny 
Youth Charitable Society,’ then ‘the Ayat Sons Areas Association’ as a subsection, with ‘most 
of Tueny area [living] in Arkawit, [in] Gereif West.’650 Similar associations from across Sudan 
operated in the same space. Hai Baraka and Comboni Ground were apparently extremely 
busy on Sundays with a mix of people from ‘every south’, for dances, football and 
conversation.651 Continuing links to these ethnic associations’ regions created Khartoum 
echoes of ‘village’ events, such as counterpart funeral ceremonies for those dying in the 
south and vice versa.652 
 
Recalling Khartoum life in retrospect from Aweil, a few key groups came up repeatedly in 
conversation. Church groups were the most common for women and men: St Vincent de 
Paul, the Catholic social and benevolent organisation many people had connections to or 
relied on financially, was officially dissolved in 1994 but continued to operate informally, 
partly because there was nowhere else to rehouse the 150 homeless children it was looking 
after.653 Technically a prayer group and a cultural and mutual support church association, St 
Paul’s Community partly grew out of the decline of St Vincent de Paul, and was a church-
based attempt to create a more pan-ethnic organisation, with sub-communities of Nuer, 
Shilluk and Dinka.654 There were many other versions of St Paul’s Community across 
Khartoum, and while there were tensions between churches - particularly with emerging 
new Pentecostals in the late 1990s. Most encouraged youth groups, drama associations, an 
“Olympics” for basketball and football between church clubs, and ceremonial parades at 
Christmas and Easter.655 More importantly for many, though, was the sprawling “ethnic 
association” of ‘Dinka Culture,’ Akut Jieng – a composite of various Catholic church-based 
aspects of what the church itself termed the Dinka Congregation, and which had Nuer and 
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Bari equivalents.656 The confusion of associations under this umbrella were summarised by 
one member: 
 
‘The Dinka Congregation was divided into politicians, the Kuei Group [see Chapters 4 
and 5], and Morwel Ater Morwel [see Chapter 4], and those of [the] Dinka language 
pattern, and there are also religious leaders, [all] within the Dinka Cultural Society.’657 
 
Among this, an association called Dinka Leadership was established early in the 1980s, and 
became the “Dinka Cultural Society” around 1997.658 The Dinka Cultural Society, another 
result of organisation and financial support through Catholic church space, was primarily 
focused on the development of the Dinka written language, encouraged by the introduction 
of a new orthography and Catholic funding of a re-translation of the bible into many 
southern languages from the early 1990s.659 This educational focus was matched by non-
church-based associations, such as the Equatoria Union and the Aweil Youth Union, the 
latter  established during the period of Sadiq al-Mahdi’s government as an educational 
association; it was allowed to continue its activities legitimately under the Bashir regime due 
to support from government officials who were themselves from Aweil.660 The Union 
included men, women and those not in education, as well as secondary school and 
university students, and it held parties as well as formal discussions.661 
 
All of these organisations placed specific emphasis on vernacular languages.662 Language 
has always been a site of struggle in Sudan.663 Supported by various Catholic foundations for 
education, such as SOLO and the Summer Institute for Linguistics, written literacy training 
was extended from 1994, growing from seven to over forty nine centres by 1997, with the 
top-performing candidate (and their county in the south) feted after competitive exams.664 
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‘People… categorised themselves’ according to sources of funding, spaces, and connections, 
with the Shilluk teaching in Moguren in Khartoum, Nuer language schools being run by 
Catholic groups, and Zande often being taught via the Seventh Day Adventists.665 Even 
members of the Fur communities in Khartoum organised vernacular teaching, as well as 
smaller western and Nuba groups: ‘every different black tribe… including Funj themselves 
were there.’666 In 1992, Miller noted that the maintenance of vernacular languages and 
multilingualism, especially among young people born in urban areas, ‘cannot be explained by 
their rural origin’: ‘this relatively high percentage of Southerners learning and speaking other 
vernaculars seems to challenge the assumption of the recession of vernaculars.'667 
 
One teacher's explanation for the importance of vernacular education in this period 
demonstrates the complex ideas of the benefits of pan-southern, pan-black integration, 
while also maintaining self-knowledge of personal and political origins and emphasising a 
moral system that values blackness and racial integrity:  
 
‘maybe the mother is not from Dinka; …Shilluk learn Dinka and Dinka learn Shilluk 
and Shilluk learn Nuer, and Nuba even… – we want our children not to lose their 
culture; not to lose themselves; [otherwise later] they will forget, claiming that – I 
heard before that my grandfather is from Dinka but now I’m from [X]. There are 
those who are denying themselves! …We don’t want a child to deny [their mother]! 
Because of economics, or because of poverty or because of being ashamed …or 
[because] their colour is black.’668 
 
This work was not confined within “ethnic groups”, and was not the preserve of a few 
‘educated’ or ‘traditional’ elites in the community. This final part of this chapter discusses 
those organising and participating in this community work, people who were explicitly “not 
lost” from their communities, and were engaged in articulating to others both the 
constitution of these communities, and how not to get lost from them. This focus on 
authorship and individual action in Khartoum is in line with the general search for agency in 
African history, which has lately focused on smaller and smaller “collectives” for study, down 
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to the familial and individual.669 Primarily, this individualist focus has looked at the mostly 
male ‘professional ethnic spokespersons’ criticised roundly by Amit-Talai as ‘regular players 
in an on-going if somewhat inchoate circuit of public exercises in ethnic minority 
consultation and representation,’ where ‘reappearing faces, recurring names, [and] repeated 
motifs’ create a representational ‘circuit’.670 This is somewhat true of the heavily 
“representational” history of state-building in South Sudan: the decentralisation and 
extension of state authority since the 1920s has focused on the creation or assertion of 
representatives, particularly in an ethnic mould, and continues in the idea of chiefly (and, 
maybe only a little more broadly, “local civil society”) representation in national negotiations 
of the shape of the South Sudanese state today. Delineating “popular intellectuals” has been 
a long-running game in South Sudanese politics: the necessary qualifications, position, and 
values of this ‘educated Southerner’ have been locally debated throughout the last 
century.671 Recent scholarly attention on these “intermediaries” across eastern Africa has 
broadly looked at the brokerage powers of chiefs, clerks, police, interpreters, and guides, 
and one could add teachers, “students” of all stripes, and church workers – including altar 
boys, youth leaders and choir masters.672 
 
But in Khartoum, these local organisers were not generally focused on “representing” the 
south in the same way as the minority of southern political elites from the 1960s onwards. 
This is articulated most explicitly by a (potentially self-deluding, but still notable) comment 
by a student on a scholarship to Wisconsin: 
 
‘…It is not my ambition to go as far the academic title of the doctor of Philosophy. 
This kind of degree tries to isolate you from the people where you can be effective. 
…I must go back [to Sudan]. Everything is not in our own hands.’673 
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These organisers were an alternative field of local intellectuals, those ‘who knew how to 
survive'674 and who also prioritised internal community discussion on significantly less 
hierarchical and formal political grounds than the ostensible “southern leadership”, much like 
Brennan has recently argued of similar work in Dar es Salaam.675 These people were not 
necessarily delineated along professional, associational or educational lines, but had multiple 
connections. Civil servants, traders, daily labourers, tea ladies, and brick makers on the 
banks of the Nile were variously involved with political parties like USAP, church 
organisations, village courts and schools.676 As with earlier generations of migrants to 
Khartoum, people played a spectrum of roles, with the most active locals being concurrently 
students, teachers, political activists, court workers, gang members and poets.677 At least 
post-facto, there appeared to be little differentiation between “roles”: chiefs and book-
writers were ‘doing the same thing.’678 Some men held multiple roles as teachers, chief court 
attendants and church leaders;679 some teachers were ex-government officials, who 
privately wrote songs, books and poetry, often for church or ethnic association events.680 
There was, in effect, no real category of “students” in Khartoum, aside from those studying 
full-time at university level; many people were perpetual students, exploring self-taught 
study in parallel with daily labour and other roles.681 
 
This diversity of roles and activities emphasises the importance of Mbembé's anti-
generalisation of urban “proletarians”: Khartoum urban “IDPs” have been homogenised and 
gendered in academic and popular literature as predominantly-female abused slum 
labourers, sex workers or beer brewers, struggling with changing gender roles and  Islamic 
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secondary school. One of the members of the highly political Dinka-language Akut Kuei song group 
worked as a language education coordinator - with Nuba and Nuer students - at a Comboni girl’s 
school from 1994: JAN, 8 September 2013. 
681 For example, SA, 8 August 2013; chiefs’ meeting, 13 April 2013. 
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laws.682 Many people, particularly women, had little time to engage with cultural and literary 
work, with some seeing writing groups as a male leisure activity. But many women 
emphasised the importance of learning vernacular languages and a critical political history of 
Sudan and their local areas, even if they did not involve themselves beyond teaching their 
children. By the late 1990s, community organisation was not only funded significantly from 
women’s earnings in Khartoum – particularly for child and adult education – but also 
included women as teachers. Sommers records that by 2005, 52 per cent of informal or self-
run community school teachers were women, and this figure was roughly borne out through 
interviews with slightly more affluent women in Aweil and Juba who became teachers (as 
well as, in one case, a political candidate) in the late 1990s and early 2000s.683 Many women 
were in retrospect extremely proud of their often dangerous work in Khartoum which put 
their children and relatives through school.684 
 
‘[Our] mothers… they struggle a lot. That’s where we get some intellectuals, 
graduates, students. … I do appreciate the women, those who were in Khartoum.  
Because they achieve a goal – they have [taught] their children until some of them 
graduate… even my mother, she was working in that. I got my education through – 
because of that. … my mother was arrested twice. [Once] she spent two months, the 
second [time] she spent six months in Omdurman Prison… That tested me, [so in 
1998] I got a chance, that’s where I defected to SPLA.’685 
 
This was primarily a family project, with many women invested heavily in this political and 
cultural work, argued along and across gender lines. Women's social (and sometimes 
formal) education was encouraged in songs and texts.686 One woman re-learnt how to 
articulate complex emotions in Dinka, and another woman remembers her mother singing 
Ngok Dinka songs from Abyei to her, and translating them into Arabic so she could 
                                                
682 J.-A. Mbembé and Sarah Nuttall, ‘Writing the world from an African metropolis’, Public culture, 16:3 
(2004), p. 254; for example, David L. Lukudu, ‘Seiko Five’, Warscapes (August 2013). 
683 Sommers notes that seven per cent of formal schoolteachers employed by the state were women in 
2005, but gives a far higher figure for women teachers in what he terms ‘informal’ education. 
Sommers, Islands of Education, pp. 71, 252. Many women teachers contributed to this study, 
including MI, SA, and AAD. 
684 AND, 29 June 2013; also see ‘The situation of Sudanese women,’ SAD 306/7/105. 
685 SA, 8 August 2013. 
686 For example, the Magazine of Dinka Culture: Story Two, p. 4; Story 23, p. 12; Story 35, p. 19. 
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understand them fully.687 Another lady’s parents frequently made her ‘just pound’ the grain 
rather than taking it to the local mill, cook with wood ‘not charcoal,’ and told her how grain 
‘should be hand cultivated, not by machine,’ all as efforts to teach her southern skills and 
preferences.688 Some men emphasised the “female intellectuals” in Khartoum society: ‘you 
know, this word of separation … I [first] heard it from my mum: my mum, she is an 
intellectual, she is illiterate but she is intellectual.’689 This is a broader definition of 
intellectual than that employed by southern political elites and standard international 
understandings of literacy and education.690 
 
These highly active people did not necessarily intend to create an intellectual hierarchy in 
Khartoum. Their (avowed) egalitarian intentions are most obvious in the acknowledgements 
and introductions to textbooks and histories. Two books’ editors emphasised the accessibility 
of authorship: the conclusion to the book The Dinka Customology of Marriage states of its 
writers, ‘their highest level of study is this: twenty four people have read other languages 
plus Dinka, and ten people read only Dinka language… One person has reached high school 
level.’691 The editor Achirin Nuoi Mou introduces the Magazine of Dinka Culture similarly: 
 
‘The authors of this book do not know whether they are great writers, because many 
of them have just started writing and reading and like this, they have written many 
other books.’692 
 
The same book calls for new members to ‘join the group of your brothers, and we move 
forward, preaching the culture of reading and writing together.’693 These cultural workers 
were not specifically aiming to become new authorities, but encouraged mutual participation 
in creative endeavours as “fellow readers.” There is evidence of Khartoum literary and 
cultural work beyond a tiny minority: Sommers (though broadly despondent about southern 
education in Khartoum as complicated, disorganised, and ‘infused with strains of political 
                                                
687 AMJ, 16 July 2013; R, 3 September 2013. 
688 AD, 5 June 2013. 
689 SA, 8 August 2013. 
690 See Michiel Baud and Rosanne Rutten, Popular intellectuals and social movements: Framing protest in 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America (Cambridge, 2004), p. 2. 
691 The Dinka Customology of Marriage, p. 13. 
692 Magazine of Dinka Culture, p. 3. 
693 Ibid., p. 3. 
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and religious resistance’) notes an almost 1:3 ratio of teachers to students in “IDP informal 
schools” in 1993 reports, and reports an illiteracy rate of only around 60 per cent for 
southern displaced people in Khartoum in the early 2000s - roughly the same as northern 
Sudanese rates.694 Abu-Manga and Miller recorded twenty per cent of southerners speaking 
English in one shanty town in 1992.695 Many southerners spoke and understood a mix of 
vernaculars. 
 
This hyper-activity was obviously not taken up by all residents of Khartoum’s peripheries, 
but specifically by those who had the energy, time, economic and intellectual resources to 
spend on making space and time for conversations, history-writing, arts, and cultural 
investment, Peterson’s cultural urban “work”.696 These ‘are the people who are the pioneer 
section,’ according to one man who was educated in Khartoum; 
 
‘when you are exposed to education then you realise… your right. For [the] majority 
of people who were here [in Aweil], they were not knowing what is at home, and 
what is between north and south. But when they move [to Khartoum], that’s when 
you found key people, educated people, … who are exposed.'697 
 
Like southern political elites, this was somewhat hereditary, circular, and inward-looking, 
with teachers training teachers, and some men holding multiple formally-titled positions on a 
multiplicity of ethnic and court committees.698 With this cultural work mainly produced in 
vernaculars, it would be easy to characterise these networks as closed and Khartoum-based 
ethnic circuits, a self-contained mutual audience of the wealthier and time-rich.699 For 
example, within the Dinka literature encountered in this study – which makes up the body of 
chapter four of this thesis – there is extensive cross-referencing: the writer and church 
worker Lino Alëu Angic Dut’s book History references a story on page thirty-seven of the civil 
servant and teacher Dut Anyak Dit’s Book of Stories, as well as directing the reader to a 
                                                
694 Sommers, Islands of Education, pp. 218–9, 223. 
695 Miller, Language change and national integration, p. 74. 
696 Peterson, Ethnic Patriotism and the East African Revival, p. 4. 
697 RRL, 3 September 2013. 
698 WMT, 17 August 2013. 
699 Sommers reports that ‘most Southern Sudanese IDPs and IDP education officials had little or no 
knowledge of education taking place in southern Sudan or beyond.’ They had never heard of New 
Sudan Curriculum or SPLM Secretariat of Education. Sommers, Islands of Education, p. 241. 
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proverb taught in the community-produced Dinka-language Primary 4 textbook, 700 and 
citing a song by Akut Kuei (“The Eagle Group”), a popular Dinka-language song-writing duo. 
The Magazine of Dinka Culture, a church-produced photocopied pamphlet written by a group 
of self-taught residents of Mayo Mandela, contains Dinka proverbs also printed in the Dinka 
Primary 4 textbook.701 However, this is partly because of shared spaces for this work: Dinka 
Cultural Society members remember one compound holding five working translation groups, 
including the Luo, Dinka Rek, and Latuko teams.702 A member of the Dinka Cultural Society 
also noted that - from the mid-1990s into the 2000s – a prominent Dinka Rek poet and ex-
civil servant chaired Rek dialect Bible translation work in the same office as the (Malwal-
dialect-speaking) Cultural Society’s Dinka literacy textbook drafting programme, and that 
Joseph Modesto – a prominent Luo politician – ran a translation team in the same office 
space.703 
 
Major figures, such as the textbook and story writer and poet Dut Anyak Dit, the song group 
Akut Kuei, the pan-ethnic dance troupe Kuato, and the Bari singer General Paulino, were 
referenced by many people in Aweil and Juba, including illiterate men and women. Pan-
ethnic dance groups boomed in the late 1990s, following in particular the example of 
Orupaap, a music group founded in 1987, and its offshoot Kuato, a prominent multi-ethnic 
dance, drama and song troupe founded by Stephen Ochalla and other musicians in around 
1994.704 Kuato and Orupaap were some of the most cited organisations by both men and 
women of all ages and educational backgrounds throughout research.705 Kuato was explicitly 
“pan-Southern,” “African,” and “Sudanese,” including dances and songs from the Nuba 
Mountains, as per the broad debates over blackness, political southern-ness and inclusion in 
                                                
700 Lino Alëu Angic Dut, History (Khartoum, 2005), pp. 2, 3, 24. 
701 Magazine of Dinka Culture, pp. 25, 22; Primary 4 Dinka Reader, p. 12. 
702 DCS, 11 August 2013. 
703 Ibid. 
704 Kuato, as with many other music ‘groups’ in Khartoum, has a confused timeline; see Catherine Miller, 
‘Juba Arabic as a way of expressing a Southern Identity in Khartoum’, Contemporary Arabic Dialects 
(2002), pp. 117–18; GP, 23 October 2013. 
705 Kuato and Orupaap have been relatively well documented: Luke Dixon, ‘Youth Theatre in the 
Displaced People’s Camps of Khartoum’, African Theatre: Youth, 6 (2006), p. 78; Christine Matzke, 
‘Performing the Nation at the London Globe: notes on a Southern Sudanese Cymbeline’, Shakespeare 
in and Out of Africa, 12 (2013), p. 61; Dave Peterson, ‘Peaceful Change and the Rise of Sudan’s 
Democracy Movement’, African Security Review, 11:4 (2002), pp. 58–69; Rebecca Lorins, ‘African 
Theatre: Women’, The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 37:3 (2004), p. 553. 
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Khartoum at the time. Miller notes the language work within Kuato, where performers would 
translate and explain songs ‘from Nuer or from Anuak or from Zande,’ generally through 
southern regional Arabic.706 Ochalla explained that Kuato organised the “collection” of songs 
from older community members and family, and the boom in similar church-based dance 
and song groups in the mid-1990s meant he toured schools and churches as an advisor. Like 
local self-supporting schools, arts and literacy groups had a broad support base: one of the 
Akut Kuei artists cited the Abyei Youth Union and a group of university graduates and civil 
servants who provided financial backing, and referenced the singers Atak Deng Deng and 
Teresa Nyankol as supporters and artistic influences.707 The renowned Bari-origin singer 
General Paulino performed with other southern musicians at graduation ceremonies, 
‘because it was the right place for them to pass the messages,’ and cited as influences 
Nuba, Nuer and Shilluk male and female performers, Akut Kuei, and the Wau-origin artist 
Emmanuel Kembe, who was forced to leave Khartoum in 1994 after performing his song 
“Shen-Shen” – about the day to day violence of life in Khartoum shanty towns – at a major 
Khartoum music festival.708 
 
This collaboration did not necessarily prioritise or strive for some kind of pan-southern 
integration. Many Dinka artists and writers use “Dinka” as a shorthand for “southern” as well 
as for the pan-southern Dinka collective, often emphasising pan-Dinka moral, linguistic and 
cultural strength while also referencing other southern groups and “black people” in general, 
sometimes all within the same paragraph or verse. The song group Akut Kuei are a good 
example of the complexity of this affiliation and focus: singing entirely in Dinka, their songs 
often focus on pan-Dinka unity and draw on community stories and sayings, but their 
content emphasises collaboration between “col Junub” (Dinka for southerners) and includes 
references to the Shilluk, Nuer, Nuba, and the Dor (Equatorians) as ‘Southerners with the 
same skin colour.’709 An Akut Kuei artist emphasised that ‘it was really very good’ when Nuer 
song groups began to translate and write in parallel with Akut Kuei songs in about 1998.710 
                                                
706 SO, 9 November 2013; Miller, ‘Juba Arabic’, p. 118. 
707 JAN, 10 September 2013. 
708 GP, 23 October 2013; ‘Emmanuel Kembe Profile’, The Sixty One (online publication, c. 2009). 
709 Akut Kuei, Songbook; see chapter four for a full discussion of this work. 
710 JAN, 10 September 2013. 
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There was a spectrum of collaboration which, to most participants, was not supposed to be 
ethnic and insular, but worked in (and emphasised the need for) federalism. As one Bari 
man commented: 
 
‘I attended several of the Dinka [events], whether they [were] Dinka Twic or Dinka 
Aweil, I attended! And I attended the people of Western Bahr el Ghazal having their 
cultural days, and they attended ours. … We worked as a team… we had the same 
agenda which we were carrying out. … The Dinka had better methods of passing 
information, [through] songs… the messages in the songs [-] the Dinkas [sic] are are 
very crafty when it comes to them. … We need to create more activists within the 
ethnic groups, but they knew that they were all southerners, and that we were 
actually doing the same thing, except [in] different languages. But it was the 
same.’711 
 
These people, and their wider networks of supporters and financers, were attempting to 
formulate an audience both within and beyond their own personal sphere,712 potentially 
understandable as layers of audience, from the closest clan and regional-ethnic -linguistic 
market to more distant hoped-for forms of influence. This is thus both ethnic patriotism - 
configuring and asserting specifically pan- or clan Dinka ethnic codes and behaviour, 
particularly around women and family - and radical nationalism; the cultural and educational 
work itself involved a fundamental discussion over whether their messages could be broader 
than ethnic community, clan, and locality, and how broad they could and should be. All this 
work wove ethno-linguistic and regional specificities with broader ideas of overarching 
commonalities of politics and moral community. This complexity and confusion is partly 
because these projects were a working-out of these ideas, and partly because of a problem 
of vocabulary. These are Peterson and Macola’s “local historians”, who are speaking both to 
a specificity of knowledge, such as folk tales, local histories and dialect-specific shorthands, 
and trying to contextualise their ideas to a wider community. This content, and my 
discussions of this work during research, are the subject of chapter four. 
 
 
                                                
711 JW, 18 October 2013. 
712 See Peterson and Macola’s argument in Recasting the past, p. 8. 
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Conclusion 
 
This community activism and creativity is a long way from the “reaction and resistance” 
narratives of South Sudanese nationalism. “Arabization and Islamization”, and its supposed 
output of a collective southern, African, Christian community formed in opposition, are 
probably too clumsy a shorthand to describe the experiences of violent impositions and 
alienation, the many kinds of loss, and the resulting ‘engineering of certainty’ – or options 
for certainty – among southern communities in Khartoum.713   
 
Resistance and resilience were more explained as a need to adapt and strengthen ways of 
living and thinking about life in Khartoum as they were about being “against” any 
oppositional force. The creative ‘bricolage’ of southern associational, organisational and 
managerial practices, as a response to the primarily internal stresses of Khartoum living, was 
run by people who drew on racial and political registers from, and beyond, the ethnic and 
national.714 This Khartoum context demonstrated that people could simultaneously be 
Peterson’s ethnic patriots and iconoclastic nationalists.715 
 
While heterogeneous, fuzzy and often somewhat contradictory, the fundamental multiplicity 
of affiliations demonstrated in this community work emphasised the popular idea of a black 
political community structured on multiple layered familial, regional and (here Dinka-centric) 
ethnic lines – arguably, on forms of moral confederation. This  work contained a confusion 
of arguments about the structure, content and relationships among Sudanese communities 
as a potential political unit, what this thesis terms a debate over the nature and intent of 
southern and/or Sudanese political community. These arguments are the focus of chapter 
four. 
 
 
  
                                                
713 Mbembé and Nuttall, ‘Writing the world from an African metropolis’, p. 361. 
714 Levi-Strauss, referenced in Louise Lamphere, ‘Migration, assimilation and the cultural construction of 
identity: Navajo perspectives’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 30:6 (November 2007), p. 1136; Peterson, 
Ethnic Patriotism and the East African Revival. 
715 Peterson, Ethnic Patriotism and the East African Revival. 
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Chapter four 
 
 
This chapter examines the content of the literary and cultural circuit invented and managed 
by the diverse southern communities in Khartoum. These men and women produced texts, 
songs, dances, histories and poetry, as part of their attempt to articulate ideas of community 
and commonality, the values, knowledge and actions needed to be part of these collectives, 
and challenged readers and listeners to define themselves. Many of the authors of these 
pamphlets, school readers, plays and songs did not demand that their readers subscribe to 
their particular worldview, but instead emphasised the importance of political self-
consciousness and critical engagement. Those who failed to participate in this self-education 
project were told: ‘know that you’re colonised now.’716 
 
The surviving documents collected for this research evidence this plural debate, which gave 
moral content and force to multiple, and not necessarily incompatible, ideas of affiliation. 
The horizontality and mutuality among overlapping racial, regional and ethnic identifications 
demonstrated in this body of cultural work is what many people described as “brotherhood”, 
and what this study describes as moral federalism. This work is part of a broader pattern of 
extensive archiving, ethnographic and historical research, writing and commentary produced 
by and within African communities, particularly in the vernacular, in the twentieth century. 
This material was part of the construction of what James calls minimum common moral 
ground: the basis for codes of action and mutual reliance ‘from which a people, as 
individuals or a collectivity, judge their own predicament, their own condition, themselves as 
persons.’717 
 
After laying out the material encountered, recorded and translated for this study, and their 
histories, interpretations and methodological challenges, this chapter looks at the ways in 
which the political and academic community have interpreted this work: these activities were 
themselves couched in “cultural” terms, as expressions of “cultural maintenance” - as 
                                                
716 The Dinka Customology of Marriage, Section 6. 
717 James, The listening ebony, p. 149. 
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discussed in chapter three - and their cultural, contextual, ruralised mode of explanation and 
terms of reference have encouraged their interpretation as apolitical, ethnic, parochial and 
anti-urban. This chapter instead argues that this “ethnic cultural” mode of expression was a 
convenient and practical idiom for implicitly political and intellectual projects. 
 
This broader view is then demonstrated through an examination of these works’ content, 
their complex layers of identification and mutuality beyond their often specific ethnic and 
local references: although this chapter draws on a snapshot of mostly Dinka-authored work, 
it highlights competing political philosophies and ideas of the future. The political community 
these texts detail is not coherent, but evidences a discussion over the shape and extent of a 
plural horizontal South Sudanese community, beyond Lonsdale’s horizontal moral 
communities of tribes, towards a federation of “black brothers.” This emphasis on the 
common political, historical and cultural experience of peripheral Sudan was the explication, 
for some people, of Garang's nebulous idea of “New Sudan”.718  
 
 
Personal archiving 
 
Men and women in South Sudan showed me hand-written, photographed, printed, taped, 
and re-typed personal archives, recorded and sometimes published products of social 
organisation from Khartoum which they had brought back to South Sudan.719 The proximity 
and intensity of urban life enabled this personal organisation, more than any other context, 
as frustrated informants emphasised in rural interviews: ‘we were really very organised 
people when we were there [in Khartoum].’720 Many people, including illiterate women, were 
frustrated by how little they could now produce – photograph albums, diaries, books and 
tapes were lost in transit; TVs were redundant without electricity in the south, video tapes 
were unplayable or destroyed by heat. Interviews often involved references to photograph 
collections, history textbooks, remembered documents, songs, speeches and cassette tapes, 
                                                
718 For a full discussion of the history of the idea of New Sudan within the SPLA/M, see Rolandsen, 
Guerrilla government, pp. 118–122. 
719 Dia also observed this in Senegal: ‘From Field to Concept’, p. 574. 
720 JG, 30 June 2013. 
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sometimes to the point of comedy: one man, in response to a question, went to look up his 
personal history in the “authors” section of a book he had edited in the early 2000s.721 Some 
of these references to a wider body of community-produced text appear aspirational rather 
than material, but there is evidence of this wider literary and cultural work, particularly from 
Nikkel, who recorded the growth of song and poem composition and book-writing, primarily 
about southern Sudan and not focused on Christian imagery, among “youths” as well as 
young clergy in the 1980s and 1990s,722 and the publishing and re-publishing of personal 
and edited collections of popular songs, as well as the songs’ oral circulation in southern 
bars.723 People’s personal archives in South Sudan remain substantial, as Stephen Ochalla 
said of his work with Kuato: ‘I’m doing [an] archive, everything we tape it [sic]. Videos, and 
photographs, and writing down – everything. Rehearsals, workshops, shows, invitations, 
meetings – I even have newspapers!’724 
 
This chapter focuses specifically on the snapshots of songs, essays, histories and poems 
encountered as texts in Aweil and Juba, supplemented by translations of songs recorded 
during research. Although I heard of many more books, songs and educational handbooks, 
and saw many Nuer, Dinka, Bari and Arabic hand-printed versions and cassette tapes on 
sale in markets in Aweil, Wau and Juba, I focused on finding work explicitly referenced or 
written by informants, only eight of which I have had translated in full for this study.725 
These texts and songs use primarily written Dinka, as well as blended Khartoum and Juba 
Arabic, a mix still used by returned Khartoum residents in the south today. I focused on 
those most referenced during research, including by illiterate men and women, specifically 
the works of Dut Anyak Dit, Morwel Ater Morwel, Akut Kuei, Kuato, General Paulino Mesaka, 
and Lino Alëu Angic Dut’s book History, which is popularly referred to as “the debt book”, as 
                                                
721 SAK, 3 July 2013; also see Coben’s discussion of Gramsci’s ideas of ‘cultural journalism’, Radical 
Heroes, p. 23. 
722 Miller, Language change and national integration, pp. 74, 79; Nikkel, Dinka Christianity, pp. 271, 276–
7; Nikkel transcribes a song in full, p. 277. 
723 Nikkel, Dinka Christianity, pp. 297, 300. One popular 1970s song by a mechanic, Jacob Jot, is quoted 
by Nikkel, p. 302: ‘We were nearly lost in the wilderness / we had disappeared far away. / ... / We 
had vanished in a bad place. / No temptation will have victory over us.’ 
724 SO, 9 November 2013; renewed civil conflicts in December 2013 meant this study has not had access 
to the text of Al Hosh, which SO has at home in Pibor. 
725 See the bibliography for a full list of texts, authors, publishing details and translators. 
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its focus is on ‘compensation’ for ‘our debts from Arabs.’726 I was given the 2005 edition, 
which was published as a pamphlet and whose credits note Dinka teachers as proof readers 
and financial supporters. Lino Alëu, Dut Anyak and Morwel Ater were named throughout 
research as influential Dinka writers, historians and teachers in Khartoum, and I thus tried to 
trace them; Dut Anyak provided me the hand-written versions of nineteen of his poems 
composed since the early 1990s in Khartoum, which he was transcribing and translating into 
English himself, from his own notes and from some photocopied pamphlets. One of the two 
singer-songwriters who made up the well-known song group Akut Kuei (“The Eagle Group”) 
provided me with a printed song book with twenty-four typed song lyrics spanning songs 
produced from 1992 to 1997. It was transcribed and written into Dinka by Lino Alëu in 
November 2003 as a “trial edition”, with support from the Khartoum Workshop Programme, 
and the pamphlet is copyrighted to the Dinka Cultural Society Committee.727 
 
Several teachers, members of the Dinka Cultural Society, catechists and part-time students 
provided me with various copies of books, or short bibliographies of texts they 
recommended that I trace. A resident of Mandela neighbourhood provided copies of three 
texts: The Dinka Customology of Marriage, printed by the Sudan Open Learning 
Organisation (SOLO), a Sudanese national NGO focusing on literacy – who printed many of 
these texts as basic photocopied pamphlets with a soft card cover – and which was written 
as a “trial edition” by the Mayo Mandela Dinka Rek Group, made up of teachers from a Mayo 
Mandela school, established in 2000. It was published in 2000, and reprinted again in 2001, 
both times for a local Khartoum audience. The same group then wrote the pamphlet Dinka 
Displacement to northern Sudan and other stories in October 2003, assisted by the 
International Extension College and SOLO. By 2004, the Dinka Mayo Mandela group had 
expanded and published the Magazine of Dinka Culture – in Dinka, titled “Reading” (Kuën) – 
with short passages from a variety of authors drawn from a wider consortium of reading and 
writing groups, based in markets and churches across Khartoum.728  
                                                
726 Lino Alëu, History, pp. 3-4; see APA, 21 July 2013; DKLK, 12 June 2013; DCD, 12 August 2013. 
727 I sought and obtained permissions to work with this material from the Dinka Cultural Society 
committee in Aweil, whom I have provided with copies of the Dinka original and English translation. 
728 These contributors were SAK from the group of St Paul, Khartoum; AAM from the group of Diaar Suk 
(Ladies’ Market), Mayo; GDK from the group of Riengthii Abiem, Mandela; JAM from the group of Guir 
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These pamphlets, song and poetry collections were longer and fuller examples of the 
broader collection of cultural and educational literature, including individual leaflets and 
reference materials, songs and poems, sourced during research. This wider collection 
includes the Dinka-language Primary 4 Reader, a vernacular school text produced on a 
photocopier and cut from various sources; a variety of Dinka and Equatorian-origin song 
lyrics written and sung in Khartoum, including song lyrics written by southern university 
students in support of the SPLA and other northern and Nuba rebellions; notes of plays, 
photograph collections, comedy group programmes and tape recordings of other songs. 
 
These songs, short books and poems recorded and translated for this chapter were part of a 
miscellanea of photograph collections, documents, membership cards, work and training 
certificates that made up the material references of interviews in South Sudan. Comparisons 
between text and song cultures were constrained by the vagaries of research in South 
Sudan: the political environment and geography of “returnees” from Khartoum restricted 
research access to predominantly Dinka areas, the renewed conflict in December 2013 
stopped travel to other regions, and this chapter’s work was dependent on the availability of 
surviving documents – often photocopied on cheap paper and bound in cardboard – in 
markets and personal collections.729 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Latueng Cieeng Monyjang (Dinka Cultural Development), Khartoum; JKA from the group of Choir, St 
Kizito; VWA from the group of Writers and Readers of Mandela; and AAR from the Group of Writers in 
Mayo Mandela. 
729 Public recordings of some of the songs mentioned here be found on YouTube and on community 
websites, although it is hard to know their provenance and so they are not linked here. Some songs’ 
lyrics match exactly with the 1990s and 2000s transcribed versions used here, and others have been 
altered, or follow different patterns of chorus and verse. 
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Figure 6: Street sales of locally-produced Dinka and Arabic-language pamphlets 
Haj Yousif, c. early 2000s. Photographed by Angelina, and reproduced with permission. 
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This written and oral literature circuit expanded in the intense activity of the early 1990s, but 
continued to draw on older texts, not least the vernacular language textbooks of the 
Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) and other churches since the 1970s.730 The texts 
produced in typed print by the mid- to late-1990s were cheaply photocopied and stapled 
with cardboard covers, and many show signs of being cut together from previous print-outs; 
the lists of versions in the frontispieces of some pamphlets reinforce this. This self-publishing 
apparently became very popular by the early 2000s, with the growing availability of 
computers and printers. Several introductions in the texts collected during research 
emphasise the importance of the illustrations drawn by contributors, which are often 
comedic or dramatic, and are photocopied into the text alongside photographs cut from 
human rights reports or news articles on the civil war. These were composite works, for a 
demi-literate but articulate audience. 
 
These composite works are on-going; people emphasised they would re-edit, re-record and 
re-publish if they could find the funds in South Sudan. The Dinka Customology of Marriage’s 
introduction states: ‘[This] book is selected out of books which are written by the Rek Dinka 
who are living in Mayo Mandela; it is written so that other books will be written too.’731 The 
songs and poems recorded here were written down as pamphlets, or copied out by their 
authors, as part of a process of clarification, editing and improvement that is still continuing 
today. This chapter finds no methodological resolution to this, but instead understands the 
translation and transcription process for this thesis as part of this on-going work: the 
translations of Dut Anyak Dit’s writings and Akut Kuei’s songs are currently being debated by 
the Dinka Cultural Society now re-formed in Aweil, with continuing disputes over translation 
of specific words. 
 
This fluid editing is most obvious in songs, for many academics a still-dubious mutational 
source.732 Songs were the most common reference point in working people’s accounts of 
their political awakenings, as catchy and emotive shorthands; but their provenance is often 
                                                
730 The Summer Institute of Linguistics is a Christian NGO focused on minority language support and 
documentation. 
731 The Dinka Customology of Marriage, p. 2. 
732 See Impey, ‘The Poetics of Transitional Justice’, p. 65. 
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hard to mark out. For example, although I met one of the two singer-songwriters who 
together created Akut Kuei, a Dinka-language political song group, who provided me with a 
photocopied booklet of collected song lyrics he helped to edit in Khartoum in 2002, I heard 
many, very slightly differing, versions of the same songs – and of other Akut Kuei songs not 
recorded in the booklet – including versions sung by the Akut Kuei singers themselves. And 
although Akut Kuei was made up of two men working primarily between 1992 and 1997, it 
was more commonly and variously described by other informants as being a large group of 
artists, or a general phenomenon of political singer-songwriters, or a “political party”: some 
young men described their attempts to become the “next generation” of Akut Kuei in 
Khartoum, by performing versions of Akut Kuei songs as well as their own new 
compositions. 
 
 
“Traditional ethnic culture” as political action 
 
These physical texts that survived return to South Sudan were part of a wider pantheon of 
note-taking and record-keeping in pace with (and – for many – summarising) far wider 
discussions. “Cultural” work has long been a useful form of political activism, with literacy 
and its uses embedded in “freedom fighting” in, for example, East Timor, Nepal, and South 
Africa.733 
 
‘it was mostly, cultural, but then of course always politics would come up. You know, 
when news came what was happening in the south here, you know, the fight, the 
war – …the suffering, the hunger, and so on. It would always, almost always turn 
into something political.’734 
 
                                                
733 For example: Estêvão Cabral and Marilyn Martin-Jones, ‘Writing the Resistance: Literacy in East Timor 
1975–1999’, International Journal of Bilingual Education and Bilingualism, 11:2 (March 2008), p. 156; 
Martha Caddell, ‘Private schools as battlefields: contested visions of learning and livelihood in Nepal’, 
Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education, 36:4 (December 2006), pp. 463–
479; Mastin Prinsloo and Mignonne Breier, The Social Uses of Literacy: Theory and Practice in 
Contemporary South Africa (Capetown, 1996). 
734 AT, 16 October 2013. 
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This carried real risk.735 In Khartoum, texts were extremely dangerous just to own, as 
Sommers found when trying to give out previous reports on education in 2005.736 One court 
worker, and now teacher, remembered newspapers holding printouts of international news 
about Sudan as “carton news” at the Khartoum Monitor office, stored in a box to be read on 
the premises only and shared by word of mouth.737 
 
Work in vernacular languages thus used the relatively apolitical space of “ethnic culture” as 
well as funding available for linguistic and cultural “tradition”, such as from UNESCO or the 
Catholic Church. This de-politicisation was helped by common prejudices against this type of 
vernacular “ethnic” work as backwards, unintellectual and therefore unthreatening. 
Vernaculars provided privacy and a useful ambiguity which offered a degree of security for 
its speakers in Khartoum, such as the Equatorian singer General Paulino’s songs in a mix of 
Bari and highly allegorical and abbreviated Juba Arabic.738 Miller and Abu-Manga record a 
Nuba girl explaining that the vernacular offers ‘a secret language,’ even while under public 
organising laws it was only permitted to sing in Arabic.739 Unlike some forms of cultural 
work, these Khartoum projects were not attempts to claim public or state rights or 
recognition, but were for creating a field of action within which to argue about power, 
liberation and the future. 
 
This publishing and archiving, even if – as one foreword noted – ‘they have written these 
books without hope that they would continue,’ was an attempt at laying out and giving 
substance and definition to histories, debates and community changes, much like Watson’s 
idea of ‘acts of persistence.’740 Dinka Cultural Society members noted that before the mid-
1990s, 
                                                
735 Achille Mbembe, ‘Provisional notes on the postcolony’, Africa, 62:01 (1992), p. 17; music was banned 
by the Sudanese government in the early 1990s, with NIF militias assaulting female singers and 
breaking up parties. Lesch, The Sudan, p. 132. 
736 Sommers, Islands of Education, p. 32; personal accounts were also given by JGRN, 28 June 2013; NB, 
18 October 2013. 
737 DKLK, 4 July 2013. 
738 For discussions of code-switching, see Catherine Miller, Enam Al-Wer, Dominique Caubet, and Janet C. 
E. Watson, Arabic in the city: issues in dialect contact and language variation, (London, 2007), p. 21; 
Cherry Leonardi, ‘South Sudanese Arabic’; Miller, Language change and national integration, p. 101. 
739 Miller, Language change and national integration, p. 107; DKLK, 21 August 2013. 
740 Magazine of Dinka Culture, p. 3; Watson, ‘“Good Will Come of This Evil”’, p. 70. 
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‘no one started to develop the history… about how people [came] to Khartoum. 
Because people were [afraid]… That is why we did not think deeply of writing the 
history of how people have been displaced. So these people were brave [enough] to 
write [books back then], [but] I think they did not produce it publicly. [Laughs]’741 
 
This literary work is often noted by Sudan researchers, if not well studied.742 For Vezzadini, 
‘uneducated political activists’ acting in or commenting on Sudanese national politics and 
history have had ‘very few channels to express their own views of the past’; at least on 
English- and Arabic-language national platforms.743 Vernacular community work – 
particularly Dinka songs – has broadly been studied either as social ethnographic evidence, 
such as the work of Francis Deng, or as general local comment on war and state crisis.744 As 
such, these texts, associations and songs sometimes appear to present a relatively 
straightforward patriarchal ethnic nationalism, policing and judging women, and eulogising 
broad-brush ideas of lost community lands, Christian and ethnic pride. These standard lines 
of academic interest also generally misrepresent these artistic endeavours as either war- or 
state-focused broad political or social critiques: the majority of songs written and performed 
in Khartoum, for instance, were about love.745  
 
As such, more recent academic literature has increasingly understood this political literacy 
organisation along two main lines: firstly, particularly for displaced people and in urban 
areas, as a means of maintaining primarily ethnicised, ruralised ideas of “return home”, and 
secondly and more broadly, as an act of (proto-)nationalist “resistance,” with teaching as 
“fighting” against both urban cultures and state impositions.746 These analyses are broadly 
                                                
741 DCS, 11 August 2013. 
742 Miller et al., Arabic in the city, p. 23. 
743 Vezzadini, ‘Spies, Secrets, and a Story Waiting to Be (Re)Told’, p. 65. 
744 Francis Mading Deng, The Dinka and their songs (Oxford, 1973); Francis Mading Deng, Dinka 
folktales: African stories from the Sudan (New York, 1974); Nikkel, Dinka Christianity; Marc R. Nikkel, 
‘Jieng “Songs of Suffering” and the Nature of God’, Anglican and Episcopal History (2002), pp. 223–
240; Bert Remijsen, Angela Impey, Elizabeth Achol Ajuet Deng, Simon Yak Deng Yak, Peter Malek 
Ayuel Ring, John Penn de Ngong, Tatiana Reid, D. Robert Ladd, Miriam Meyerhoff, and others, ‘A 
collection of Dinka songs’ (Edinburgh, 2012); Impey, ‘The Poetics of Transitional Justice.’ 
745 JA, 8 September 2013, and 10 September 2013; ADD, 17 August 2013; SO, 9 November 2013; GP, 23 
October 2013. 
746 This idea fits with the standard analysis of Arabization and Islamization: see Chapter 3. 
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standard in Sudanese scholarship on urban migration,747 and fit in with humanitarian 
summaries of people’s work in Khartoum for ‘eventual reintegration,’ as one IDP assessment 
put it in 1990, as well as with later planning for return and resettlement post-CPA.748 Going 
back was a common idea in Khartoum: ‘some people [at] that time [talked] of the special 
time, that maybe [the] time to come south will one day become good [sic].’749 However, 
with constant doubts over the future of the war and the possibilities of eventual return, 
particularly as families settled and grew in Khartoum, in practice this idea of preparing next 
generations for return focused more on providing regional, local, and ethnic “traditional” 
information, to make southern landscapes and livelihoods familiar to children. Sommers’ 
2005 study noted the editing of standard textbooks to reflect regional grains and animals, 
substituting pictures of cows instead of camels.750 This is evidenced in the detailed 
illustrations and photographs printed in books, and in interviews with teachers about their 
classroom work: ‘I draw the cows, sometimes, with the bulls in [the] cattle camp, and how 
the cattle are arranged in the cattle camp, and the containers that people are using for 
milking, so I just draw everything.’751 
 
With “return” as a logic for these projects, this community work is then described as 
‘education as resistance.’752 Sommers records an ‘IDP school administrator’ saying: “In 
Khartoum, people don’t fight with guns. People fight with minds.”753 But, as most donor-
funded reports on Khartoum focus on structured primary and child education, these 
researchers predominantly look at local curriculums and formal Christian educational texts, 
such as the vernacular “Readers” sponsored by the Catholic church in Khartoum.754 This 
                                                
747 For a summary of this literature, see Leonardi, Dealing with government in South Sudan, pp. 5–7. 
748 Feiden et al., Khartoum displaced assessment and recommendations, p. 22. 
749 AT, 8 June 2013; also AAD, 14 August 2013, and many other accounts. 
750 Sommers, Islands of Education, p. 247; as explained by DKLK, 4 July 2013 and 21 August 2013; WMT, 
18 August 2013. 
751 MMD, 17 August 2013. 
752 Sommers, Islands of Education, p. 243; also see Anders Breidlid, ‘Sudanese migrants in the Khartoum 
area: fighting for educational space’, International Journal of Educational Development, 25:3 (2005), 
pp. 253–268; Anders Breidlid, ‘Education in the Sudan: the privileging of an Islamic discourse’, 
Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education, 35:3 (September 2005), pp. 247–
263; Anders Breidlid, ‘Sudanese Images of the Other: Education and Conflict in Sudan’, Comparative 
Education Review, 54:4 (2010), pp. 555–579. 
753 Sommers, Islands of Education, p. 243. 
754 Breidlid, ‘Sudanese Images of the Other’, p. 564; Sommers, Islands of Education. 
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focus on relatively formal educational programmes that were often inspected and interfered 
with by the Khartoum state tends to close down the space for ‘IDP’s expression of political 
and religious resistance’ to ‘limited revisions of the state curriculum, which they are forced to 
use,’755 and to an idea of “southern resistance” specifically against the state and their 
‘Islamic influences.’756 Islamic passages were often replaced with Bible verses or sermons, 
such as in the Dinka Primary 4 Reader, which has a visibly inserted section comparing the 
Dinka and Christian genesis stories and an endorsement of further Bible study. But this focus 
on formal child education, as a reaction to displacement from a rural and ethnic “home” and 
against Arab-Islamic state impositions, is too narrow:757 while “future return and present-day 
resistance” is a convenient shorthand explanation for both Khartoum teachers and 
humanitarian reportage, it glosses a far broader understanding of these complex projects. 
 
This does not necessarily make these texts works of pure ethnic nationalism. The dominant 
language of these texts is “ethnic” because of the use of vernaculars to describe common 
historical experience: their authors often use idioms as generalisable, often-ambiguous 
demonstrations of common knowledge, and as a means of euphemising, variously, political 
critique, direct threats to the regime or information about the war, for example: “the eagles 
have landed on the road,” or “the doctor is coming with his medicine.” 
 
A more historical approach situates this work within longer-term southern understandings of 
urban contexts and the benefits of education. Leonardi’s recent work emphasises 
 
the perceived lack of knowledge, whether in terms of southerners needing more 
knowledge and education to catch up with their “elder brothers” in the north, or in 
terms of the enduring claim that politicians practised cunning and trickery. The belief 
that ordinary people could easily be “tricked” by the educated and town people was 
an expression of vulnerability in the politics of knowledge, as well as a moral 
criticism.758 
 
                                                
755 Sommers, Islands of Education, p. 17. 
756 Particularly Breidlid, ‘Education in the Sudan’; Sommers, Islands of Education, p. 247. 
757 For example, see Miller et al., Arabic in the city, p. 21. 
758 Leonardi, Dealing with government in South Sudan, p. 135. 
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This is still a common idea, and many teachers were proud of their efforts in Khartoum to 
spread the ability to – as Leonardi says – ‘mediate the line between threat and guarantee’ of 
state power,759 and provide the basis for future southern-led governance.760 But also – 
maybe more emphatically – these writers and teachers intended to promote a very specific 
type of education against this trickery, rather than teach a westernised education or 
promote specifically “ethnic traditional” values. All the texts and songs encountered in 
research explicitly criticised those whom Leonardi calls ‘modern, urban intellectuals’: the 
men who presented themselves as superior to “tribal” things, who called Garang a “savage”, 
or who criticised the continuing war. These men were criticised in turn as being ultimately 
uneducated – despite their university degrees – and focused on “eating.”761 This vocabulary 
is directly referent to broader discourses of eating and the politics of the belly in African 
political discourse, with this language of eating resources, power, and social futures meshed 
here with the Dinka taboo against selling cows for food.762 “Eating” is a common metaphor 
across this Khartoum literature, for example in Akut Kuei’s songs Anyoot yic (“It has not 
started yet”), and Abuk jal ting, ku abuk jal ting (“We shall see – we’ll see”) – which includes 
the lines 
 
Now that we are like the ticks on the cows 
The tick that sucks at the cow 
Now that we are like the fly on the meat 
… 
It is food that is killing us, 
It is eating that we are fighting. 
We were made to fight 
And you agree to go and fight with your brother 
Just because of food 
… 
Do not sell your right because of food – 
Don’t sell your land for food, 
Don’t waste your lives for food. 
 
                                                
759 Ibid., p. 207. 
760 Five teachers voiced their pride in having taught members of the SPLM elite, South Sudanese civil 
service, and SPLA officers. 
761 Leonardi, Dealing with government in South Sudan, p. 148. 
762 Most notably, Bayart, The State in Africa. 
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These people were thus acting as Feierman’s “peasant” or Gramsci’s “organic” intellectuals, 
situating themselves in between these superior urban self-titled “intellectuals” and their 
parochial, hide-bound counterparts in the village: they aimed to foster a form of critical 
thought that both consciously resisted the standard intellectual hegemonies in Khartoum, 
and promoted the (clandestine) intra-communal discussion of alternatives.763 Their texts 
argue for a critical self-awareness based on rewritten community histories, aiming to 
promote an understanding of the individual and communal place of southern people in 
Sudanese political and historical context. These cultural activists were thus indirectly 
disproving Scott’s claim ‘that subalterns always perceive clearly the reality of elite 
domination.’764 They argued instead that this understanding required work. 
 
The content of this education, and the type of knowledge taught, would need to stop 
someone from being fooled – in the common language of these texts and songs, being 
“blind.”765 This is demonstrated, interestingly, by Sommers’ observation that state textbooks 
at grade five and above were not altered, because by that stage of education – as a 
headmaster stated in Aweil – the students ‘know the situation,’ and should be able to 
criticise the textbook’s epistemology themselves.766 This literary community were arguing for 
a ‘real education’ based on intra-community dialogue and a critical factual basis for self-
knowledge in context: ‘when you see yourself, you can find that you are already 
marginalized.’767 
 
Thus a theme of all of this work was the preservation of internal integrity, a personal inner 
“front”, and a core of social and moral responsibility and understanding, expressed through 
variously-translated ideas of “the right”, “knowledge”, “respect” and “heart.” This was not 
necessarily self-definition against a set “other”: this literature was concerned with critiquing 
                                                
763 See Feierman, Peasant Intellectuals. 
764 Summarised by Fletcher; see Fletcher’s problematisation of ‘resistance studies’, Beyond resistance, p. 
viii; Scott, Weapons of the weak. 
765 For example, Dut Anyak’s poem Panda (“Our Country”): 
The blind man can now see 
Days are not the same, the blind man is throwing away his walking stick 
And Akut Kuei’s song Jieng ameen wuot (“Everyone hates the Dinka”). 
766 Sommers, Islands of Education, p. 248. 
767 DAA, 13 July 2013; APA, 22 July 2013. 
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a growing individualism and the need for personal control in the pressures of the Khartoum 
economy and geography. This was based on the common fear of “getting lost”, including in 
the day to day demands and opportunities of individualising city life. These texts and stories 
are punctuated by demands for self-awareness and factual knowledge, and their direct 
questions to their audience – as actual quiz “tests” or as rhetoric – tried to set the terms and 
content of this self-awareness. 
 
These moral messages were lodged in “factual” histories and emotive songs and poetry. 
These were not specifically “ethnic projects”, but were aimed at re-framing and challenging 
the standard hegemonic order of Sudanese “national history”, re-casting what was “national” 
and re-constituting the boundaries of “community history.” Their often contradictory or 
ambiguous language about the linguistic, local, regional, racial and political lines and layers 
of community inclusion were arguments about the parameters of alternative political 
collectives.  
 
This literacy and educational work was not designed to be comfortable or positive. Watson, 
writing of African American slavery and post-redemption literacy work, emphasised the 
‘ambivalence’ of literacy, as a means both of self-determination as well as ‘indoctrination 
[and] disillusionment’; she notes that literacy brought alienation, dissatisfaction and 
frustration.768 One chapter of Lino Alëu’s History is titled “My heart burns with sadness 
throughout the day and night”, and Dut Anyak writes 
 
We hear the old words 
We know they repeat themselves 
And they hurt in our hearts when we think on them.769 
 
Akut Kuei’s song Rinydan Junub (“This southern generation”) says ‘being always annoyed 
makes you a man,’ and their song Ke Col Ater Cie Ke Yeku Puol Yok Muonyjang (“The Dinka 
don’t give up the fight”) includes the lines 
 
                                                
768 Watson, ‘“Good Will Come of This Evil”’, p. 68. 
769 Dut Anyak Dit, Diet e muooc (“Bravery songs”), written c. August 2004, Khartoum; the song’s 
translator noted that this pain is meant to act as encouragement. 
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It is paining me, it is paining me if I think of all this destruction 
I don’t sleep 
I wish I could divide my heart 
To divide it amongst all the people 
It pains my heart, 
I wish I could divide it among all the southerners.770 
 
General Paulino’s song Nan Be Kolo Jongo (“I am crazy”) contains a similar lament, 
 
I became crazy from being lonely 
I am tired of staying alone, 
No one to comfort me or even to heal my wounds, 
The wounds inside me, do you remember me?771 
 
Community-run literary and artistic education was difficult and emotionally draining work: 
the texts, poems and songs drawn on for this chapter all directly address the history of pain 
and loss of their audiences, and explicitly demand emotional and intellectual self-reflection 
and response. The rest of this chapter will focus on the content and aims of this work Freire 
calls ‘conscientization,’ as an attempt to create mutual and critical self-awareness.772 
Compared to formal child education and literacy programmes, these writers held a very 
different understanding of “basic skills.” 
 
 
Recruitment to political consciousness 
 
These texts primarily emphasise the importance not of a broad westernised liberal schooling 
but a comprehensive and critical worldview.773 This was explicitly anti-hegemonic historical 
work, challenging the narratives put forward by the state. History was already a contentious 
field in formal education in Sudan, with state textbooks ending in 1956 and focusing on the 
                                                
770 Written c. 1994-5, Khartoum. 
771 Written in the early 2000s, Khartoum. Translated by Melanie Itto. 
772 Paulo Freire, Literacy: reading the word & the world (London, 1987). 
773 Primary 4 Reader; also SAK, “Equality”, in Magazine of Dinka Culture, p. 10: ‘If one wants to be the 
only educated one, and others with whom they are sharing the country are not educated, then there 
will be no peace.’ 
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Arabian Peninsula and Islamic history. People were well aware of the selective editing of 
these books: 
 
‘We were bringing [the Comboni priests] the textbooks and saying the explanation 
here is [doubtful]. … we doubt the textbook, because some explanations were 
forgeried [sic] – the history is not telling the real thing. … Like the coming of Arabs 
they write to be the coming of people. … Some realities which have been forgeried 
from the Sudan history, we used to correct them.’774 
 
Teaching and writing history was, after 1992, a position apparently reserved in state schools 
for Muslims only, and so was considered a dangerous profession.775 One Dinka man 
remembered his Fajulu and Latuka history teachers, who taught ‘the book [but] added some 
things’ – about the Abboud regime closing off the south, the expulsion of missionaries in 
1964, and the ‘assassination’ of the southern Sudanese Communist politician Joseph Garang 
in 1971. The Latuka-origin teacher was, apparently, arrested four times, ‘because he’s a 
politician.’776  
 
The majority of these texts and songs focus on old regional histories, writing southerners 
into a longer history of Sudan, or recording their own subaltern history of the civil wars. This 
history writing was so important that a research methodologies section is included in the 
Dinka Primary 4 Reader.777 The Reader details a history of the Nubian kingdom, Merowe, 
Greek migration and the gradual arrival of Christianity,778 but emphasises that: 
 
The history of the people who have lived in your land where there are black people - 
we do not know it. There are no records in the books, but we have them on rocks 
and caves. … The stories of our grandparents are of a few years past. Which means 
we have only discovered the history of the people who stayed at the riverside where 
Khartoum is now. … There are no records, we do not have remains, the words they 
spoke orally are not from long ago and they are unclear.779 
                                                
774 DKLK, 21 August 2013. 
775 DCD, written note on the government’s introduction of a new education policy in 1990, referencing a 
new teachers’ guide for history published by the National Committee for Curriculum Development and 
Educational Research for the academic year 1992-1993, 12 August 2013. 
776 DKLK, 4 July 2013 and 21 August 2013. 
777 Primary 4 Reader, p. 7. 
778 Ibid., p. 9 
779 Ibid., pp. 8, 10. 
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The book Dinka Displacement to the northern Sudan begins with a history of the Northern 
Bahr el Ghazal famine, with the opening sentence, ‘what took them away from their 
country?’ It then details the start of the famine in 1985, what people were forced to eat, 
including plant names, and the route through Meiram, when events were so terrible that ‘a 
person who died on the road can be overlooked.’ This was so that children could know ‘how 
you came to northern Sudan,’ and so that others would ‘[not] forget all the past and present 
events.’780  
 
These history books had, therefore, very different foci and timelines - both to national 
history textbooks, and also in comparison to southern elite histories of the “1983-2005” war. 
Teachers emphasised this alternative history as a fundamental part of their curriculum: 
‘these were the things we taught in the school, and these were also the things that made us 
sad.’781 Lino Alëu’s book History listed the presidents and prime ministers of Sudan and then 
stated: ‘all these presidents had oppressed black people and sold them.’ His history of 
(specifically) South Sudan starts by writing ‘every black [sic]’ into the struggle for 
independence in 1956, and includes the Closed Districts order controlling southerners’ 
movements, a short mention of the 1947 Juba Conference, details of the southern regional 
administration in the 1970s, and a section on the Babanusa and Daein massacres.782 Texts 
and songs also referenced international texts, such as Lino Alëu’s reprinted first person 
accounts of atrocities collated by an international human rights organisation (probably 
Human Rights Watch), as well as popular sustained metaphors from SPLA propaganda - 
such as “needles” for AK47s in one Akut Kuei song - and traditional songs and stories, such 
as Dut Anyak’s shorthand reference to an Aweil-area Dinka war song.783 
 
                                                
780 Dinka Displacement, Section 1. 
781 APA, 22 July 2013. 
782 Lino Alëu, History, pp. 16-17, 23. Howell also noticed ‘text-books of unusual influence’ in secret 
circulation in Khartoum, such as TR Batten’s series Tropical Africa in World History, in 1978; ‘Political 
leadership and organisation in the southern Sudan’, p. 112. 
783 Lino Alëu, History, p. 19; Akut Kuei, Piny ci Deng nok (“The land that killed Deng”); Dut Anyak Dit, 
Diet e muooc (“Bravery songs”). Similar referencing is observed by Cabral and Martin-Jones in East 
Timor: ‘Writing the Resistance’, p. 159. 
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Songs included references to a continuous history of slavery, and many of the books found 
in Aweil included photocopied images of atrocities, such as the Primary 4 Reader’s back 
page image of shackled men, and Lino Alëu’s History including a picture titled ‘abducted 
children’, and one of men with amputated hands.784 There was significant power in 
articulating experiences of forced labour, mass violence and abductions in villages in the 
south, and labour exploitation in Khartoum specifically as slavery. Lino Alëu’s History 
emphasises the continuities of slavery as a common experience for, broadly, Dinka people, 
southern people, and black people in the Sudan since the 1800s to the present day, and 
notes international authority on this: 
 
The Human Rights Watch has conveyed the message to Dinka youth, women and 
children that many people have been abducted by Baggara and categorized them 
into two: 
- groups of men and women to work on their farms as slaves 
- groups of other young men and children to take care of their cattle as slave 
shepherds.785 
 
Even if this was recent or lived history for its “students”, as some of the members of Dinka 
Cultural Society said, ‘you want somebody to remind you,’786 and to put individual or 
relatively distant experience into a broader historical narrative, as one young woman who 
was born in Khartoum said: ‘we realised it was colonial – because we were slaves to the Jur, 
to Arabs.’787  
                                                
784 Lino Alëu, History, pp. 32, 27; Dut Anyak Dit, Wek caa bi ben ting (“I will not see you again”): 
This slave peg that we’ve been tethered to, 
The black race wants to uproot it 
…  
The people among us still hammer the peg further 
They will not manage it. 
The hammer they are using is being taken from their hands. 
785 Lino Alëu, History, p. 19. 
786 DCS, 11 August 2013. 
787 AAD, 14 August 2013. 
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Figure 7: Photocopied image in Dinka Primary 4 Reader, captioned ‘Slavery in Wau, where 
people are chained’ 
Reader provided by Arou Piol Adam. 
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This work emphasised comparisons of life pre-1985 versus life in Khartoum, and the epic 
and heroic nature of southern history – ‘we want to show… the change.’788 Comparative 
histories and sustained metaphors are common in the predominantly Dinka texts and songs 
examined here, but also in Equatorian versions seen and collected during research. The 
book The Dinka Customology of Marriage is a sustained comparison between Khartoum and 
pre-war southern “traditional” gender relations and marriage norms. Songs particularly – 
probably because they were more commonly written than books, and recited in 
conversations and gatherings, including among women – put personal histories of 
displacement in wider historical context and with a narrative arc.789 
 
This work aimed to produce an overarching historiography and core narrative, with major 
historical figures, periods and events, on which local histories and references could be hung, 
as an implicitly nationalist teleology. These songs and texts emphasised a broad heroic 
southern history, often beyond ethnic or clan boundaries: Dut Anyak Dit references the King 
of Zande – likely a reference to King Gbudwe, famously written of by E. E. Evans-Pritchard, 
and who died in 1905 of wounds received in a clash with Condominium forces in Western 
Equatoria – as one of many martyred ‘forefathers’ in his poem “I will not see you again.”790 
The book Dinka Displacement similarly includes a long story of how the late and famous 
Dinka Rek paramount chief Giir Thiik of Luonyaker, Warrap State, became a chief.791 The 
Primary 4 Reader references the historic northern Sudanese state of Alwa as a root of its 
national Sudanese history; Alwa was also used by Nuba Mountains politician Philip Abbas 
Ghaboush and his party, the United Sudan African Liberation Front (USALF), as their name 
for the imagined future state of a united black Sudan.792  
 
But by far the most heavily referenced and invoked hero in the (mostly Dinka Bahr el 
Ghazal) texts and songs is William Deng Nhial, a politician from Tonj, then part of Bahr el 
Ghazal state. As he caused a split in the SANU party in 1965 during the first civil war and 
                                                
788 SAK, 3 July 2013. 
789 See Malik, ‘Displacement as Discourse’; for example, General Paulino’s song “Problems have come”, a 
version of which was re-written and sung by the Gbaya singer Emmanuel Kembe. 
790 E. E. Evans-Pritchard, ‘A History of the Kingdom of Gbudwe’, Zaire, 10:5 (1956), pp. 451–491. 
791 Dinka Displacement, Section 6. 
792 ‘Constitution of USALF,’ May 1970, Comboniani, uncatalogued Bresciani papers, A/90. 
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advocated federalism under a united Sudanese government before being murdered in 
Cueibet in 1968, William Deng seems an unlikely martyr figure. However, his name has been 
invoked in Dinka songs – particularly from Greater Bahr el Ghazal – since his death, and a 
song addressing William Deng is recorded by Francis Deng in his 1973 text The Dinka and 
their Songs.793 Akut Kuei’s songs reference William Deng frequently, particularly his death as 
sacrifice and his judgement on the current apathy or lack of valour of southern people.794 A 
court worker remembered and sang a similar song, written probably in the mid-1990s, with 
the lyrics “who is unlucky like a black man?” with the chorus: 
 
Dinka! The majesty of Deng Nhial will be lost 
Shilluk! The majesty of Deng Nhial will be taken 
Nuer! The majesty of Deng Nhial will be gone 
Zande! The majesty of Deng Nhial will be lost795 
… 
 
William Deng Nhial is most heavily invoked as an owner of the land, for instance in Akut 
Kuei’s famous song Duk ben la wel wel: 
 
Why did you come and step on the land of Deng Nhial? 
And the land of Ajang Duot? 
And the land of Ayel Baak? 
And the land of Tookmac?796 
And the land of our maternal uncles? 
… 
People live on the land but they have to know the owner.797 
 
And in Akut Kuei’s song Piny ci Deng nok, “The land that killed Deng”: 
                                                
793 "We are the Dinka," including the lines: ‘it is the land of Morwel Malou and William Deng Nhial. We 
shall avenge the evils of the past.’ Deng, The Dinka and their songs, pp. 216–7. 
794 Duk ben la wel wel (“Don’t panic”), 1994; Pienyda, pienyda, pienyda (“Our land”), 1992; Ku na kocka 
(“What of these people?”), 1997; Aya yii ye ping, ye ping (“I’m hearing – I’m hearing”), c. mid-1990s; 
Ke col ater ci ke yeku puol yok muonyjang (“The Dinka don’t give up the fight”), c. mid-1990s; Abi 
thok terrek (“It will finish, one by one”), c. mid-1990s; Piny ci Deng nok (“The land that has killed 
Deng”), c. mid-1990s; and Cien kedie ka alei [sic] (“I have no problem with foreigners”), c. 1996. 
795 This chorus can be repeated through a list of tribes; as sung by DKLK, 21 August 2013, as well as by 
Akut Kuei in Juba. 
796 Likely, my translators noted, a code name for an Anyanya (c. 1964-1972) or SPLA (c.1983-2005) 
guerrilla leader local to the area. 
797 Duk ben la wel wel (“Don’t panic”), 1994. 
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If it is not this land, the land that has killed Deng, 
If it is not this land that will be compensation for Deng - 
Then we shall avenge with one hundred people, 
One hundred, tens of thousands, we shall not count. 
Even if I’m given food, I will not accept - 
The life of Deng Nhial is not food… 
The life of Deng Nhial is not worth money… 
The life of Deng Nhial is not thirty-one cows…798 
 
The word used for land is baai, or baai panda – a territorial expression of a permanent 
homeland that runs through these books and songs. As Zoe Cormack details, the term baai  
‘has been infused with strong associations of liberation war, nationalism and independence’ 
and ‘provides a way of expressing the nation and political identification with the state,’ but – 
more importantly – this use of baai subsumes the central state of southern Sudan to a local, 
rural and ‘moral centre.’799 This is true of the sustained moral analogies that run through the 
books of children’s stories, poems and songs, with wolves and hyenas attacking the baai and 
outsiders stealing from it.800 Intrinsic to the idea of baai, and as common in the Dinka songs 
and books, is the idea of ownership of land. Many people emphasised the true meaning of 
the name Sudan - ‘because of this colour of ours’ - as a mark of authentic ownership of baai 
panda;801 Nikkel records a female songwriter singing in 1991: ‘we are the real owners of the 
country… is there a soil which does not know its owner? The country resembles us.’802 This 
is reinforced by the common representation of Arab-origin Sudanese as immigrants, as ‘the 
land they entered is an African land… I studied this history in the school.’  
 
Sudan803 is the land of the black people 
We shall struggle for it 
                                                
798 Piny ci Deng nok (“The land that has killed Deng”); thirty-one cows is the sum paid by Dinka people as 
dia, compensation for murder, under the legal codes set out at Wanh Alel in 1984. See Cherry 
Leonardi, Leben Nelson Moro, Martina Santschi, and Deborah Isser, Local justice in southern Sudan, 
(Washington, DC, 2010), p. 27. 
799 Cormack, ‘The Making and Re-Making of Gogrial’, pp. 187, 189–190. 
800 Akut Kuei, Junub pandan (“The South our country”), c. early 1990s. 
801 DCS, 11 August 2013. 
802 Nikkel, Dinka Christianity, p. 332; also see Akut Kuei’s use of the term ‘visitor’, in Duk ben la wel wel 
(“Don’t panic”), Pienyda, pienyda, pienyda (“Our land”), and Thudan ee Panda (“Sudan is our 
country”), c. mid-1990s. 
803 JG, 19 July 2013. 
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… 
It is God who created us and placed us in Sudan and said this is your land. 
You are a visitor - you go804 
 
There are comparative ideas of land, homeland and ownership in the Equatorian and Arabic-
language work from Khartoum, including the work of General Paulino Mesaka and 
Emmanuel Kembe, although this needs further exploration beyond the scope of this study.  
 
These songs and books, however, do not focus on a clear future nation-state of South 
Sudan, but on political identification with a broader territorial moral collective. In 
establishing a historical homeland – even if the parameters were vague – this literary work 
was challenging readers to imagine an alternative political community. 
 
 
The plural political community of “southern” Sudan 
 
The political community evoked by these projects, though, was deeply complicated and 
potentially contradictory – for instance, Akut Kuei’s two songs “Sudan our country” and “the 
South our country.” These projects are ambiguous: many of these texts could be described 
as Dinka “ethnic nationalism”, but their ethnic specificity in language (and thus their 
apparent target audience) belies their broader pan-southern or pan-black language, and 
their generalisations of “southern”, “black” or “Dinka/etc.” Similarly, this ethnic specificity 
reflects the practicalities of language in arts – for instance, Akut Kuei were singing in Dinka 
for the Dinka primarily, but also because using the vernacular was safer, emotionally 
powerful, and drew on musical traditions. Non-Dinka speakers were familiar with (and 
sometimes could sing) Dinka songs, and vice versa. But while written in Dinka and often 
about “the Dinka”, these Dinka texts use the terms jieng/monyjiang, ran col, and janubi 
(Dinka, black person, and southerner), and the Equatorian texts and songs accessed in this 
study move between generic “people”, “black people” and “southerners”. 
 
                                                
804 Akut Kuei, Thudan ee Panda (“Sudan is our country”). 
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This was not necessarily just a case of interchangeable terminologies. These texts, and their 
authors, aimed specifically at complexity and interpretation, creating ambiguous works of 
broad emotional strength that was often the opposite of more common dogmatic, 
unequivocal political propaganda. For instance, a Dinka friend (a keen cultural sponsor and 
ex-resident of Khartoum himself) took the lead in an interview with one of the Akut Kuei 
songwriters to discuss his own interpretations of their work: 
 
LB:  The information you have in your songs is more than what you saw in your 
eyes [sic], I believe. You might have seen ten things but what you have put 
down here is ninety. [laughter] 
JA:  So now, like what you said, the meaning of songs here, is really powerful, 
more than – 
LB:  What you saw. 
JA:  What I saw.  These – deep things coming from my heart.805 
 
The authors of these texts were well aware of the contradictions and problems of mutual 
affiliation as “southerners” or as “black people” in their work. The most obvious example of 
this is in the Akut Kuei song “Everyone hates the Dinka” (Jieng ameen wuot): 
 
The Dinka are hated by everyone 
The Dinka are hated by everyone 
But they can’t defeat them 
Something’s gone wrong in this South Sudan of ours 
Look at Africa – 
They are different, but southerners have the same skin 
The Nuer of nyantoic speak and act differently 
But we, the people of the South, have the same skin 
The Dor806 and the Nuba are different 
But they are also Southerners, with the same skin 
The Shilluk are also Southerners with the same skin 
But the heart – the heart is not the same 
If it was one, 
We would not have problems between us, 
Scrapping over the remains of the carcass 
We have chaos over the carcass 
And we leave a person eating the meat, 
Dipping their hands into the Dinka for their blood. 
                                                
805 LB and JAN, 8 September 2013. 
806 A Dinka term for Equatorians. 
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It is better to go hungry.807 
 
When translating this from the Dinka, many Dinka speakers – including the song’s author, 
who wrote the original version in 1992808 – disagreed over who was meant by “the Dinka,” 
with many saying (potentially retrospectively) that this meant “southerners,” or more 
broadly, the black people of the south. These songs’ focus on the lack of pan-southern 
solidarity is echoed across this genre of educational texts, emphasising the need for mutual 
respect, intermarriage in Khartoum, and mutual solidarity: ‘If he only loves to promote this 
own culture, and does not want other people’s culture to develop, then there’s no truth.’809 
This cultural work was part of a debate over the content and form of alternative Sudanese 
moral and political communities, even if this was not necessarily predicated on clear ideas of 
an eventual geographical or political unit: they demanded their listeners do the personal 
moral, intellectual, and communal “workings-out”.  
 
This plurality of markers was an articulation of layers of affiliation, of social solidarity and 
mutual political understandings; these mutualities were explained by many people as 
“brotherhoods”, and maybe are best articulated in an academic context as a kind of moral 
federal community. In these texts, loosely-drawn ethnic, pan-ethnic and local communities 
were coordinate, mutually referent, while also independent and sometimes competitive, and 
operating under umbrella commonalities of political and historical experience and ideals. 
People's local, regional, linguistic, clan, ethnic identifications were affiliated as a loose 
collective based on consciousness of a common political history of being black, peripheral 
and subordinate. This oral and written literature debates the lines of this layered black 
community. The area of “the south” – or of “black Sudan”, which is sometimes 
correspondent – was mutually defined, and is an historically and politically shifting concept 
across these texts: the Primary 4 Dinka Reader, for instance, includes a map of the ‘land of 
the areas of Dinka’ but juxtaposed this with the explanation that, just south of Jebelein, ‘the 
southern part of Sudan is for black people [koc col],’ including the Nuer, Luo, Shilluk, Nuba, 
                                                
807 Jieng ameen wuot (“Everyone hates the Dinka”), 1992. 
808 JAN, 10 September 2013. 
809 SAK, ‘Equality’, in Magazine of Dinka Culture, p. 10; also ‘The Culture in northern Sudan’, Magazine of 
Dinka Culture, p. 5; ‘The system of marriage among the Dinka,’ and ‘What is Marriage?’, The Dinka 
Customology of Marriage, pp. 7-8. 
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Zande, Bongo and Ndogo.810 Topologies of violent confrontation characterise these mobile 
borders in these accounts, for instance in Akut Kuei’s song “Abyei, Abyei, the wut of Deng 
Kuol”: 
 
We no longer want to be in the north… 
Twelve years Abyei has fought with these sons of dogs 
And we have allowed them to suffer 
If we had realised this 
We would have told the youth from Dor811 to run to the border… 
And the youth of Dor would run in, 
And the message would be taken to Nuer… 
Then this war of ours would have finished at the border… 
… 
And one thing I want to tell you, 
You southerners, 
Let’s respect Aweil and Abyei, 
They have managed to keep the nightmare at bay - … 
If it were not for them, then the Arabs would have gone deep into the south for the 
border.812 
 
This writing of alternative political histories encouraged the imagining of new world orders, 
and the exploration of the limits of what Anderson called the ‘deep horizontal comradeship’ 
of national community. Discussions of the constitution and defence of black or southern 
Sudan often echo or directly take up John Garang’s ideas of “New Sudan.” A core phrase in 
the SPLA's ideological rhetoric from its first use in the SPLM/A manifesto of 1983, “New 
Sudan” was initially used to describe an imagined Sudan which would emerge after the 
overthrow of the regime, becoming unfashionable after the 1991 SPLA split but then re-
emerging in 1994 at the first SPLA National Convention.813 By the end of the Convention, 
New Sudan had gained a more ambiguous definition, as – ‘for the time being’ – Bahr el 
Ghazal, Equatoria, Southern Blue Nile, Southern Kordofan and Upper Nile Regions.814  
 
                                                
810 Primary 4 Reader, p.6. 
811 Dinka term for Equatorians. 
812 Abyei, Abyei wun e Deng Kuol (“Abyei, Abyei, the wut of Deng Kuol”), c. mid-1990s; Lino Alëu makes 
similar statements in History, p. 11. Wut means a section of the Dinka, more easily translated here as 
the “people” of Deng Kuol. 
813 Rolandsen, Guerrilla government, pp. 118–9. 
814 Ibid., pp. 121, 172. 
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Garang’s problematic pronouncement on the reach of the civil war - in the words of one Bari 
man, ‘those of you who want to fight for South Sudan, fight and then when you get to Kosti 
– you stop there, we will continue’ – resonated with many people engaged in this mutual 
and personal definition of the limits of baai panda junub:815 ‘whether I came from the north 
to join them in Kosti or not, or whether I perished there it didn’t matter – my people would 
stop at Kosti and come back to what is theirs.’816 
 
‘We want to re-Africanise those people in the north parts [sic]. There are some 
people like - there is a tribe called Denagla. There is a tribe called Shaggiya. These 
people, they have their own language. Which means that they were African…’817  
 
Where the “south” ended in these texts is also complicated by the consistent claiming of 
northern Sudan in origin myths and genealogies, particularly by the Dinka.818 This claiming 
of “southern origins” in northern Sudan, as Beswick has recently detailed, is not only an 
expression of Dinka nationalism, but is linked to discussions of the heritage of pre-colonial 
non-Muslim regional states such as Nubia and Alwa, and to pro-southern and pro-black 
historical work in general.819 The Primary 4 Reader states ‘we assume our grandparents 
were also the ones near Khartoum’ - but the textbook goes on to briefly explain textual, oral 
and archaeological historical sources, the limited source material on southern and pre-
colonial Sudan, and emphasises the importance of research and record-keeping.820  
 
Membership of these collectives was often expressed in these texts along lines of “trust”, 
apparently in the broadest sense of the term as truth, responsibility, mutual safe-keeping 
and common hope. This is a long-used term among migrants in the north: Woldemikael’s 
                                                
815 lit. our ‘homeland, the country of the south’; JW, 18 October 2013. 
816 JW, 18 October 2013; another version of Garang’s statement is recorded by Jok, Diversity, unity, and 
nation building, p. 9: ‘anyone not convinced about the liberation of the whole Sudan can stop when 
we reach Kosti and leave me to march to Khartoum alone if I so choose.’ 
817 JGRN, 28 June 2013. 
818 These origin myths are not limited to Dinka people; see Leonardi, Dealing with government in South 
Sudan, p. 22; Nikkel, Dinka Christianity, pp. 41–43. For example, see The Dinka Customology of 
Marriage, Introduction, p. 5; Lino Alëu, History, p. 9. 
819 Stephanie Beswick, Sudan’s Blood Memory: The Legacy of War, Ethnicity, and Slavery in Early South 
Sudan (Rochester, 2004). 
820 Primary 4 Reader, p. 10. It is possible that the author of this section of the textbook was drawing on 
Arkel’s 1940s writings that described excavations in northern Sudan apparently finding skeletons 
resembling Dinka and Nuer physiognomy; see Nikkel, Dinka Christianity, p. 41. 
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informants in Wad Medani in 1985 referred to “northerners” as mundukuru, now a common 
derogatory term in South Sudan for Arabs but in Woldemikael’s translation meaning 
“untrustworthy”, and Malik records a Kordofan woman resident of a slum area as being 
afraid that ‘one day they [southerners] will come to kill and eat me’ (although her friend 
corrected her that southerners could be trusted, unlike the Nuba).821 Similarly extreme 
accounts of a lack of trust – or the fundamental amorality or immorality of “Arabs” – 
punctuate explanations of relationships with Darfur and Arab northerners in these southern 
interviews and texts.822 As Ibrahim noted in 1990, ‘women’s perception of the “Arabs” is 
limited to whom they call “Arabs” in the shanty town’; he delineates this as everyone who 
was not southern or Nuba.823 Like “southerners,” “Arabs” are not a coherent grouping but a 
shorthand for those outside of the racial, ethno-linguistic and political lines of trust.  
 
As with Brennan’s work on Tanzanian nationalism, this work established ‘a politics of enmity 
concerned with defining enemies of the nation and creating corresponding purge categories,’ 
listing atrocities and acts of discrimination against Dinka people, including photographs of 
amputations and enslaved men.824 This was most emphatic in accounts of murdering 
patients to remove their blood, organs and bones, generally believed to be done by northern 
and/or Arab doctors, ‘in order to remove some good things for his medical activities’: ‘even 
they steal the babies sometimes,’ and ‘they sometimes remove the blood, or [it] can be 
sold.’825 Lino Alëu’s History is explicitly violent and retributive, calling not necessarily for 
financial restitution but direct violent repercussions against the Khartoum regime and its 
supporters by generations to come. 
 
Ask the child like this: 
 - Do you know what Arabs did to us? 
Explain it properly to the child, if he understands, ask him or her: 
                                                
821 Woldemikael, ‘Southern migrants in a Northern Sudanese City’, p. 30; Malik, ‘Displacement as 
Discourse.’ 
822 For example, PDA, 21 June 2013; DKLK, 4 July 2013; AT, 8 June 2013; chiefs’ meeting, 13 April 2013. 
823 Ibrahim, ‘The conditions of the Southern Sudanese Women Migrants’, p. 253. 
824 Brennan, ‘Blood Enemies,’ p. 389; for examples, see Lino Alëu, History, p. 26. 
825 APA, 22 July 2013; DKLK (4 July 2013) also told stories of blood- and bone-selling. For regional 
histories of blood-sucking and body-snatching, see Luise White, Speaking with vampires: Rumor and 
history in colonial Africa (London, 2000), p. 37. 
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 - What shall we do to Arabs?826 
 
In this imaginary Venn diagram of political and social trust, then, the Nuba and Darfur 
communities were peripheral “brothers”: but, for many people, while ‘all the south Sudanese 
in Khartoum [were] brothers together,’ people from the Nuba Mountains and particularly 
from Darfur were “brothers” of a different kind.827 This reflected the contemporary attitude 
from the SPLA and other anti-regime political organisations in Sudan at the time: ‘Dr John 
realised that there is [unity] of the black people.’828 This was layered, as above: ‘when you 
talk about the rights, even if you are not from that [area], you get people supporting you… 
[the SPLA was] addressing every problem which is facing any Sudanese people in general. 
And south Sudanese in particular.’829 Perhaps startlingly, despite the apparent fading away 
of Garang’s inclusive rhetoric about democratic reform and national black African unity post-
CPA, most of these texts and the discussions around them emphasised the historical and 
political inclusion of eastern and western Sudanese people.830 Without writing a history of 
Darfur, Nuba and Beja activism in Khartoum here, these communities were frequently seen 
by “southerners” as part of this geographic power struggle and ownership of Sudan – in 
theory, if not always in practice. This was partly because of the heterogeneity of 
populations, an awareness of mutual discrimination and violence from the Khartoum state 
because of their blackness, and the collective educational provision in impoverished areas of 
the city.831  Many Khartoum southern residents at least studied alongside these other “black 
marginalised” populations in Khartoum, particularly the Nuba residents.832 ‘The students we 
taught [were] not from Dinka alone, but from various states, including the far north, and 
western Sudan, Darfur. It’s a mixed school, but [we] used to tell [sic] in classes that – you 
                                                
826 Lino Alëu, History, p. 11. 
827 ADA, 13 August 2013. 
828 SA, 8 August 2013. 
829 RRL, 3 September 2013. 
830 See Dut Anyak Dit, Yok ci yokoth tuoom (“We have gone opposite ways”): 
What you are looking for is not what I’m looking for 
We are going different directions 
You have missed me… 
Look your way – the road is there. 
I have turned my back on you. 
I am going to the border 
I will sit at the border and demarcate it. 
831 JGRN, 28 June 2013. 
832 DKLK, 21 August 2013; also AAD, 14 August 2013. 
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are our people. Because you have been originated from the south… you have been 
originated [sic] from the south, southern Sudan!’833 This was based on a subjective personal 
spectrum of inclusion, trust and collaboration with the collective Nuba, “easterners” and 
Darfuris (mostly in that order). Several people had attended the Nuba politician Philip Abbas 
Ghaboush’s rallies because ‘we want to learn politics.’834 This pan-black Sudanese politics – 
particularly with the Nuba and Philip Abbas – is emphasised in many of these texts, for 
instance a chapter in Lino Alëu’s History, titled “William Deng Nhial and Philip Abbas 
Ghaboush”: ‘[they] were the first leaders who begin the struggle for the south against 
Arabs. They met and discussed to find a solution about Arab colonialism in Sudan.’835 
 
But there were limits to the solidarity that rested on this political nexus of culture, language, 
religion and moral affiliation. The Darfur populations of Khartoum are a good example of 
these limits for their southern neighbours, whose young men often joined the Sudan Armed 
Forces under Bashir’s “jihad” in the 1990s and early 2000s.836 The presence of Darfur locals 
blurred these lines of brotherhood and social inclusion as ‘co-citizens who suffer with 
them.’837 People from Darfur were often described as “black but…”, being racially but not 
consciously politically, socially or intellectually part of a broader Sudanese black collective, 
unlike those who were “black and…”: ‘we are black and we are south Sudanese,’ in that 
order.838 
 
‘We were the same by the skin, but different in heart. They think that they are Arabs. 
…So for Darfurians we don’t mix with them sometimes, because for them they used 
to steal our things and they don’t want to be our brothers. For some time they sat to 
be Arabs, and we as Dinka.’839 
 
For many “southern” residents of Khartoum, Darfur people’s political and social loyalty was 
suspect, undermined by some Darfur groups’ claims to Arab genealogies, forms of Islam, 
                                                
833 MAA, 11 August 2013. 
834 DKLK, 21 August 2013. 
835 Lino Alëu, History, p. 27; this section is probably referring to General Union of Nuba meetings with the 
SANU leadership, c. 1965-69. 
836 APA, 21 August 2013. 
837 Ibrahim, ‘The conditions of the Southern Sudanese Women Migrants’, p. 253. 
838 Berman, ‘Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State’, p. 306. 
839 LAM, 8 June 2013. 
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and political Islamic ideas. For many Dinka residents, their Darfur neighbours further 
challenged pan-Sudanese solidarity in the Khartoum suburbs because of personal memories 
and historical legacies of the suffering of particularly Dinka communities at the hands of 
southern Darfur and southern Kordofan armed raiding parties, known as murahaleen; 
Rizeigat and Misseriya massive armed raids, driven initially by famine in western Sudan in 
the mid-1980s and then fuelled by government assistance as proxy warfare against the SPLA 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, killed tens of thousands of people and depopulated large 
parts of northern Bahr el Ghazal.840 Many of the poorer and newer residents from greater 
Bahr el Ghazal and Abyei had suffered significantly in Darfur and on the route to Khartoum; 
many people had experienced, and lost relatives and children to, violence against displaced 
communities on the roads and in the towns on the way to Khartoum, or been kidnapped or 
forced by violence or circumstance into enslavement or exploitative labour by local 
landowners or cattle and camel herders between 1986 and 2005. There are many examples 
of extreme vitriol against Darfur communities in this literature, not necessarily restricted to 
Muslim groups or those claiming Arab ancestry. 
 
‘They are the ones [who] damaged our people… they are black in colour but their 
heart [is] different. [They were] thinking that what we [were] doing [then] was bad. 
But now, they are suffering!… They were the ones who did bad to us [sic], at that 
time. They were very strong ones, they stand and confront our people in the field of 
war. They even sang songs of jihad… they had songs [singing] that they are not 
afraid, [as] Darfurians [sic].’841 
 
This definitive delineation of the “Darfurian” community as stooges of the Khartoum regime 
was common in interviews and texts: ‘they are black, but they are brainwashed by [the] 
Islamic system.’842 The most extreme example is Lino Alëu’s introductory comments about 
the nature of the civil war in his History. 
 
We will punish Darfurians [sic], and they will know that Garang was [fighting for the] 
freedom of a black person… it is good for God to show Darfurians how the disaster 
occurred [in the south]. It is good for God to show them the disaster, to see it with 
                                                
840 Andrew N. M. Mawson, ‘Murahaleen Raids on the Dinka, 1985–89’, Disasters, 15:2 (June 1991), pp. 
137–149. 
841 DCS, 15 July 2013; also ADA, 13 August 2013. 
842 DCD, 15 July 2013. 
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their own eyes in Darfur… what let us be conquered by [the] Arabs was [Darfur], 
they are those who let us be conquered… I will thank God if He will show Darfurians 
disaster.843 
 
More common, though, is a more subtle explanation of why, for many, Darfur people could 
not be fully trusted: they were “duped”, not politically conscious, or not fully understanding 
of their deeper political and historical position in Sudan. As one man explained, ‘the situation 
to the south was not only for the south, but for the black [people]’ – but ‘[the Darfuris] don’t 
understand that they are also black.’844 Many people, as well as Lino Alëu’s History, 
emphasised that Darfur people were misled into thinking that they were fighting for the 
cause of Islam. This explanation emphasised that, by the 2000s, many people from Darfur 
realised that they had been “duped”, and ‘became aware’ of this alternative understanding 
of, and political vision for, Sudan.845 John Garang, in all cases, was ‘the one enlightening 
those of western Sudan… to know themselves also as a black people, and [that] Sudan 
[belongs] to them. So, black people united [in] the one vision - know [that] the Sudan 
[belongs] to them.’846  
 
This cultural work did not consistently or solely set out a “southern Sudanese” communal 
identity, or even argue that southern-ness should take a kind of precedence over ethnic, 
regional or racial affiliations. The historical and political content of this work was not (or not 
only) pushing a clear “South Sudan nation-state” based on an alternative selective political 
history created by these local educated elites. Instead, these texts and their authors 
encouraged a consciousness of broad affiliations of black political and historical 
consciousness, and emphasised the critical discussion of the nature of black, southern and 
Sudanese identification, and the importance of self-reflection in this context; as Dut Anyak’s 
poem Kongku rot deet (“We must study our souls”) says, 
 
We must study our souls, and come together 
We first study ourselves, then we will become one 
Let’s not be misled by blackness 
                                                
843 Lino Alëu, History, p. 8. 
844 ABA, 16 August 2013. 
845 Chiefs’ meeting, 20 August 2013; ABA, 16 August 2013. 
846 SA, 8 August 2013; also ABA, 16 August 2013; chiefs’ meeting, 20 August 2013; Lino Alëu, History. 
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But let’s be united by facts.847 
 
Lino Alëu wrote that knowledge is to ‘understand our hearts’, to ‘cooperate’ and to ‘select 
out those with poor vision [sic] among us.’848 The most obvious manifestation of this focus 
on practical education is the frequent tests, questions and mottos strung through the books. 
These are not straightforward questions but demands for critical thought: 
 
Questions: 
1. What is the lesson we learn from the above? 
2. Is there anybody who has ever done this?849 
 
The book Dinka Customology of Marriage has a revision section with twenty-two questions 
on the content of the book, including ‘which things are not in order in Khartoum?’850 Dinka 
Displacement demanded that ‘a person… read [and] analyse,’ and ‘think about [the stories] 
carefully.’851 This should be a collaborative education, according to the Culture magazine: ‘if 
you are just reading some books and articles outside without attending classes, you think 
yourself someone who is educated, but those things cannot take you anywhere.’852 
 
These exams could be seen as tests of character, not knowledge. Their central demand for 
personal and collective responsibility and self-regulation is common across histories of 
southern Sudanese political thought.853 This demand is commonly conceptualised in these 
texts and songs as yic, commonly translated or co-opted into English as “right” or “the 
right”; Leinhardt translates yic as ‘truth which is arrived at and stated by a communal 
intention.’854 Leonardi’s discussion of “rights” focuses on its application for advocacy and 
‘claiming one’s right’, an educated person’s ‘creolised and multivalent term, an interpretation 
                                                
847 Dut Anyak Dit, Kongku rot deet (“We must study our souls”), 2003. 
848 Lino Alëu, History, p. 12. 
849 Magazine of Dinka Culture, p. 13; also see Lino Alëu, History, p. 10; Magazine of Dinka Culture, p. 13. 
850 The Dinka Customology of Marriage, p. 12. 
851 Dinka Displacement, Sections 4 and 10. 
852 Magazine of Dinka Culture, p. 12. 
853 See Cherry Leonardi, ‘The Poison in the Ink Bottle: Poison Cases and the Moral Economy of 
Knowledge in 1930s Equatoria, Sudan’, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 1:1 (March 2007), pp. 34–
56; Tuttle, ‘Life is Prickly’. 
854 Godfrey Lienhardt, Divinity and Experience: The Religion of the Dinka (Oxford, 1961), pp. 139, 247–8; 
for the Nuer equivalent, see Douglas H. Johnson, ‘Judicial Regulation and Administrative Control: 
Customary Law and the Nuer, 1898–1954’, The Journal of African History, 27:01 (1986), p. 59. 
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both of Western notions of legal rights and of vernacular concepts like yic in Dinka’; she 
defines yic as an objective truth ‘which transcends the subjective truths of disputants.’855 
 
Here, in Dinka and English (used by both Dinka and Equatorian people), these terms go 
beyond claim-making into explanations of political consciousness and self-management, a 
“right” and “rights” that are understood through this educational work: ‘when you are 
exposed to education then… you realize your right.’856 All the texts, songs and their writers 
were explicitly anti-individualist, warning of the dangers of and against the isolation and 
commercialisation of relationships and daily living in Khartoum, getting “lost” in the day to 
day pressures of survival. This theme is not anti-change, but emphasises the importance of 
social systems: as the Dinka Customology of Marriage book states, ‘you consider being 
related as when you share ideas, and you share wealth,’ but in Khartoum, ‘marriage is not 
stable, it is flowing like money’: ‘don’t turn marriage into a business.’857 These texts 
demanded nuance and a depth of emotional understanding in communication, particularly 
by younger people who did not understand some social demands of their communities or 
use the complex emotional linguistics and expressions of their vernaculars.858 ‘Old words 
have changed, because the young men… have stopped understanding words, and stopped 
asking.’859 The texts are littered with Khartoum-specific proverbs and instructions about 
interpersonal relationships – not always simply criticising “the youth” necessarily, and often 
praising “good” young men and women who are aware of and use different registers and 
languages in the various social situations in Khartoum.860 This is a demonstration of the 
reaction against what Leonardi describes as ‘the widespread discourse of selfish “townese”’: 
‘townspeople actually worked hard to maintain kinship and wider relations and to invest in 
social capital, respectable marriages and recognition of their social status in networks and 
communities beyond the towns.’861 Realising this right and responsibility was also about not 
                                                
855 Leonardi, Dealing with government in South Sudan, p. 101. 
856 RRL, 3 September 2013. 
857 The Dinka Customology of Marriage, pp. 5, 7-8. 
858 For example, The Dinka Customology of Marriage, pp. 8-9. 
859 Dinka Displacement, Section 11. 
860 Both Akut Kuei’s Song Book and the Primary 4 Reader print proverbs at the end of each section or 
song; all the texts sourced for this thesis contain proverbs. 
861 Leonardi, Dealing with government in South Sudan, p. 157. 
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losing hope or becoming immersed in day to day economic and leisure activities, as one man 
explained: 
 
‘[These songs were] enlightening the southerners to remember the situation they are 
[in]. Because… some of them have even given up. … And because of this despair – 
this song was the one [to] restore the hope [sic]. … The singer [wanted] to remind 
people that if you behave like this now, then what Deng Nhial died for is going to 
become zero [sic]. You’re supposed to be aware… you eat the food of important 
people here in Khartoum – and majesty of Deng Nhial is going to be taken. You walk 
in the street like free people – but the majesty of Deng Nhial… which means: he 
wants to tell them that even though you walk freely inside the streets of Khartoum, 
you are still enslaved, you are a stranger here.’862 
 
Those who did not know “their right” in Khartoum were members of the community who 
were intellectually lazy, living day to day, scared or dismissive of social involvement, and 
individualist, parochial or insular. In the Dinka texts, this is often expressed through the 
common idea of “weak” or “hard” hearts.863 This was often a topic of humour as well as 
serious debate. Comedy groups commonly acted ‘[as] the court… and also how are the 
leaders behaving in the community.’864 The popular play Al Hosh (“The Compound”), written 
in the mid-90s by a founding member of Kuato and Orupaap, is a good example of this self-
satire that was engaged in by comedy groups and youth theatres across Khartoum suburban 
communities, often around churches.865 Al Hosh focused on an “everyday” mixed-ethnicity 
southern Sudanese compound in Khartoum, whose residents fulfilled all the comedic tropes 
of the community, including a group of young women at Afhad University dedicating 
themselves to gossip, men, and the latest fashions; a lazy, drunken and abusive man and 
his beleaguered wife; and a lone man in good employment who was rich and generous but 
was exploited for his generosity by the rest of the compound. Nobody in the play avoids 
satirist criticism.866 
 
                                                
862 DKLK, 21 August 2013. 
863 For example, Akut Kuei, Kongdien e cuec (“My right hand”), and Ka ye beny theeth (“The spearmaster 
will regret his prophesy”); Dut Anyak Dit, Yomdit mei (“The dry season storm is rising”), c. 1992. 
864 AMJ, 16 July 2013. Miller records text from several plays on this theme: ‘Juba Arabic’, Appendix 3. 
865 SO, 9 November 2013; an improvised comedy group was repatriated to Apada and still practices today 
on Sundays. 
866 SO, 9 November 2013. 
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This work therefore encouraged people to have internal critical lives, in the face of heavily 
policed public space and expression. One man remembered using headphones and a 
cassette player to listen to these subversive songs while on a long commute to work and 
school on public transport.867 This importance of having and controlling a positive and 
constructive internal life in spite of Khartoum economic and political pressures is expressed 
throughout these texts as speaking in the heart versus the mouth. 
 
What is said in the heart is much more than what is said in the mouth. The heart 
thinks and says a lot… What you say in your heart is not the same as what you say 
with your mouth. The mouth is good because it will fear to speak.868 
 
Another book emphasises: ‘we would like you to keep those words in your hearts, and think 
of good words that you will use… there are many things to be said, but few speak the 
truth.’869 A 1998 song by an unknown author, recorded by Nikkel in 2001, summarises this 
emphasis on internal critical responsibility as a member of a broader moral and political 
community: 
 
I must struggle to adjust my life 
For best advantage, 
Both in the way of our ideals 
And in actuality. 
If it does not proceed like this, 
Then my life and my existence 
Have no meaning 
In the flow of the stories of my people, 
In the history of the world.870 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
867 DKLK, 4 July 2013. 
868 Dinka Displacement, Section 10; also see Magazine of Dinka Culture, p. 16. 
869 The Dinka Customology of Marriage, p. 12. 
870 ‘Deng and Mohammed in the Land of Sudan’, Nikkel, Dinka Christianity, p. 281. 
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Conclusion 
 
This cultural work complicates the more broad-brush or elite-focused explanations of 
contemporary post-secession South Sudanese nationalism from Frahm, Jok and others, as 
detailed in the Introduction.871 Nor does this local intellectual work match up with the 
broader characterisation of the state of South Sudanese nationalism today. This chapter 
challenges the assertion that “southerners” have ‘only a hazy notion of a collective national 
identity beyond [their] unified opposition to the north.’872 As argued in chapter one, using 
“southern” as a default or a priori term when discussing political thought in the region 
constrains discussions of nationalism. Similarly, many of the discussions of South Sudanese 
nationalism focus on post-CPA or post-secession local debates, which are broadly 
characterised as a tension between “ethnic” and “national” identification.873 This assumes a 
lack of supra-local, supra-ethnic critical thought pre-2005, and imagines nationalism in terms 
of a “prioritising” of the national over the tribal, a nationalism predicated on a ranked 
hierarchy of clear affiliation.874 These analyses’ emphasis on the empty reactive nature of 
South Sudanese negative nationalism, needing ‘a clear-cut enemy’ to bring disparate and 
discrete specifically ethnic communities together, is the logical conclusion of a dualistic, 
state- and civil war-focused historical perspective.875 These chapters, though, have 
demonstrated Khartoum residents’ work to discuss and articulate a plural moral community 
beyond the specifically ethnic. People well knew that, as Jok said, ‘nations are made, not 
born… creating such a nation… requires a vision, a plan, and honest and participatory 
actions, not just the pronouncements of politicians’:876 these local intellectuals were doing 
this work in Khartoum already. 
 
                                                
871 Jok, Sudan; Ole Frahm, ‘Defining the nation: National identity in South Sudanese media discourse’, 
Africa Spectrum, 47:1 (2012), pp. 21–49; Peter Harengel and Ayantunji Gbadamosi, ‘“Launching” a 
new nation: The unfolding brand of South Sudan’, Place, Brand:  Public Diplomacy, 10:1 (2014), pp. 
35–54; Christopher Zambakari, ‘South Sudan and the nation-building project: Lessons and challenges’, 
International Journal of African Renaissance Studies - Multi-, Inter- and Transdisciplinarity, 8:1 (June 
2013), pp. 5–29. 
872 Jok, Diversity, unity, and nation building in South Sudan, p. 2. 
873 Frahm, ‘Defining the nation’; Jok, Diversity, unity, and nation building in South Sudan; Copnall, A 
Poisonous Thorn in Our Hearts. 
874 See Jok, Diversity, unity, and nation building in South Sudan, p. 4. 
875 Frahm, ‘Defining the nation’, p. 22. 
876 Jok, Diversity, unity, and nation building in South Sudan, p. 4. 
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This work was part of ‘the process of interpretation and reflection that takes places [sic] in 
all forms of protest and social mobilisation,’ framing and demarcating commonalities and 
potential communities - what is sometimes called “meaning work.”877 This was aimed at 
producing a sense of moral responsibility and communal history, but on plural and fluid 
lines. It did not explicitly set out definitive “southern nationalist” or ethno-nationalist units, 
but demanded broader critical engagement, and provided the basis for creative imaginings 
of possible future political communities. This Khartoum cultural and literary world is a good 
example of Lonsdale’s deep political work, beginning to draw up the limits of southern, 
racial, and political inclusion, and challenging the civic virtue of the wealthy, apathetic, 
culturally promiscuous, and politically ignorant.878 These texts and songs – and their authors 
and writing groups – were focused on a recruitment to consciousness. 
 
As in Tuttle’s work, this confronting of the painful political context and wartime experience 
was a ‘[struggle] to gain control and to keep or regain the ability to make choices.’879 These 
ideas of potential political community were dependent on concepts of “trust” and mutual 
understanding, concerned that ‘the heart is not the same,’ and intent on encouraging people 
to take up a particular perspective on the war and the world, as ‘black people united on the 
one vision – [who know that] the Sudan belong[s] to them.’880 
  
                                                
877 See Baud and Rutten, Popular intellectuals and social movements, p. 1. 
878 Berman and Lonsdale, Unhappy valley: conflict in Kenya and Africa (London, 1992); Bruce J. Berman, 
‘“A Palimpsest of Contradictions”: Ethnicity, Class, and Politics in Africa’, The International Journal of 
African Historical Studies, 37:1 (January 2004), pp. 13–31. 
879 Tuttle, ‘Life is Prickly’, p. 322. 
880 Akut Kuei, Jieng ameen wuot (“Everyone hates the Dinka”); SA, 8 August 2013. 
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Chapter five 
 
 
The part-time artists, authors and organisers of southern communities in Khartoum 
considered themselves to be ‘in the lion's den.’881 Many people claimed involvement in 
explicitly subversive political activity, beyond the internal intellectual projects of their cultural 
and social work. They aimed for this work to achieve more than community solidarity and 
intellectual resilience, and described themselves to me as active civil war agents, detailing 
stories of “resistance” in the mid-1990s to mid-2000s.  
 
This resistance, in retrospect, was explicitly “for the SPLA”, part of a long-standing 
simplification of “the southern liberation movement” from all parties.882 One man, who 
worked as a volunteer for around twenty years while a labourer in a factory in the mornings, 
explained: 
 
‘The most important issues were to support the SPLA outside here, like those whom 
we trained [in school], they came out and joined the SPLA; [this was why] we 
opened schools. …so many people were trained in the north. We were intending to 
support the south.’883 
 
This simplification of wartime affiliation and action is entirely at odds with the messy 
pluralities, flexibilities of identification and broader understandings of black Sudanese 
political community detailed in previous chapters – as well as contradicting the large body of 
academic literature on resistance. Any variety of modes of resistance, and of grey areas 
between rebellion and collaboration, are broadly stripped away in these accounts of spying 
and subversion in Khartoum: traitors, collaborators and quislings are apparently clear-cut 
actors to those working undercover. 
 
But these explanations of clear “good” and “bad” agents, of rebel nationalists versus weak 
and greedy collaborators, are also challenged by the actual details of the stories of spying 
                                                
881 DCD, 15 July 2013. 
882 Howell, ‘Political leadership and organisation in the southern Sudan’, p. 94. 
883 WMT, 17 August 2013. 
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and subversion recounted in Aweil and Juba. There are no clear-cut “good” actions in these 
accounts; the terms “collaborator” and “sell-out” are accusatory rather than descriptive.884 If 
resistance is not fetishised in analysis, then, as Fletcher observes in his critique of 
“resistance studies”, ‘it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish the good guys from the 
bad guys’:885 reducing civil wars to loyalists versus rebels, as Peterson observes of Mau Mau 
detainees in Kenya, makes it ‘hard to see the range of intellectual and moral projects in 
which [people] were involved.’886 
 
This chapter therefore takes a different approach to these binaries of pro/anti-SPLA, and 
subversive activists/collaborators. In exploring these multiple narratives of resistance, this 
chapter is not primarily debunking or questioning the truths of these accounts. It does not 
focus on the argument that this (macho) talk was retrospective self-justification by people 
who actually did very little, or that this was just self-aggrandising make-believe “spy stories” 
by people who wanted to tell me of their exploits, and who were otherwise aware of their 
own powerlessness or apparent passivity. There are elements of all of this demonstrated in 
this chapter. Instead, it primarily argues that these accounts of “good and bad” political 
action are part of the struggles of Khartoum residents to fit their ideas of black federalist 
moral communities into the practicalities of realistic political futures and structures, within 
the socio-economic and political limitations of life in Khartoum.  
 
The messy reality was that there was no single SPLA – or southern “movement" in general – 
in the political context of the mid-1990s civil wars, and the various militarised factions did 
not necessarily fit into categories of “pro-south/north”, or even “pro-unity/secession.” The 
broad mutual aim of self-determination was a political catch-all,887 exemplified by the SPLA 
slogan “awich ku angich ku,” literally translating to “we know what we want.”888 This chapter 
therefore looks at these explanations of actions, motives and compromises in the Khartoum 
                                                
884 That these terms were commonly used in the English and in translations in research. 
885 Fletcher, Beyond resistance, p. viii. 
886 Peterson, ‘The intellectual lives of Mau Mau detainees’, p. 75. 
887 For a discussion of the changing aims of the core Garangist SPLA, see Claire Metelits, ‘Reformed 
rebels? Democratization, global norms, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army’, Africa Today, 51:1 
(2004), p. 70. 
888 Peter Adwok Nyaba, South Sudan: The state we aspire to (Nairobi, 2011), p. 155. 
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context, demonstrating Kalyvas’ point that ambiguity is ‘endemic’ to the ‘convergence of 
local motives and supra-local imperatives’ in civil wars, despite a continual empirical quest 
for “the root causes.”889 
 
This reading also avoids the historiographical and methodological issues of a retrospective 
history of “spying”, and any over-emphasis on “action.” Talking about “resistance” presumes 
a distinction between “the state” and “the rebels” – a distinction that exists rhetorically, but 
not in practice. As Archbishop Gabriel Zubeir Wako asked of Khartoum university students in 
1986: ‘All black people are considered rebels. But rebels against whom? And why?’890 
 
It would be easy to write off these reported rebellious actions as glorified “mass political 
subversion”, made to write the tellers into a national history of the war as proud 
secessionists - particularly because of the moments of bathos and realism in many accounts: 
‘we thought they were going to arrest us and then they didn’t.’891 
 
‘I found that there were some military intelligence of the SPLA that could help me, 
but it was very difficult for me to get any contacts of these people… We didn’t have 
[a] connection, to tell you the truth, with anyone in the SPLM/SPLA.’892  
 
This would be to underestimate the paranoiac belief in this southern “fifth column,” and the 
danger of its mobilisation, by the brutal, repressive and increasingly extensive security 
branches of the Sudanese state.893 Regardless of the substantive extent of their subversive 
work, many people showed me serious scarring and gave me accounts of torture and 
imprisonment. Detention, surveillance, torture and public state violence in the 1990s and 
2000s have been relatively well-documented, particularly of Nuba, National Democratic 
                                                
889 Stathis N. Kalyvas, ‘The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil Wars’, Perspectives 
on Politics, 1:03 (September 2003), pp. 475–6; these ideas have recently been taken up by Anderson 
and Rolandsen, ‘Violence as politics’. 
890 Archbishop Gabriel Zubeir to Khartoum University Students, 'Peace-Makers: peace in the Sudan', 24 
March 1986, Comboniani E/674/26/4. 
891 JW, 18 October 2013. 
892 YM, 10 September 2013. 
893 The growth of formal and irregular state security forces is documented by Human Rights Watch; 
Rone, Behind the red line, pp. 129–130. 
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Alliance (NDA) and human rights activists.894 Organising musical performances and evening 
classes invited the attention of formal and informal security forces and armed members of 
the local neighbourhood committee and People's Police Force.895 Jebel Aulia and Mayo had 
notoriously abusive Comprehensive Security police stations by the mid-1990s.896 Several 
people showed me large scars and burns. 
 
‘[They] just … wrapped me with, uh – what do you call it in English, I don’t know – 
the metal wire, they wrapped me, and they put me [tied] to the car – and they 
dragged [me] –’897 
 
Another man was in prison for a year, and suffered from being exposed on the roof of the 
prison in blistering heat, a common form of torture in Khartoum;898 some people related 
stories of electrocution, and colleagues dying in custody.899 Even if the political outcomes or 
actions of these “civil society” or party organisations were negligible or symbolic in practice, 
the dangers of engagement were real. People in Khartoum really did run severe risks to act 
in what they thought were subversive ways. 
 
Brennan described nationalist development in Tanzania as focusing on ‘the process of 
defining who was a good citizen… and who the enemy was.’900 In the same way, animosity 
and frustration in accounts of political activism in Khartoum in this period was predominantly 
directed not at the “grand other” of “the Arab North,” but at people within the southern 
communities.901 Accounts focus on the complexities of determining trustworthy 
collaborators, versus southern “sell-outs,” and those who got “fat” off the post-colonial 
                                                
894 Lesch and Fadl (eds.), Coping with torture, pp. 3–4; Rone, Behind the red line, pp. 55–78, 127–8. The 
Amnesty International back catalogue of Urgent Actions, held in the Amnesty International Secretariat 
archives in the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam, and church reports such as Rev. 
Canon P. P. Augustine to John Boulden, ‘Horror in the Sudan,’ 14 April 2001, SAD.891/1/1-2, also 
detail this history. 
895 Rone, Behind the red line, p. 138. 
896 Ibid., pp. 138–9. 
897 JA, 10 September 2013.  
898 YM, 10 September 2013. For corroboration of this technique, see Rone, Behind the red line, p. 3; 
Lesch and Fadl (eds.), Coping with torture. 
899 PKKM, 9 August 2013. 
900 Brennan, ‘Blood Enemies’, p. 391. 
901 For a broader discussion on this common internal focus of subversive political movements, see 
Nachman Ben-Yehuda, ‘Gathering dark secrets, hidden and dirty information: Some methodological 
notes on studying political assassinations’, Qualitative Sociology, 13:4 (1990), p. 367. 
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state.902 These ‘rhetorical personages’, like Brennan says, ‘opened discursive space’ for 
questioning the limits of morality and citizenship in the political community of the speaker,903 
and most importantly, drawing clear lines of good and bad political action. The figure of “the 
sell-out” was a powerful force, affecting behaviour and appearing as a common selfish and 
morally weak agent of destruction in people’s accounts of wartime in Khartoum; but on the 
other hand, people were (and are) unwilling or unable to name anyone specifically and 
simply as “a sellout.” 
 
                                                
902 Brennan, ‘Blood Enemies’, pp. 397–8. 
903 Ibid., pp. 410, 413. 
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Figure 8: ‘Sell-outs at the table with the Arabs’ 
Published in Akut Kuei song book, p. 14. 
 
 
 
 
Detke ke apath koc rec yiecda aa kak.  Watch them closely, these are the ones who are 
spoiling our right. 
 
Dut Anyak Dit, Weet maath (“The two friends”), 1993.
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This chapter will first detail some of these explicit accounts of work “for the SPLA”, and the 
convenience of stripping away wartime ambiguities; it will then focus on the substance of 
what was explained as “spying”, looking at forums of underground political groups and 
examining how discussion of political futures, in itself, constituted political subversion. This 
discussion relied heavily on the safe political space and governance of the huge peri-urban 
black settlements of Khartoum by the early 2000s, which was based on the work of the 
“collaborators”, men who claimed traditional authority, military support and/or political 
power from dubiously pragmatic alliances with the Bashir regime. Those working as or with 
these brokers, within a less binary logic than self-described “SPLA spies”, had similar 
imaginings of alternative governance and future polities, but which were often more 
explicitly ethno-nationalist than pan-Sudanese. Those who were apparently politically 
beyond the pale for many people – such as the regime-funded rebel militias of Paulino Matip 
and Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, among others – were practical necessities in Khartoum and part 
of this “struggle” for the south, justifying their own work as pro-southern and emancipatory 
based on quite different (and possibly more pragmatic) understandings of governance and 
political futures. Actors like Paulino Matip were arguably also revolutionary subversives, 
albeit militaristic and ethnicised revolutionaries.  
 
This is therefore a study of explanations of applied morality in Khartoum, and the 
compromises and justifications necessary during the civil wars to attempt to square possible 
actions with political ideals. This is Lonsdale’s deep politics, ‘[where] people sustained in 
their narrative imagination what they struggled to achieve in practice.’904 This chapter also 
integrates violence – as a part of the ideas and practice of governance in Sudan, and a 
delimiting factor on action – into this history of discussions over possible forms of a future 
Sudanese political community.905 As Wendy James observes, 
 
from the periphery, the market-place of “certainties” on offer is less open than might 
be represented at “the centre”. For most people, there are very few real options, 
once the merchant banks and the arms-dealers have made their choices. In the daily 
lives of ordinary people there may be very little choice as to whether one wears Bata 
                                                
904 Berman, ‘“A Palimpsest of Contradictions”’, p. 26. 
905 Anderson and Rolandsen, ‘Violence as politics’, p. 545. 
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shoes, joins a fundamentalist church, or joins an ethnically based militia and dies for 
it. The only certainty is a pragmatic one, that you may have to do it.906 
 
This chapter demonstrates these tensions, between imagined radical new worlds, the 
pragmatism of a violent labour economy, the determinism of wartime practicalities, 
constraints on immediate personal futures and actions, and the quotidian efforts of “getting 
by.” 
 
 
Spy stories 
 
Accounts of subversive political action post-1983 broadly involve either returning to the 
south or recruiting guerrilla fighters, propaganda production, political parties, and seditious 
“New Sudan”-based youth groups. This style of “sedition” by southerners in Khartoum – like 
the binary of “spy” versus “collaborator” – has a long and dubious history, particularly in 
accounts of politics from a minority of male political elites.907 There are few (and differing) 
opinions on the character and legitimacy of this explicit “political activity” until the 1970s, 
and very little information on, or analysis of, Khartoum-based political subversion since 
then.908 It would be relatively easy to build an image of a vibrant and coordinated subversive 
political movement in Khartoum, thanks to the availability and intense revolutionary intent of 
“opposition” documents, such as the NDA and Communist Party archives in Amsterdam, the 
occasional bombastic political party or student manifesto in national archives,909 and the 
emphatic descriptions of organised spy cells in many politicians’ accounts of Khartoum in the 
1980s and 1990s, homogenised as covert SPLM activity under other names.910 Post-facto 
oral histories similarly contain spy stories that demonstrate the impact of dominant national 
narratives about the war and political independence, and situate the teller as part of a 
                                                
906 Wendy James, ‘Introduction: Whatever happened to the enlightenment?’, in Wendy James (ed.), The 
pursuit of certainty: religious and cultural formulations (London, 1995), p. 12. 
907 These accounts are always by men: R, a young woman, pointed this out, 2 September 2013. 
908 For one of the more ambitious accounts of this subversive history, see Abbas, ‘Growth of Black 
Political Consciousness in Northern Sudan.’ There is substantial material available in the Communist 
Party, National Democratic Alliance and Amnesty International archives, all held in the International 
Institute of Social History, Amsterdam. 
909 For some examples of these, see chapter one. 
910 EBK, 12 September 2013; JUA, 1 November 2013; NB, 18 October 2013. 
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specific and implicitly united fight against discrimination and marginalisation – in their words 
– that was aimed explicitly at the now-achieved independence. 
 
Throughout research, I heard stories of spying and subversion explicitly for the war effort 
that chime with Howell’s description of late 1970s work more closely.911 These stories, 
primarily of transferring information to “the opposition”, involved figures from major SPLA 
and SAF commanders and civil servants down to market traders and chiefs. Although mostly 
about men, I heard several stories of women employed to pass maps and stolen information 
to contacts in Darfur and Kordofan through travelling on buses with notes hidden in their 
vaginas.912 As in Howell’s notes, code names were used to arrange for people, such as 
medical doctors, to travel to join rebel movements, particularly through NGO workers in the 
“transition area.”913 This work was made particularly “subversive” – for my benefit, at least – 
by giving code names for spy work. The most dramatic was “Black Fox” - named in English 
and translating as awan col in Dinka – which allegedly consisted of seven southern 
Sudanese government staff, broadly working in “security”, buying information and 
transferring it abroad; ‘this money [was] coming from a secret place, so no need to mention 
it.’914 The two members I spoke to said that they passed information on armaments and 
troop movements for SPLA ambushes from the 1980s (which seems improbable) to 1995.915 
One member explained that the name of operation changed to Diin Ajer (“The [concrete] 
stone religion”) in 1996, as a new reincarnation.916 This organisation also had internal spy 
names. One “alternative name”, Mony Boc Kaliec Wel,917 meant in its owner’s words 
 
‘… that the night is pregnant for something that is invisible. … I write the letter and 
put that name, and when they find that letter they cannot get such a man! [sic]’918 
 
                                                
911 Howell, ‘Political leadership and organisation in the southern Sudan.’ 
912 JW 18 October 2013; AMA, 9 August 2013; DKLK, 4 July 2013; AT 14 April 2013; a woman also noted 
this: AMA, 9 August 2013. 
913 AB, 12 August 2013. 
914 PKKM, 9 August 2013. 
915 PKKM, 9 August 2013; also MMD, 17 August 2013. 
916 MMD, 17 August 2013. The SPLA apparently called it Katip Ajer, “the Stone Battalion”. 
917 These spellings are from interviewees. 
918 MMD, 17 August 2013. 
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Diin Ajer returned in another interview with an Equatorian ex-Khartoum resident, with the 
narrative starting in 1995, involving high-ranking South Sudanese officials working within the 
Khartoum regime sending information919 to the SPLA. ‘They will say [that] this news, we 
[got] it from Diin Ajer! [Laughs]’920 Another man, in explaining the name Diin Ajer, 
summarised the neat binary duplicity of the double agent: 
 
NK Why was it called Diin Ajer? 
PK You know because, what we say – is not what we do. Like we told the northerners – 
we belong to [the] government of Omer Bashir, we are squatters, we are against 
[the] SPLA, and we are ready to fight [the] SPLA. But what we say is not what we are 
doing. We told them something, we do something different. 
NK So why “concrete”? 
PK [Because] that stone [is so hard that] you cannot break in to know what is inside.’921 
 
 
 
 
Jongo 
 
The most common claim to political activism in the civil war in Khartoum, throughout 
interviews in Aweil and Juba, was participation in jongo. Jongo is a colloquial Sudanese 
Arabic term for casual or seasonally employed agricultural workers, employed generally in 
weeding, and living as squatters in settlements along the Sudanese agricultural belt of 
Gedarif and Kordofan.922 While there are many English and Arabic-language analyses of the 
social politics and migrant networks of the Sudanese workers on agricultural schemes in this 
region, the term was used in two ways by people in Aweil and Juba: 
 
‘Is it jongo for work or the jongo that goes to Ethiopia? … So the jongo were the 
workers who go into agricultural scheme for the work, and that is also where they 
get that SPLA jongo. So when you go to [the] agriculture scheme, you leave the field 
                                                
919 JA, 8 September 2013. 
920 Ibid. 
921 PKKM, 9 August 2013. 
922 See Magdi El Gizouli, ‘South Sudanese labour: refill the “kambo”’, Sudan Tribune, 8 October 2012. 
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and then you go to Ethiopia to join the army. And that is why they were called 
jongo.’923  
 
This jongo work in the Gezira was part of explanations of black movement and survival in 
wartime northern Sudan. By the early 1990s, the areas up to the Ethiopian border, via 
agricultural schemes and trade routes, was a well-known path to potentially get investment 
capital for businesses in Khartoum.924 This movement for trade and labour was the basis for 
the more political outcomes of jongo. Most people associated jongo with the political 
movement of information and, increasingly, people. Because roads back to many areas of 
the south were blocked or too dangerous to pass,925 people – mostly men, but some women 
– would ‘go underground’ to Gezira, Gedarif, south to Kordofan, or into Ethiopia, and 
information would travel through these networks.926  
 
This apparent jongo project – with no real leadership or common system emerging over the 
course of research, despite several claims to management – was explicitly articulated as 
semi-organised recruitment and travel to “the SPLA.”927 Two men explained: 
 
‘whoever became set [on going] – goes to mobilise the rest of his colleagues in order 
to find a way to Gedarif. … Setness [sic] comes as a result of the war, when your 
brother has been killed in the south, and the rest of your relatives, then you become 
set and you intend to go. Sometimes your father will be killed; when you heard about 
that, also you involve into the group. … we are not the ones to select them but they 
came alone, yeah, when they feel set is when they come and report themselves that 
they wanted to go this way. And for them they keep on counting the number until 
they reach 100, and then they give money and send them to Gedarif. … when they 
reached, because there was a certain market where they meet, so these people 
when they went there they met some other Dinka and they know where these people 
stay and they go to them. … it is the market, at the border, and sometimes we visit 
                                                
923 WDAA, 17 August 2013; also explained by DCD, 15 July 2013. PDA (21 August 2013) was a jongo 
worker in Gezira for 24 years. 
924 GDA and MWD, 22 June 2013; PKKM 9 August 2013. This is borne out by statistics on cane-cutters in 
Gezira from a sample survey conducted by Hassaballa Omer Hassaballa in 1991: people from Darfur 
made up 52.4 per cent, Upper Nile 8.9 per cent, Equatoria 3.6 per cent, Bahr el Ghazal 10.1 per cent, 
and White Nile 10.3 per cent of labourers. ‘Displacement and migration as a consequence of 
development policies in Sudan,’ SAD 940/5/2/34-50, 45. 
925 LLAA, 3 June 2013. 
926 DCD, 15 July 2013; also GDA, 22 June 2013. News was also transferred via southern workers in the 
civil service: GDA and MWD, 22 June 2013. 
927 It is unclear to which factions or divisions. 
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to go as jongo also, as workers, we visit that place as workers and we come back. So 
the time we went to north, we walk around at the whole country, we know all the 
corners and the borders of the Sudan with Ethiopia.’928 
 
This “setness”, for many, was a generic point across accounts, a moment of personal 
contextualisation rooted in a personal loss in the war during their time in Khartoum, such as 
hearing of a raid on a local village or a significant loss of cattle. One man said that – having 
seen familial marked cattle for sale in Omdurman – many men, including himself, wanted to 
go to Ethiopia to join the fighting.929 Most of the people I met who stated that they went to 
join the SPLA through travelling via Ethiopia, or whose family members went, travelled in 
1995 or 1996.930 This apparently included men and women, from better-off as well as poor 
families.931 One man laughingly admitted that he reached the (dangerous) border area but 
was too frightened to cross, so came back to Khartoum.932  
 
As a broad process of information-passing, conscientisation, radicalisation, spying and 
recruitment, jongo had a plethora of affiliate organisations and claims to responsibility; 
individual or familial decisions about return and volunteering for guerrilla combat were 
framed within a wider, formalised recruitment to an imagined umbrella SPLA. Despite the 
apparent informality of this movement, many members of organisations cited in the previous 
chapters – including the Dinka Cultural Society, St Pauls Community, and Akut Jieng – 
claimed jongo as a core aim of their work:933 ‘we have so many officers now, they are still 
calling us teachers [laughs].’934 Most were keen to define three periods of “Jongo battalions” 
recruitment. Jongo 1, the oldest and least organised, was dated by several people to the 
time of Sadiq al Mahdi in roughly 1989,935 with Jongo 2 in 1992 to 93,936 and Jongo 3, the 
                                                
928 GDA and MWD, 22 June 2013; LLAA gave a similar account, 3 August 2013. 
929 AT, 8 June 2013; also SAK, 3 July 2013. 
930 For example, APA’s cousin went to join Jongo 2 in 1996 after spreading Akut Kuei songs and becoming 
frightened for his life; APA, 21 July 2013. Other accounts from MDWR, 21 August 2013; SA went to 
join Jongo in 1998 after he graduated, but returned directly to Aweil and tried to support the SPLA 
regionally (8 August 2013). 
931 SAK, 3 July 2013. 
932 WDAA, 17 August 2013. 
933 SAK, 3 July 2013; DCS, 11 August 2013. 
934 DCS, 11 August 2013. 
935 WDAA, 17 August 2013; GDA and MWD, 22 June 2013; AT, 6 August 2013. 
936 SAK, 3 July 2013; PDA, 21 June 2013. 
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largest movement, in 1995 to 96:937 ‘Bashir has two jongos, Sadiq al Mahdi has one 
jongo.’938 Those who did not travel were part of jongo through recruitment, working 
alongside more mysterious SPLA organisers in Gedarif, Kassala and Ethiopia,939 ‘sensitising 
the public, especially the youth… and the sound minded people, who know what is going 
on.’940 The National Democratic Alliance, its constituent political parties and its civil servant 
membership in Khartoum allegedly assisted with routes and funding.941 Some claimed jongo 
was mostly made up of Dinka men (and some women), but many others claimed Nuba, 
Darfur, Blue Nile and Dongola recruitment,942 which was corroborated by a retired senior 
SPLA officer in Juba:943 
 
‘The SPLA also codenamed them as jongo, because they were coming from farms 
around Gedarif, around Doka, and the eastern Sudan. But the name given to them by 
the SPLA/SPLM was New Sudan Brigade… because the SPLA wanted to incorporate, 
the elements of uh – NDA, National Democratic Alliance, and it was to be [the] 
formation of a national army.’944 
 
The description of this jongo movement is a demonstration of the agglomeration of political 
mobilisation, communication and associational efforts in fighting for “the cause.”945 This 
raises several questions: over the practical limits of pan-black activism, the actual aims 
beyond “fighting for the SPLA” – whatever “the SPLA” politically constituted – and over the 
extent and shape of political activity. It would be relatively easy to try to classify political 
activity in this period as a spectrum of action to inaction, and of iconoclastic nationalists to 
anti-secessionist collaborators. But working “for the SPLA” encompassed a range of 
motivations and ideologies behind often politically ambiguous actions. This fighting for the 
                                                
937 PKKM, 9 August 2013. 
938 WDAA, 17 August 2013. 
939 AT, 8 June 2013. 
940 SAK, 3 July 2013. 
941 DKLK, 21 August 2013; SA, 8 August 2013. 
942 PKKM, 9 August 2013; DKLK, 4 July 2013. 
943 EBK, 12 September 2013; EBK, a high-ranking military officer, reported that Darfur people made up 
most of the jongo recruitment, which began in 1994. The cohorts he led were then graduated in 1995, 
and became the New Sudan Brigade in 1997. 
944 EBK, 12 September 2013. For notes on the activity of the New Sudan Brigade, see Douglas H. 
Johnson, The root causes of Sudan’s civil wars: peace or truce (London, 2011), pp. 207–8, 211, 213–
5. 
945 This was noted in Khartoum by similar-minded revolutionaries: Gizouli, ‘South Sudanese labour.’ 
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SPLA and/or “the south” is a point of confusion in these interviews; a lot of what people 
explained as pro-SPLA work – such as holding political discussions in beer houses – 
apparently had very little to do with actually directly helping the SPLA, or even participating 
in any material way in the civil war effort. Most stories of spying were not grand dramas, but 
were small acts of rebellion, insubordination, or open discussion of the war - all dangerous 
in the Khartoum context. 
 
 
Fighting for the South 
 
The actions described under the jongo banner in the mid-1990s chime with what Howell 
records as underground southern political activity in 1978, ‘mainly concerned with passing 
messages about what was happening in the South, and also in Khartoum, to the movement 
outside [Sudan]’: 
 
‘Several informants have claimed that a fairly well-disciplined cell system was in 
operation inside the Sudan in which only three or four people were known to each 
other with one person “linking” with another cell. Certainly, small groups operated, 
but there appears to have been quite widespread knowledge about who were the 
most important links and which senior southern administrators were sympathetic and 
which were not… [these men] helped people to escape the country when it was felt 
necessary to do so, and when there was a request from outside that a particular 
person was needed…’946 
 
Interviews about the 1980s to 2000s gave similar descriptions of political cell networks, 
through chains of individual links and concealed identities, and clandestine meetings in cars 
and churches, coming out one by one for security.947 Overall, though, meetings appeared to 
be primarily about passing information: 
 
‘if the movement got any information, then the leaders can call us, [saying] “you take 
this information into the grassroots so that they can know information”… when the 
people are fighting in [certain] areas, then they say – last night there was fighting 
                                                
946 Howell, ‘Political leadership and organisation in the southern Sudan’, pp. 196–198. 
947 JW, 18 October 2013; MMD, 17 August 2013. 
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[that] took place in this area against [X], …like [what] took place in Torit, the last 
[time], they said “Torit is captured by our people, then now we returned it back.”’948 
 
Many people produced minutes, records and descriptions of seminar circuits and political 
meetings held in the schools and church centres detailed in chapters two and three, initially 
under the aegis of parties such as the United Sudan African Party (USAP), until they were 
banned. USAP itself was a collective of politicians and parties - whether nominal or well-
subscribed - including other “non-southern” parties such as the Communists and Democratic 
Unionists,949 and later with rebel Darfur movements such as the United Popular Front,950 as 
well as other parties or associations that are untraceable in wider literature and archives.951 
The state crackdown on USAP and other political parties in 1989, although officially driving 
them “underground”, apparently did not change much in practice, as many less prominent 
organisers were also employed at Catholic school and church networks, cultural and 
community organisations, and in local civil service positions.952 Politicians - many of whom 
made their living by teaching or working in churches - including James Surur, Joseph Okel, 
Philip Abbas Ghaboush, Hilary Paul Logali and Toby Maduot visited schools and churches to 
take part in discussions.953 As today, in the mid- to late 1990s students in both state and 
private schools formed their own versions of political parties, including the Sudan African 
National Union, the DUP, NCP, African National Front, the Communist party and Democratic 
Salvation Front, where they debated national politics relatively freely.954 Attendees and 
participants were not just the educated, male or young, but included illiterate market 
workers and women.955 Most “meeting places” were in people’s homes.956 
 
Many people who attended these meetings through the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s 
summarised their organisers as the National Democratic Alliance, which apparently started 
being a force locally in the Khartoum suburbs in 1992, supposedly taking over from these 
                                                
948 DCD, 12 August 2013. 
949 The Democratic Unionist Party had southern members; DKLK, 21 August 2013. 
950 ADA, 13 August 2013. 
951 SA, 8 August 2013; DKLK, 21 August 2013. 
952 DCD, 12 August 2013. 
953 DCD, 15 July 2013. 
954 DKLK, 21 August 2013. 
955 DKLK, 21 August 2013; AAD, 14 August 2013. 
956 JW, 18 October 2013, among many other accounts. 
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“banned” parties.957 Established as an exile opposition coalition by twelve political parties – 
including many of the above – and fifty-one unions in October 1989 following the coup, the 
NDA is broadly characterised as a failure, although its army, under SPLA-affiliated control, 
was active on the Ethiopian border in 1996.958 NDA’s elite political coalition fragmented from 
1999, but the organisation continued in theory and name.959 From a local perspective within 
Khartoum, the NDA was at least nominally a forum for these politicians, parties, discussants 
and informants to transmit and debate politically sensitive information. 
 
Other organisations similarly claimed revolutionary positions, even if their actions were 
broadly informative and internal. The most explicitly revolutionary and “pro-SPLA” in 
accounts of Khartoum was the African National Front (ANF), which was incorporated into the 
SPLM as part of the Youth League after 2005.960 Its leadership was mostly drawn from 
university students and graduates, as well as those who could be classified as “middle-class” 
in Khartoum, such as teachers, legal clerks and clergy, many of whom now live and work in 
regional towns in South Sudan.961 Two now-prominent ex-students of a Khartoum-based 
university said that they (re?) established the ANF with a group of students in the late 
1990s, using university records to find notes on the founding of the “original” Southern 
Students Welfare Front in 1958 as a means of establishing themselves as part of this 
student heritage.962 Its political debates were intense, with screenings of propaganda videos 
and performances of rebel songs.963 Membership included northern, Nuba and Darfur 
students, as well as students from the Communist party,964 although there were tensions 
and splits, for instance between the Nuer/Shilluk and Dinka sections in 1991.965 Much like 
the NDA, the ANF was explicitly a conglomeration of political ideas and aims. ’It is a shelter 
                                                
957 DCD, 12 August 2013. 
958 Lesch and Fadl (eds.), Coping with torture, p. 2; Johnson, The root causes of Sudan’s civil wars, pp. 
122, 138. 
959 ‘Sudan: National Democratic Alliance (NDA)’, Refworld. 
960 ADA, 13 August 2013. 
961 Ibid. 
962 JGRN, 28 June 2013; YM, 10 September 2013. 
963 ADA, 13 August 2013; ADA provided me with a battered copy of SPLA songs, written in Sudanese 
Arabic and containing a lot written by Nuba and Darfur authors, specifically in support of the SPLA’s 
pan-Sudanese revolution. 
964 YM, 10 September 2013; JGRN, 28 June 2013. 
965 JGRN, 28 June 2013. 
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that student southerners are hiding themselves [under] to fight the system… the ANF is the 
umbrella.’966 The Nilein University ANF group organised one of the only explicitly 
documented “SPLA” actions in Khartoum in 2002, detailed by two ex-members – both 
detained afterwards – in South Sudan, and protested in Amnesty International Urgent 
Actions at the time. One man, now a farmer and teacher, explained: 
 
‘We raised the SPLM flag in Nilein University, [me] and some other groups. We made 
a celebration, [an] anniversary of the SPLA.  …We raised it up [on the] university 
campus, and we were arrested, we were twenty-five in number. [We] spent twenty 
two days in jail in security cells. …We denied all the accusations that we belonged to 
the SPLA.’967 
 
Presenting all this activity as ‘recruiting the battalions’ disguised the fact that most of this 
political activism was focused on talking.968 As Howell observed in the early 1970s, ‘above 
all, [this] was a means of bringing southerners into contact with each other… [this] 
reinforced loyalties and provided an important boost to morale.’969 These various political 
parties, debating societies and house meetings took on this subversive ‘underground cells 
work,’ after the shutting down of open political discussion in the early 1990s.970 These 
groups discussed various potentially realistic political futures, making people turn their 
“hardened hearts” into action of some form, even if in the form of talking.  
 
‘When we talked to non-northerners, we talked about what is our right and what is 
not our right, and [this was] also struggling – it means you are fighting. Because the 
person is supposed to find the right [sic]. When he find the right from us, then he 
has to join us. That is how we normally work. … So you talk to one person, and that 
one will go to talk with another person, and on and on. Until the information has 
intensified the whole of the community [sic].’971 
 
                                                
966 JGRN, 28 June 2013. 
967 DKLK, 21 August 2013; YM, 10 September 2013. These events are corroborated by Amnesty 
International reports ‘AFR 540092002 SUDAN UA 15402 Fear for safety: incommunicado detention: 
possible Prisoners of Conscience (POCs): 25 students - members of the African National Front (ANF)’, 
May 2002, and ‘SOUDAN: 25 étudiants membres du Front national africain (FNA): Further information 
on UA 154/02’, July 2002, AI Secretariat archives, Amsterdam. 
968 PKKM, 9 August 2013. 
969 Howell, ‘Political leadership and organisation in the southern Sudan’, pp. 196–198. 
970 YM, 10 September 2013. 
971 LLAA, 15 August 2013. 
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Access to information, and the ability to discuss and debate this information, was a deeply 
subversive act in its own right, especially in Khartoum by the mid-1990s. Security forces 
conducted raids on private homes and offices, confiscated books, and detained at least one 
person for the unauthorised possession of a fax machine.972 Academics and political 
observers have long criticised Sudanese domestic opposition politics as a “talking shop”, but 
the activities of these political associations were all “just talk” because that was considered 
to be fighting, in an active political debate over how to mobilise political community, and on 
what lines.  
 
The mobilisation of rebel consciousness, ambiguity and “tricking” the opponent constituted 
subversive action – even if the actions were themselves not visibly subversive. Political 
action could involve playing to parochial stereotypes to avoid violence: ‘that is why we 
pretend to be cooperative with them, in order [that they do] not aggress [sic] our people. … 
For us we went to [the centre of Khartoum like] those who went to the forest [like rural 
villagers], [not] like those who are going to the town.’973 Conversion and collaboration could 
be justified this way: ‘[they] can bribe me, to give me food, and I can give [it to] my brother 
– and [then] I did nothing.’974 
 
A demonstration of this alternative conception of political activism is the most cited 
“successful” example of this “fighting the system” in the mid-1990s. This was not a self-
designated political party or “spy cell”, but the song group Akut Kuei, whose published work 
formed part of the canon of the last chapter. Akut Kuei – literally meaning “Eagle Group” in 
Dinka, as a coded reference to SPLA battalion names – is a good example of the ambiguities 
of membership, structure and intent within this “political work” in Khartoum in this period. 
Many people gave a variety of histories for the group, many of which do not accord with the 
more individualistic account of one of the songwriters and singers of the two-man group, as 
the name Akut Kuei and many of their songs have been appropriated and reinvented by 
various young Dinka men and some women, and translated into Nuer and Shilluk versions, 
                                                
972 Rone, Behind the red line, pp. 161–162. 
973 LAM, 8 June 2013; similar stories were told by LLBK about returning to the south in the late 1990s 
through Abdel Baggi Ayii Akol’s territories in Southern Kordofan, 19 October 2013. 
974 APA, 21 July 2013. 
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across East Africa and further afield.975 Various other prominent Dinka writers, as well as 
some Nuer activists and singers, were included by Akut Kuei fans in their lists of members of 
its core ‘committee.’976 All – including the founding member – agreed that Akut Kuei was 
formed for the purposes of jongo, ‘to teach people’:977 
 
‘They used to hold occasions, celebrations, in places in Jabarona and even in 
Comboni ground… they used to sing these songs so that the youth can hear them, 
[so] they will rebel. These songs, they are the ones that led to the rebellion of 
battalion called jongo in the SPLA.’978 
 
Akut Kuei was then “betrayed” by “Dinka politicians,” who translated two particular songs 
that insulted southern politicians “collaborating” with the government.979 One of its founders 
has a prominent scar on his shoulder from a period in detention in Khartoum, before he 
moved to Egypt. 
 
Akut Kuei were ‘like a party’ in Khartoum because their focus was on political motivation and 
communication; they arguably were one of the most successful political groups, as their 
songs are well-known in Kampala, Nairobi, Sydney and London.980 Their songs (and other 
songs ascribed to them) project plural, concentric ideas of inclusion and mutual support 
under umbrella concepts of marginalisation, historic powers and traditions – often under 
pan-ethnic or regional labels such as Dinka or Equatoria – and blackness, attempting to 
delineate the constitution of potential political communities. For instance, the song “Our 
leader Garang Mabior has liberated our country, so let’s turn our eyes to it, all of us,”981 
written by an immediate forerunner to the artists of Akut Kuei, explains 
                                                
975 A few people said that the member I spoke to had died in Australia. This translation work was noted 
by several people, and English translations of Akut Kuei’s song lyrics are often used online, and cited 
as key source material, for instance a commenter on the online article by Hamid Eltgani Ali, ‘Darfur 
war crimes, changes in demographic composition, and ethnic displacement,’ Sudan Tribune, 1 October 
2012: ‘if you know someone that can translate the songs in Akut-Kuei’s Cassette for you from 
Thuongjang/Dinka to Arabic or English, please look for this cassette.’ 
976 DKLK, 4 July 2013; APA, 21 July 2013. 
977 APA, 21 July 2013. 
978 DKLK, 21 August 2013; also DCS, 11 August 2013. 
979 Named by APA, 21 July 2013; DCD, 12 August 2013. 
980 APA, 21 July 2013; Kuei songs generally agreed to be some of the best; ‘they had very good songs – 
even now they are present here in the cassettes, we have them.’ DKLK, 21 August 2013. 
981 lit. “Banyda Garang Mabior acii panda, bei bei ok acok onyin thin eben.” 
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Banyda Garang Mabior aci panda  Our leader Garang Mabior has liberated  
bei bei     our country 
Banyda Kiir Mayar acii panda bei bei Our leader Kiir Mayar has liberated our country 
Banyda Abuk Abuk acii panda bei bei Our leader Abuk Abuk has liberated our   country 
Panda Rumbek;    Our country Rumbek; 
Panda Mading Aweil;    Our country Mading Aweil; 
Panda Wau;     Our country Wau;  
Acii tek thok     They are not different 
E pandan tonken    It is the same country.982 
 
Labelling people, or their parties, as either for “secession or unity” was always too 
reductionist a paradigm for explaining political ideas, “southern” or otherwise. These political 
discussion forums were more heterogeneous: 
 
‘We [had] a lot of freedom to research for ourselves. We were not confined to certain 
things… because we were given these freedoms of research, not like normal political 
limits.’983 
 
Debates over definitions of a political constituency for a future polity were long-standing in 
Khartoum, for instance the torturous definition of the predominantly Fur, Nuba and Beja 
USALF constitution in the mid-1970s, which included ‘all pure black Sudanese in and outside 
the Sudan’, and also ‘any federal minded Arab Sudanese.’984 Documents from the 1980s and 
1990s emphasise this growing negotiation of political affiliations among the dissident 
organisations in Khartoum;985 ‘we were just [discussing]: how can black people unite?’986 
People counted friends in political discussions from Darfur, greater Equatoria and eastern 
regions of Sudan,987 but these friendships were part of a brokering of the limits of practical 
political affiliation – broadly between ideas of specific regional national self-rule, with the 
ethnic and territorial border disputes that this entailed; broader ideas of black Sudanese 
nationalism, which necessitated a delineation of “Arab” Sudanese; and the more inclusive 
                                                
982 Atak Deng Deng, 2003, recorded 17 August 2013, translated with the artist. 
983 YM, 10 September 2013. 
984 ‘Constitution of USALF,’ Comboniani, A/90. 
985 For example, see Africa Confidential, 15 October 1971, TNA FCO 39.901. 
986 SA, 8 August 2013; also AMA, 9 August 2013; PKKM, 9 August 2013. 
987 DKLK, 21 August 2013. 
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ideas of pan-Africanism, which were generally with university students’ associations.988 At a 
1999 workshop in Oxford titled “The SPLM’s New Sudan vision and Southern Sudanese 
nationalism: are they compatible?” Lazarus Leek Mawut noted fears ‘that southern Sudan is 
being made to sacrifice too much for something very illusive [sic] or too ambitious,’ and that 
the presence of “Northerners” – including Nuba and Ngok Dinka – ‘is resented by a few 
southern Sudanese “ultra nationalists”.’ But in Khartoum, he noted, ‘public rallies, literature 
and discussions’ invoked a spectrum of local and historic ethnic figures in their descriptions 
of a broader and wider regional nationalism, including ‘Mayen Mathiang, Sultan Yambio, 
Prophet Ngundeng, Prophet Awuo Kon, Biar Abit, Kon Anok, Sultan Akuei, Chief Lohide, 
Prophet Arianhdit, Tafeng, [and] Ali Gwatala [sic]’, and Leek Mawut asked: 
 
‘If the people of Abyei, [the Nuba Mountains] and [southern Blue Nile]… are clear of 
what the are fighting for, how come that the teacher does not know what he has 
been teaching his students?’989 
 
Similar criticisms of both the SPLA and their own leadership in the late 1990s and early 
2000s can be found in the Nuba political record.990 This Nuba southern affiliation centred on 
the figure of Philip Abbas Ghaboush, who had a long history of connections among southern 
and Nuba populations in Khartoum since 1970s as a priest and 1980s as a politician,991 and 
who attended various southern community graduation ceremonies.992 By contrast, most 
informants in Aweil and Juba dated affiliations with Darfur groups to later in the early 2000s, 
coinciding with the publication of the “Black Book,”993 before which point many people 
excluded Darfuris from their understandings of “black Sudan”.994 
 
                                                
988 YM, 10 September 2013. 
989 Dr Lazarus Leek Mawut, ‘The SPLM’s New Sudan vision and Southern Sudanese nationalism: are they 
compatible?’, “Current conditions in the southern Sudan” workshop, Institute of Social and Cultural 
Anthropology, Oxford, 13 February 1999, SAD 307/3/15, 16, 20. 
990 Kunijwok Gwado-Ayoker Kwawang, leader and chairman of the Sudan African Congress, to Daniel 
arap Moi, N.D. c. 2002, SAD.89/10/107. 
991 CMS Newsletter No. 352, September 1971, SCF A173 Sudan. 
992 SA, 8 August 2013; also noted by DCD, 15 July 2013. 
993 ‘The Black Book,’ anonymous translation, March 2000, MEDU 17/3/GEN/67. 
994 APA, 21 July 2013; chiefs’ meeting, 20 August 2013. 
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This discussion over the limits to, variously, alliance, collaboration, affiliation or federation 
within the common aim of substantive political change fitted within John Garang’s very 
broad genius, and many people in Aweil and Juba were happy to explain their continued 
belief in the idea of “New Sudan” and their disappointment with secession.995 But the 
problems of creating the political community necessary for a New Sudan were evident, for 
instance in the common statement that Nuba and Darfur activists needed to join ‘as 
southerners,’996 or the popular description of Nuba and Darfur (and other regions’) political 
activists as ‘black brothers.’997 This struggle over the descriptor for this alternative political 
community, and the hierarchy implicit in “fitting” black Sudanese communities into a 
“southern” bloc, was indicative of these tensions over the practical shape of “self-
determination.” These discussions involved grey-scales of demands for independence and 
self-rule, and so struggled with what form these demands would take, and whether this 
would be together with, in some kind of “affiliation” with, or separate to their “brothers.” 
Ideas of federalism – as Abel Alier argued in 1999 in a Khartoum student union debate – 
were unspecific enough to accommodate this pluralism, and were not based on political 
experience or specificities.998 The layered affiliations articulated in these communities’ own 
political literature were similarly difficult to map into a territory, particularly as there was no 
one conception of “the south” as a region, and the “south” was long defined as a political 
affiliation as much as a regional line.999 Those engaged in these debates were aware of 
these problems, with some activists emphasising the need to incorporate this complexity in 
any political outcome: ‘there is no short cut in the future.’1000 
 
 
                                                
995 SA, 8 August 2013; YM, 10 September 2013; DKLK, 4 July 2013. 
996 APA, 21 July 2013; MDWR, 21 August 2013; DKLK said that Philip Abbas Ghaboush is a ‘southern 
leader’, 4 July 2013. 
997 ABA, 16 August 2013; DCD, 15 July 2013; also noted by DCS, 11 August 2013; SA, 8 August 2013. 
998 Abel Alier, ‘Self determination: its meaning and interpretation’, lecture given to students of Ahlia 
University, 26 November 1999, SAD 307/3/131. 
999 For example, the African Liberation Front manifesto, written by George Akumbek Kwanai, c. 18 August 
1965: ‘all the Southern Sudanese residing outside the southern Sudan shall only enter the Free 
Republic of Azania after their acceptance has been a successful parliamentary bill’ ... ‘those 
southerners who reside outside the Free Republic of Azania but contributing directly to the overthrow 
of the hostile regime shall be given free admission to the Free Republic of Azania as soon as the 
borders are free’. TNA FO 371.190417 VS1015.47. 
1000 Kwawang to Moi, SAD.89/10/110. 
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Space, compromise, and “selling-out” 
 
These were attempts to discuss the form and shape of a potential future national 
community, which were frustrated by the limits to pan-Sudanese affiliation and imagination, 
and by the economic and political practicalities of survival in civil war. But these activists and 
spies specifically considered themselves to be fighting for self-determination, despite the 
heterogeneity and confusion of their practical aims for the future. In their explanations of 
their “pro-SPLA, pro-south” work, they described themselves in antithesis to other 
southerners’ actions, rather than to the northern regime or northerners in general. In this 
analysis, these southerners were either blind men or stooges: the mazariin, the 
betrayers.1001 These “sell-outs,”1002 “stooges,”1003 and “traitors”1004 were historic villains in 
southern political culture, and figures common to civil wars.1005 An Akut Kuei song from the 
early 1990s begins: 
 
I have no problem with foreigners 
I have no issue with foreigners 
This is between me and the black man - 
The black man who is making himself the Arab of the South.1006 
 
These sell-outs were described several times in terms of a common child’s tale of the lueth 
fish in the River Lol in northern Bahr el Ghazal; the lueth looks terrifying, but has no teeth, 
and (stupidly and gullibly) told this to the crocodile.1007 The song that apparently led to the 
                                                
1001 Quoting LLBK, 19 October 2013. Metaphors about sight and blindness run throughout the vernacular 
literature cited here, for example Dut Anyak Dit’s 1993 poem Macar Anyaar (“The black buffalo”): 
Coor kuc kapuoth to tueng, The blind that doesn’t know the times ahead, 
Coor dot aduok yic,    The blind that sees what is on his plate, 
Coor ci puoth thou, coor ngueen alei. The blind whose heart cannot think - a stranger is better 
than him. 
Coor pir rim, rim kacken. A blind man surviving on blood, the blood of his people. 
1002 Howell, ‘Political leadership and organisation in the southern Sudan’, p. 7. 
1003 Vivienne Barton, interview with Joseph Oduho, recorded in ‘Half a million dead so far in forgotten 
war,’ Sunday Nation, 4 May 1969 TNA FCO 39.480. 
1004 George Hunter, ‘A cry for help in a land of despair’, Daily Express, 17 March 1971, KNA MSS.29.198 
Sudan. 
1005 Kalyvas, ‘The Ontology of “Political Violence”’, p. 467; see Edward Thomas on the wording of the 
SPLM constitution in 1983, which focused most of its vitriol onto such sell-outs: South Sudan, p. 111. 
1006 Akut Kuei, Cien kedie ka alei (Lit. ‘I have no problem with foreigners’; the Dinka is mis-spelt in the 
original). 
1007 Primary 4 Reader, p. 3; and Dut Anyak Dit, Adhuom Akan! (‘There is a hole!’). 
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detention and flight of the Akut Kuei songwriters in 1996 specifically targeted these 
collaborators: 
 
What will happen to them? 
Will their testicles not be cut off, when we start stabbing at the Arabs?1008 
 
But in discussion, asking about these “blind” collaborators provoked embarrassment, silence, 
evasion, frustration, equivocation and amusement.1009 Many were sympathetic.1010 These 
collaborators were – according to two “political activists” as above – ‘the people who’ve 
mixed everything,’ and were ‘just in between.’1011 Again, this “internal political divide” was 
far less zero-sum than it was presented.  
 
The second part of this chapter examines these described “sell-outs,” who did not justify 
their political actions in the same terms as the “spies” of the first half, or who held a 
different understanding of what “working for the war” meant. This is an exploration of the 
concern among southerners in Khartoum in the 1970s, noted by Howell, over the dangers of 
“false autonomy”:1012 what was acting and thinking truly independently in the politically 
ambiguous, dangerous, and deeply confusing political context of the factional 1990s and 
2000s? And was it possible to find the space for an independent discussion of alternative 
future polities? 
 
The room for discussion among the radical National Democratic Alliance and African National 
Front umbrella in this period was dependent on safe space and distance from the Khartoum 
state. Most people were highly supportive of southerners or “brothers” working in the 
Sudanese state system in some form: ‘a person who is working in the government, and who 
                                                
1008 This is a reference to a western Dinka story about a hunting party in time immemorial: the hunting 
party killed an elephant, and while the group were butchering it slowly from the outside, one 
impatient and greedy member of the party climbed into the belly of the elephant to steal the best 
organs. However, one of the other men’s knives cut into the elephant and cut off the thief’s testicles – 
which, as the story emphasises, was his own fault. Akut Kuei, ‘Ku Na Kocka?’ (‘What of these 
people?’). 
1009 Chiefs’ meeting, 20 August 2013; AMA, 9 August 2013; AAD, 14 August 2013; RRL, 3 September 
2013; and many other discussions over 2013. 
1010 For example, DCD explained that people were “exhausted” in Khartoum; 15 July 2013. 
1011 AAD, 14 August 2013; AMA, 9 August 2013. 
1012 Howell, ‘Political leadership and organisation in the southern Sudan’, p. 7. 
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is taking care of the people, is known [as a good person] through what he is doing.’1013 
Many of the “spies” at work in the first half of this chapter were employed by the state at 
some point, including in the militia barracks of southern politicians, as administrators, or as 
clerks in the judiciary.1014 The most obvious form of this interstitial authority were those 
formally employed as chiefs or in chiefs’ courts.1015 These people, according to one court 
worker, ‘became respected by police because they know there is a law.’1016 
 
These chiefs were often less ‘sacrificial’ than pragmatic.1017 Duffield described Dinka 
traditional authorities’ roles in southern Darfur in 2002 as ‘brokers on behalf of the 
displaced,’ gaining authority through allocating ‘labour, credit and aid’ but also by having the 
ear of local state security to denounce alleged “SPLA sympathisers.”1018 These alternative 
courts and government liaisons were necessary: many people described complex disputes 
and violent crimes that were variously ignored, misunderstood, or dealt with punitively, 
violently or wrongly in the formal government system.1019 These people often played 
valuable roles, such as passing information on private judicial decisions or criminal 
investigations, and arranging the return of abducted adults and children in southern Darfur 
and in agricultural schemes.1020 As in the 1960s, these people in positions of authority – not 
just chiefs, but in my research all men – were political middlemen, simultaneously both and 
neither NCP and/or SPLA.1021 
 
Several people discussed the proliferation of chiefs in Khartoum: 
 
                                                
1013 MDWR, 21 August 2013. 
1014 RRL, 3 September 2013; AMA, 9 August 2013; DCD, 12 August 2013. 
1015 These southern intermediaries have been discussed briefly in chapter three, but here I am focusing 
on their political positionality; for a discussion of the ambiguous position of chiefs specifically, see 
Leonardi, Dealing with government in South Sudan, p. 140. 
1016 LAM, 5 June 2013. 
1017 Tuttle, ‘Life is Prickly’, p. 49. Explained by SAK, 3 July 2013, and ABA, 16 August 2013. 
1018 Duffield, ‘Aid and Complicity’, p. 96; a similar form of brokerage is described in Khartoum by Ibrahim, 
‘The conditions of the Southern Sudanese Women Migrants’, p. 251. 
1019 DKLK, 4 July 2013. 
1020 AMM, 21 June 2013; AAY, 11 July 2013; AMA, 9 August 2013; for independent examples of this 
assistance with emancipation, see ‘Non Athway Escapes Slavery’, SAD 307/6/5, and Human Rights 
Watch Africa, Children in Sudan: Slaves, Street Children and Child Soldiers (New York, September 
1995). 
1021 Leonardi, Dealing with government in South Sudan, p. 141; DKLK, 21 August 2013. 
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‘A person – just [could say] alone that “I’m a chief” to Bashir, and he accepts [sic]. 
And  [at] the refugee conference, …they just express that “I’m a chief,” and people 
[would then try] to pay at least some little money [to them], and then you will be 
accepted as a chief.’1022 
 
De Geoffroy noted this, describing three forms of sultans: those who came as chiefs with 
displaced populations, those appointed in Khartoum and those paid by the government and 
accepted because of their connections.1023 For Aweil residents, these categories were too 
prescriptive, and these apparently separate or potentially antagonistic “types” would often 
mutually organise; for instance, Ibrahim recorded in 1990 that 
 
‘The squatters of Abu Siid have elected Ali Faragalla, a Mondari Muslim to be their 
Sheikh and speaker before the town council… Ali is being supported by a committee 
of 16 Sheikhs representing the main ethnic groups of the shanty town.’1024 
 
This mutual organisation was formalised in the government-recognised Ashara Wilayat  
(Arabic for “Ten States”) court system, a persistent reference throughout work in rural and 
urban Aweil, and part of the various “traditional courts” invested in by the Bashir regime.1025 
Many people gave different dates for the formal establishment of Ashara Wilayat, from 1988 
to 2000, with various branches including a major one at Lafa’a, and various leaders’ 
names.1026 But while this court was part of the longer tradition of collaborative inter-tribal 
justice systems running in Khartoum, all associated Ashara Wilayat specifically with 
Khartoum government recognition of court judgements, and therefore the coercive authority 
to resolve cases.1027 For many people, there was ‘no alternative’ to this court mostly because 
of language barriers and finance.1028 
 
                                                
1022 MDWR, 21 August 2013. 
1023 de Geoffroy, ‘Fleeing war and relocating to the urban fringe’, p. 525. 
1024 Ibrahim, ‘The conditions of the Southern Sudanese Women Migrants’, p. 251. 
1025 For discussion of the role of chiefs and sultans in general, see chapter three, pp. 112-115. 
1026 PDA, 21 June 2013; chiefs’ meeting, 20 August 2013; NAJ, 8 June 2013; DKLK, 4 July 2013; AAY, 11 
July 2013. 
1027 According to the “formal codes”, as one man called it, of Nuer “Fangak punishment,” or Dinka “Wanh 
Alel punishment”: NAJ, 8 June 2013. 
1028 DKLK, 4 July 2013. 
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These heterogeneous authorities blurred distinctions between traditional, military and formal 
government, both ‘being and opposing the state.’1029 The logical extreme of this necessity 
for local governance and the securing of political space were the Southern Sudan Defence 
Forces (SSDF), including Riek Machar, Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, Paulino Matip and others, 
active at various times and with various resources.1030 These various militarised authorities 
were not only regime-funded military “warlords,” but active organisers of their own parallel 
systems of governance in Khartoum, including their own prisons, barracks and offices,1031 
and were formalised into the SSDF with the 1997 Khartoum Agreement. As with their 
individualised support from the regime and the SAF, these groups were a loose coalition at 
best.1032 Two court members in Aweil explained that these militia leaders ‘sat alone between 
the northern army and the southern army.’1033 
 
In early interviews, everyone I spoke with described these men and their followers as ‘bad 
people,’ ‘dead-hearted people… who do not know about what will happen in the future.’1034 
‘Most southerners, they don’t like them, because they [destroyed] the south.’1035 For the 
Dinka Malwal residents of northern Aweil, explanations of the SSDF commanders’ work in 
Khartoum centred on their local representative, Sultan Abdel Baggi Ayii Akol, who comes 
from Malual Bai in Aweil East, and who – with his sons – commanded a militia along the 
railroad from Aweil into Darfur, with a main base in Meiram.1036 Young observed ‘local 
SSDF’s commanders’ tendency to carve out their own semi-independent domains’ in the 
border regions of the south, and this extended to Khartoum.1037 As a less-powerful affiliate 
of the now-deceased Nuer commander Paulino Matip in Khartoum’s Lafa’a Gufa’a area, Ayii 
based himself in Jabarona, before the formal recognition of his militia, which gained strength 
                                                
1029 Lund, ‘Twilight institutions’, p. 689. 
1030 John Young, The South Sudan defence forces in the wake of the Juba declaration (Geneva, 2007); 
Matthew B. Arnold, ‘The South Sudan Defence Force: Patriots, Collaborators or Spoilers?’, The Journal 
of Modern African Studies, 45:4 (December 2007), pp. 489–516. 
1031 Chiefs’ meeting, 20 August 2013; DKLK, 4 July 2013; MDWR, 21 August 2013. 
1032 Arnold, ‘The South Sudan Defence Force’, p. 491. 
1033 GDA and MWD, 22 June 2013. 
1034 D, 22 July 2013; APA, 21 July 2013. 
1035 DKLK, 21 August 2013. 
1036 Ibid. Very little is known about Abdel Baggi’s militia and organisation: Young, The South Sudan 
defence forces, pp. 22, 36. 
1037 Young, The South Sudan defence forces, p. 17. 
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by the early 2000s.1038 Ayii had established himself earlier, first in northern Bahr el Ghazal 
and then Abyei, then as an authority in Jabarona as ‘a half way between Dinka and the 
Arabs’, according to chiefs in a returnee settlement outside Aweil.1039 As one young teacher 
also said: ‘if people were in the north, you better attach yourself to Ayii, because he has 
power from Arabs.’1040 Some referred to Ayii as ‘our militia.’1041 For a local Aweil 
administrator, ‘this was the positive side.’1042 Along with Paulino Matip, another man said, 
 
‘we explained what is happening in our community. They said, leave the case, come 
to us - show us the problem and we will settle it. And we went to them, we were 
given some police from these two militiamen, and we reported crimes to them.’1043 
 
Ayii had military police and vehicles, his own official court stamp recognised by government 
courts, and jails, in Wad Isein in Mayo and elsewhere1044 – which courts like Ashara Wilayat 
drew on to implement their decisions.1045 Ayii remained separate from Ashara Wilayat, 
attending infrequently and resolving larger issues at his own offices; ‘even if the security 
elements want to be asked to come to the villages [sic], [Ayii] is the one to direct them.’1046 
These courts were ‘separate’ from government courts, dealing with ‘family matters’ and local 
conflicts.1047 Those who could not pay the court fines, for instance for elopement, would pay 
Ayii’s court through labour. One man said Ayii had a hibiscus tea farm in Meiram, but many 
young men would be employed in Ayii’s militia forces, providing paid policing of routes back 
to the south in the early 2000s.1048 These militarised intermediaries were explained as 
“necessary evils”: ‘if you refuse, then you will be killed. … Some people tried to avoid [them] 
– but there’s no alternative.’1049 At the same time, Abusharaf noted that Paulino Matip’s 
                                                
1038 Chiefs’ meeting, 20 August 2013; APA, 22 July 2013; SA, 8 August 2013. 
1039 Chiefs’ meeting, 20 August 2013. 
1040 D, 22 July 2013. 
1041 NAJ, 5 June 2013. 
1042 RRL, 3 September 2013. 
1043 NAJ, 5 June 2013. 
1044 APA, 21 July 2013; GDA and MWD, 22 June 2013. 
1045 GDA and MWD, 22 June 2013. 
1046 Chiefs’ meeting, 20 August 2013; DKLK, 4 July 2013; GDA and MWD, 22 June 2013. 
1047 DCD, 12 August 2013. 
1048 LLBK, 19 October 2013. 
1049 Chiefs’s meeting, 20 August 2013. 
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court system was approached with caution by Khartoum locals;1050 Ayii’s prisons could also 
hold “Arabs” who had been found guilty of minor infractions. 
 
The few studies of the SSDF generally characterise the groups as  
 
simply local-level organisations tied to the government of Sudan and primarily 
concerned with the defence of their immediate communities’; ‘[to] the extent that 
they entertained political objectives it was for the separation of the South and 
rejection of “New Sudan”.1051 
 
However, in the context of Khartoum discussions, these political objectives were arguably 
more developed than this lens of “separation/unity” allows. The militarised authorities 
organised in Khartoum in the late 1990s and 2000s were a form of separatist federal 
southern ethnic nationalism in practice. Young notes that these factions saw their political 
administration of controlled areas in the south on regional and ethnic lines as ‘important 
steps towards the realisation of their goal of southern self-determination.’1052 Many leaders 
worked to find scholarships and employment in Khartoum and abroad for young men from 
their administered regions.1053 Similarly, their courts and administrations in Khartoum were 
separate but associated, with chiefs from Luo, Dinka, Balanda, Nuba, Nuer and Shilluk 
groups and clans acting as ethnic representatives.1054 These organisations claimed the right 
to make political and military agreements between ‘their territories’ in the south, and by 
extension between communities in Khartoum.1055 
 
In this sense, then, actors like Ayii Akol were less co-opted “sell-outs” than their alliance 
with the Khartoum regime implied. One man remembers Ayii’s openness in ‘criticising the 
system’, ‘because he was not afraid, because he was in the system already.’1056 As Arnold 
said, 
 
                                                
1050 Abusharaf, Transforming displaced women in Sudan, p. 48. 
1051 Young, The South Sudan defence forces, p. 15. 
1052 Ibid., p. 17. 
1053 JGRN, 28 June 2013. 
1054 SA, 8 August 2013. 
1055 Arnold, ‘The South Sudan Defence Force’, p. 502. 
1056 ABA, 16 August 2013. 
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‘The SSDF members saw themselves as “true southerners”, as they were seeking full 
independence for the south, while conversely arguing that the SPLA was the actual 
“sell-out” to southerners because it had long fought for a unified Sudan.’1057 
 
More broadly, southern chiefs and state administrators argued for their political integrity on 
different lines: their “collaboration” with the regime was, for them, an alternative form of 
this important southern duplicity in Khartoum, a bargain to protect their community or 
create alternative political spaces of control in the city and the south – such as the 
government-recognised chiefs’ courts, and the militia leaders based in Khartoum. These 
“defence forces” and their mixed military-“traditional” administrative structures were a 
pragmatic and delineated mobilisation of the social and political solidarities implied by the 
community organisation and education discussed in chapters three and four. Like the spies 
and rebels of the first part of this chapter, these men were similarly creating safe spaces 
and alternative ideas of governance and future polities. These ideas found expression from 
the early 2000s in ideas of ethnic nationalism organised into a South Sudanese “nation of 
nationalities”, as vague as the black Sudanese federalism of “New Sudan.”1058 This ethnic 
nationalism was ideally organised on regional zones of militarised authority and within a 
federal independent south, an imaginary which persists as a “working model” in southern 
politics today.  
 
These ideas do not match up to the looser and more collaborative models of mutual 
identification, as black Sudanese southerners, in the political education of previous chapters, 
or to the more emancipatory and democratic ideals espoused by the jongo recruiters. But 
just getting by in Khartoum, and the safe political space necessary to discuss these more 
inclusive and less violent versions of a potential post-war Sudanese culture, were both 
dependent on this more ethnicised, exclusive and coercive system of authority. The pan-
Sudanese political creativity of the ANF, NDA, USAP and others was reliant on, and 
ultimately buried by, the practical needs of militarised authority along ethnic and local lines. 
As one chiefs’ court worker said, ‘these were those who were taking care of the Dinka and 
                                                
1057 Arnold, ‘The South Sudan Defence Force’, p. 504. 
1058 Leonardi, Dealing with government in South Sudan, p. 187. 
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southerners in general. If they were not there, people would have lost [everything].’1059 This 
authority provided a measured safety, but also, as Duffield observed in southern Darfur in 
2001, ‘a guarded atmosphere of dependence and intimidation,’ setting limits to what could 
be spoken about, organised and imagined within Khartoum.1060 
 
The awkwardness with which people spoke about Ayii Akol and the vitriol against “sell-outs” 
did not only conceal the political necessity of “collaboration” on all sides; it also obscured – 
through its binary view of united pro-SPLA fighters working against the regime and its 
stooges - deeper histories of the ambiguous, violent and confusing civil wars. “Civil war” was 
not the descriptor used for a conflict that was, as one teacher put it, ‘not clear to the 
people,’ but ‘a dark channel.’1061 Particularly from 1991, at the same time as southern 
communities were establishing themselves around Khartoum, the conflict was increasingly 
made up of an impenetrable and baffling array of affiliations, authorities and organisations. 
In this sense, the National Democratic Alliance, as an apparently coherent entity disguising 
an incoherent and divided plurality of actors and aims, was much like the Southern Sudan 
Defence Forces.1062 
 
Similarly, as Anderson and Rolandsen have pointed out in eastern Africa more widely, 
conflict was not confined to a structured civil war arena, but was an integral structural force, 
a banal reality, and a common source of employment.1063 The part-time teachers, writers, 
students and artists, as well as the politicians of the ANF, NDA and USAP, were as integrated 
as the rest of the black communities in Khartoum in an impoverished economy with few 
                                                
1059 MDWR, 21 August 2013. 
1060 Duffield, ‘Aid and Complicity’, p. 96. 
1061 DKLK, 21 August 2013. As veteran politician Peter Adwok Nyaba wrote, ‘during those hard days, it 
was impossible to tell the truth from mere propaganda.’ Nyaba, Politics of liberation in South Sudan, 
p. 3. 
1062 As exemplified by the Southern Sudan Forum’s confusing coalition in 1999: Samuel Odat, SPLM-
United, Programme of Southern Sudan Forum, 29 January 1999, SAD 89/6/15: the Southern Sudan 
Forum ‘is a new umbrella organisation composed of the SPLM-United, Bahr al-Gazal Group, Bor Group, 
Southern Sudan United Movement (SSUM), Southern Sudanese internal politicians, community 
leaders, and a number of SSIM/A commanders: John Kong Chol, Simmon Gatdkowth and others [sic].’  
1063 Anderson and Rolandsen, ‘Violence as politics’, p. 546. 
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routes to financial security, livelihoods or self-improvement.1064 Away from discussions about 
“sell-outs”, many people acknowledged what they called a ‘coping strategy.’1065  
 
‘It’s for their sake – they want to live! They have children! People are suffering! No 
food to eat! If you are given [a] position, ohh, you can go and work, get your money, 
eat!’1066 
 
In the context of what seemed an unending and endlessly complex conflict, many people 
were sympathetic to those who thought ‘that there is not going to be a peace again… they 
need a good life [so their] children [can study].’1067 Many vulnerable young men (and some 
women) – who, in the words of one clerk, ‘[didn’t] have [an] objective’1068 – were forced or 
decided to join the SAF, PDFs or local militias, out of financial necessity and a lack of options 
for personal advancement.1069 For those in secondary education in the 1990s and 2000s, 
military training and for men a period of national service were compulsory in order to 
receive a secondary school certificate, and forty-five days' PDF training was mandatory for 
civil servants, university students, and government-recognised tribal authorities.1070 One 
man noted that militia membership was financially rewarding, with members taking up to 15 
per cent of any revenue.1071 There was not necessarily a clear distinction between military 
employment, with many men having worked variously in the SAF, SSDF, SPLA (of some 
form) and the Joint Integrated Units (JIU) after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 
2005, often moving with weapons or because of funds and travel needs.1072 Work was 
migratory and transient; SPLA recruits would leave for Khartoum due to a lack of pay or 
food, or out of frustration, and then rejoin militias such as Ayii Akol’s, which gave young 
                                                
1064 RRL, 3 September 2013; APA, 21 July 2013; ADA, 13 August 2013; DKLK, 21 August 2013; DTL, 10 
July 2013; GDA and MWD, 22 June 2013. 
1065 ABA, 16 August 2013. 
1066 DCD, 15 July 2013. 
1067 APA, 21 July 2013. 
1068 ABA, 16 August 2013. 
1069 There are many examples from interviews and sources, for example, MDWR, 21 August 2013; APA, 
21 July 2013; DKLK, 4 July 2013; GDA and MWD, 22 June 2013; also see Human Rights Watch Africa, 
Children in Sudan; this was also observed by Ibrahim, ‘The conditions of the Southern Sudanese 
Women Migrants’, p. 252. 
1070 Rone, Behind the red line, pp. 11, 13, 268–292. 
1071 APA, 21 July 2013. 
1072 For example, JMA, a Luo man now living in Aweil, worked in the SAF for 20 years to support his 
family, and denied any political opinions on this (12 July 2013). 
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men access to home areas, weapons, funding, cattle and options for marriage: ‘when they 
joined that militia they come and take the lady [for] free!’1073 Similarly, many militia soldiers 
became SAF, JIU and ultimately SPLA employees under the CPA in 2005 and the Juba 
Declaration in 2006, when Paulino Matip’s SSDF transferred to the SPLA.1074 
 
This military employment was not necessarily due to personal choice, political machinations 
or cunning, or possible economic gain; much of this was coercive, contingent and traumatic. 
Many of the men who had engaged in or submitted to military employment struggled to 
frame their experiences and choices within their own wider moral frameworks and ideals of 
political change and community.1075 For instance, later recruitment to PDF units in 2003 
onwards involved horrific calculations of action and responsibility. A man who had been a 
long-term student, member of the ANF and DUP, and writer in Khartoum, returned to Aweil 
to become a teacher, and who translated several of the songs in the previous chapter, 
explained accordingly: ‘if you are lucky to go to Darfur, it’s better [than the South],’1076 
because of the emotional and moral burden of committing violence against fellow 
southerners; but in Darfur, ‘we have make genocides! We have killed those people very 
much! … I witnessed all this, we killed there.’1077 He later elaborated: 
 
‘I was taken to Darfur section… we were going to liberate Jebel Marra from Abdel 
Wahid.1078 … Because it was imposed on us that if you don’t go and fight, you will not 
have your [Sudan] school certificate. … So we went there and we fight! Because we 
have no alternative. You will not learn all these years, then you sit [with] zero at the 
end. You must achieve what you have been struggling for. So…we were not happy! 
[sic] Even the war in Darfur, we have committed genocide exactly. Because [in] that 
fighting, …you don’t love anyone - the children and the women, …if you put them in 
a room, you burn it. We [did] this. … You are recommended to burn everything. … 
And if you say I will not fight, they will say you belong to Abdul Wahid! … [If] you 
don’t want to fight, then you belong to the security – you will get a firing squad, 
                                                
1073 DKLK, 21 August 2013. 
1074 GDA and MWD, 22 June 2013; Arnold, ‘The South Sudan Defence Force’, p. 492. 
1075 For example, MDWR, 21 August 2013. 
1076 DKLK, 21 August 2013. 
1077 DKLK, 4 July 2013. 
1078 Abdul Wahid Mohamed al Nur is the original chairman of the Sudan Liberation Army, a Fur and 
Zaghawa guerrilla movement fighting in part against the Sudan government from 2001; the 
movement fractured in 2006. 
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according to military orders, they will say – this man is [the] enemy. … So we are 
dealing with orders.’1079 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
‘We attained this freedom as a united people, from the western end of Bahr el Ghazal 
to the eastern borders of Eastern Equatoria; from Abyei in the North to Nimule in the 
South.’1080 
 
The presentation of the Sudanese civil war as unilinear and binary – not just between north 
and south, but between forces of revolution and justice versus dictatorship, and between an 
emancipatory secession of “the South” versus an unequal unity of Sudan – has been a useful 
reconceptualization for the new South Sudanese state. This standard format disguises the 
many negotiations, both practical and intellectual, over the pragmatic realities of potential 
political futures. Among southern communities in Khartoum, turning the grey-scales of 
“moral federalism” into political structures foundered on the limits of political imagination 
and collaborative space: political relationships were structured and restricted by the 
economics of civil war. These scales of compromised action and intent, though, meant that – 
despite being a powerful idea – nobody was a “sell-out.” The “Sudanese civil war” was 
incorporative and pervasive, challenging definitions of “civilian,” “militia member,” or “SPLM 
activist”; as an Akut Kuei song said, the civil war context was ‘a disaster that will spare no 
one.’1081 Stories of political action in Khartoum illustrate competing ideas of “good work” in 
the war, in a morally ambiguous field of play: but everyone was ‘still southerners.’1082  
 
As Kalyvas said, after civil wars, ‘the master narrative of cleavage provides a handy way to 
ex post facto simplify, streamline, and cover up the war’s ambiguities and contradictions.’1083 
These were not just ambiguities over affiliation, but over the ideological specifics and 
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1080 The Office of the Chairman of the Committee For National Healing, Peace and Reconciliation for 
South Sudan, working paper, ‘Comprehensive Strategic Dimensions for Healing, Peace and 
Reconciliation for all South Sudanese,’ July 2013, Juba. 
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1082 APA, 22 July 2013. 
1083 Kalyvas, ‘The Ontology of “Political Violence”’, p. 487. 
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possible outcomes of the conflict, the logical extremes and pragmatic realities of the 
previous chapters. The progression towards demands for secession was not clear in practice. 
Secession was not a panacea option for most people, and was one aspect of complex 
discussions over was what was “achievable”, personally and generally. Many had different 
conceptions of “the south”, and how to fight “for” it; ultimately, action was key, and 
variously justifiable. Inaction was not: 
 
You are told but you don’t listen 
You are shown, but you don’t want to see 
This is something even the Dinka deaf have heard, 
And the Dinka blind have seen. 
So you Dinka, what are you waiting for? 
Are you waiting for your paycheck? 
Are you waiting for your paycheck? 
If it’s your payment 
If you’re waiting for your pension 
We’ll be like donkeys, just waiting for our paycheck.1084 
 
This wartime action was ambiguous and broadly defined. ‘If you pretended to be a beggar in 
Khartoum – you are even affecting their economic situation.’1085 Cheats, thieves and cultural 
performers all contributed to the struggle; joining the security services or converting to 
Islam could be justified as finding routes to educate your children independently, “for the 
south.”1086 These “positive” actions were not always obvious - ‘some people are angry, 
unless [they] are educated to understand it.’1087 You ‘cannot act like you are in Bilpam!’1088 
This complex self-positioning was explained to me in an example of one man’s uncle, a 
mine-layer working for the SAF around Juba. 
 
‘This man used to talk with us… he used to tell us that… in the military – [even] if 
you are not happy, you have to pay your loyalty to the orders. This devil, which is 
called orders…! …he was even loyal to the SPLM. If he gets somebody coming from 
the south, he used to [tell] him all about the situation, if he [had] money he can give, 
[he gave it]. One of his children now is in the SPLA. He’s the one that told [me] that, 
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1087 Ibid. 
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please, I will die in the Arabic army, then you go to Gedarif [with the] Jongo 
battalion, so that if we die here, you can live there, if you die there, then we can live 
here. … He said that we are going to be divided, to divide ourselves. … So he was a 
very intelligent old man.’1089 
 
Unlike the grand narrative of the civil war, wartime living involved what Ndebele called ‘the 
sobering power of contemplation, of close analysis, and the mature acceptance of failure, 
weakness, and limitations.’1090 
  
                                                
1089 DKLK, 21 August 2013. 
1090 Njabulo S. Ndebele, ‘The Rediscovery of the Ordinary: Some New Writings in South Africa’, Journal of 
Southern African Studies, 12:2 (April 1986), p. 150. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
Black Monday 
 
2005 was a fracture in many people's personal histories.1091 This fault line came not with the 
signing of the CPA, but with the SPLM/A leader John Garang's death on 30 July 2005 in a 
helicopter crash. His death came soon after his joyfully emotional visit to Khartoum on 8 
July, where he was greeted by hundreds of thousands of people, including many wearing 
and holding SPLM colours, before his inauguration as Vice-President of Sudan the next 
day.1092 The options for a “New Sudan” laid out in the CPA seemed at the time increasingly 
achievable, as a northern Sudanese academic told the press, 
 
'There was such a huge amount of enmity and bad feelings, you would expect 
Garang to be killed. But to come to Khartoum, that we never expected.'1093 
 
Twenty days later, Garang's death was confirmed by radio early on Monday 1 August. 
 
‘[It] started in the morning, when people hear the news on the radio that Dr John 
was crashed. … All the black people, the southerners, they went to the tarmac…’1094 
 
People took to the streets in what has since been called Black Monday, initially in middle-
class suburbs in central Khartoum including Soba, Haj Yousif, al Mamoura and others, with 
unrest later spreading to the peripheries.1095 
 
‘As I keep on watching [the silent street]… I heard the sound of people behind the 
building. SPLM Oyeee! For the first time in Khartoum shouting like this. SPLM 
Oyeeee! … they told me – didn’t you know that Garang is killed?! So they say, he’s 
killed, so [when] they said that - you get angry very fast. He’s killed?! Who killed 
him?! So… I joined the fight.’1096 
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‘It’s the whole of the southern tribe who were fighting. … It is all even the older 
people fought also. Only that they don’t have guns. … even [women were] involved 
in fighting!… After the news that president has crashed – it was announced directly 
within Dinka community that this, the crash of the president, is in Arabic [sic] hands. 
… They went straight to fight… They were really very sad [, so] they moved violently, 
they need[ed] to kill people even if they are killed, it’s okay, it’s what they need, they 
were just striking violently.’1097 
 
By midday, some of the army and police moved in to contain violence away from factories 
and major institutions, generally ignoring the poorest suburbs and thus allowing the violence 
to escalate there; other residents responded by forming vigilante groups.1098 By the 
Wednesday, soldiers and armed civilians were involved in retributive killings in many of 
these Western- and Southern-dominated neighbourhoods.1099 Eighty four people were 
recorded killed by Thursday by the International Committee of the Red Cross, although 
many people put the count far higher;1100 rumours that a southern militia leader had been 
killed briefly heightened the violence.1101 By the following week, the death toll was at over 
130 people.1102 
 
The fight emphasised the ambiguous lines of the “southern community” in Khartoum. 
Southerners were not the only people involved in the riots, as Assal observed, with others 
also targeting ‘those identified as members of the riverain elite on an ethnic basis.’1103 One 
contemporary observer noted: 
 
‘Despite reports to the contrary, the residents of Angola and Mandela are not 
exclusively southern Sudanese – and the rioters were not exclusively southern either. 
                                                
1097 MTL, 11 July 2013; the gendered point is supported by Khalid Mustafa Medani, 'Black Monday: the 
political and economic dimensions of Sudan’s urban riot,' Middle East Research and Information 
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1101 Ibid. 
1102 Andrew England, ‘Tensions run high in slums of Sudan after death of Garang’, Financial Times, 18 
August 2005; Medani, Black Monday. 
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Their ranks included a large contingent from the war-torn western province of Darfur 
as well as the Nuba Mountains region in the east.’1104 
 
This was racial profiling on both sides; while people emphasised that ‘the [Nuba and Darfur 
residents] were not attacked’ by southern rioters, the Arabs were ‘going to be 
recognised’,1105 and vice versa: 
 
‘[Wednesday] was the day when these Arab people have mobilised themselves, 
against any black [sic]. Because when they [the Arabs, sic] came… they realised that 
it wasn’t only South Sudanese, it was [anyone] black against them. It’s true! It was 
not South Sudanese, it was Nuba, it was Darfur, it was everybody brown, black, 
against them.  …Now at [that] point, we [were] not talking about South Sudanese 
anymore, we just talk of black. [Laughs]’1106 
 
At the same time, the practical powers of Khartoum's “southern ethnic militias” came to the 
fore. Many people noted the importance of Paulino Matip, Abdel Baggi Ayii Akol and other 
SSDF figures in controlling the suburbs and stopping the fighting: 
 
‘they all came with their artilleries and patrol[ed] around where the Dinka are, and 
the situation was cured by them. … When people were striking and Ayii Akol and 
Paulino Matip were helping people, even the Arabs knew that all the black tribes are 
together that day.’1107 
 
Black Monday was therefore a horrific exemplification of the pan-Sudanese black community 
constructed in Khartoum, and of the practical power of federalised, ethnicised and 
militarised southern authority in the city. The government described Black Monday as an 
expression of “grief and hysteria” but also as the work of an organised fifth column,1108 both 
of which at least reflected the outcomes of the violence. But events in 2005 also 
fundamentally changed the character of, and relationships within, Khartoum suburbs. 
Immediate social tensions combined with discussions over boundary commissions and 
repatriation to begin to explicitly delineate the “southern community”: as a non-southern 
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resident of Kalakla told the Financial Times after the riots: ‘Southerners should stay in the 
south and northerners should stay here.’1109 Rumours and conspiracy theories abounded, 
practical relationships between local authorities, police and chiefs became strained, and the 
Financial Times records:  
 
‘numerous northerners and southerners, old and young, in different neighbourhoods, 
repeat the same message: whatever trust did exist between the two communities is 
evaporating.’1110 
 
 
2005-2011 
 
The body of this thesis ends here, in 2005, with this shift towards the political and practical 
definition of a distinct South Sudan, and the funnelling of collective southern efforts into 
what self-determination and political change could be achieved under the CPA. Disputes 
over the exact line of a potential north-south border threw being “southern” into explicitly 
geographical relief. The new regional administration of the Government of Southern Sudan, 
the opening of SPLM party offices in Khartoum, and the convenient journalistic and political 
simplifications of North and South encouraged this distancing. 
 
Despite longstanding calls for substantive representation, rights and political revolution by 
both those in power and their new nascent national public, the energies of the SPLA, SPLM 
and fast-growing bureaucratic and administrative apparatus of Southern Sudan were 
focused primarily on achieving the creation of a now-possible nation of South Sudan, rather 
than broader change. Politics was arguably intellectually on hold until 2011, to the point 
where, by the national elections in 2010, discussion of any of the details of citizenship, 
political rights and forms of governance was deferred until after the referendum over 
secession in 2011.1111 
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This period also saw the massive re-migration of the vast majority of Khartoum’s southern 
Sudanese residents back to southern Sudan. Garang's death, the creation of the southern 
administration, and a huge aid initiative to return the IDPs to their “place of origin”, 
encouraged a broad turn to repatriation: 
 
‘If that first president of ours would have been still alive, we would have given him 
enough time to prepare our south Sudan, as a good home land for his own people, 
and then he has to be the one taking decisions also to move us back, once the south 
Sudan has established, but when we have seen that he’s no longer alive, then we 
start preparing coming back. … That’s how we lost the opinion of staying there, and 
then we start mobilising ourselves, and start coming back to our motherland.’1112 
 
This process was initially confused, badly coordinated and supported, and often significantly 
coercive on the part of both the Sudanese authorities and Southern Sudanese regional 
powers; early mass movements in 2005 and 2006 were sometimes abortive. By 2006, 
though, huge numbers of families and individuals had begun the strenuous, financially 
taxing, carefully-staged and managed process of moving back “home”, including many 
people who had never been to southern Sudan before. This was actively encouraged by 
many among the Khartoum communities: a group of men explained that they 
 
‘[kept] encouraging ourselves, [we kept] encouraging [the] children' to go to the 
south, until the 2010 election was scheduled; '[we] say [we] shall be registered in 
South, and told people should go to [their] land and be registered there. … This is 
how we influenced people so [that] they hated Khartoum and wanted to be 
repatriated back to the South.’1113 
 
About 1.5 million people travelled south from northern Sudan in 2006 and 2007 alone, and 
these numbers increased in 2010 in the run-up to the referendum. What figures there are of 
people originating from southern Sudan remaining in Khartoum are calculated from a 
subtraction of these counted “returnees” from an original estimate of about 1.7 million 
southern Khartoum residents.1114 As with the period of massive movement and resettlement 
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from 1986 to 1992, this was a period of intense disruption and rupture for those relocating 
part or all of their lives and families to often unfamiliar or strikingly changed areas. The 
stress and complexity of this resettlement and re-establishment of social order has been 
documented in detail by a new wave of social anthropology,1115 and articulated most 
obviously in South Sudanese contemporary discourse through discussions of social morality, 
stereotypes of the various “returnee” communities from different parts of eastern Africa, and 
rights to land. Previously called jellaba, now people who once lived in Khartoum are called 
“Khartoumers” in common South Sudanese parlance, often accused of being uneducated, 
over-serious, and snobbish by people who lived in eastern Africa during the wars.1116 
 
2005 to 2011 was also, for many, a tense period of redrawing lines and power bases: most 
people believed that the war could or would restart. Southern Sudanese forces pushed 
ahead with significant military and militia recruitment, despite widespread international 
assumptions that the CPA heralded a move towards disarmament and demobilisation. 
Stories of the aftermath of Black Monday from Khartoum residents emphasise renewed 
militarisation: ‘after the signing of the CPA, Ayii opened a military training centre in 
Khartoum, where he trained soldiers and transported them to the south.’1117 Many people, 
particularly unemployed or casually employed men, were recruited to the SAF, SPLA, and 
SSDF under the 2005 Joint Integrated Units agreement that fused SAF and SPLA units in a 
demonstration of Sudanese unity.1118 Militia leaders such as Paulino Matip, with the SSDF, 
also recruited, particularly from people from Unity and Upper Nile. This recruitment to the 
SSDF was not necessarily a political act against the SPLA, but for many was exactly the 
opposite, as one man explained: 
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Grabska, ‘The Return of Displaced Nuer in Southern Sudan: Women Becoming Men?’, Development 
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Newhouse, ‘South Sudan Oyee! A Political Economy of Refugee Return Migration to Chukudum, South 
Sudan’, (Washington University thesis, April 2013); Sara Pantuliano, ‘Going home: Land, return and 
reintegration in Southern Sudan and the three areas’, Overseas Development Institute, Uncharted 
territory: land, conflict and humanitarian action (London, 2009), pp. 153–170. 
1116 JG, 11 June 2015; J, 8 August 2013. 
1117 GDA and MWD, 22 June 2013; also APA, 22 July 2013. 
1118 Small Arms Survey, Pendulum swings: the rise and fall of insurgent militias in South Sudan 
(November 2013). 
  246 
‘These people were separate, Abdel Baggi and Paulino Matip were special. …they 
don’t come to SPLM and SPLA directly. Paulino Matip was already with the Arabs, and 
Abdel Baggi was already with Arabs; … and Abdel Baggi Akol is intending to join the 
SPLA after the peace was signed [the Juba Agreement, reintegrating SSDF forces 
with the SPLM, signed January 2006]. Paulino also needed to join the SPLA. And 
these people [the recruits], they need to join the SPLA, but there is no nearer road 
than to join Paulino Matip and Ayii Akol - which will be the road to bring them to the 
SPLA. … They [Matip and Ayii Akol] were to come and report themselves [to the 
SPLA under the Juba Agreement], that I come with a certain number of troops, and 
this one comes with a certain number of troops, that was their plan. And these militia 
leaders, they already have their guns which they took from Arabs.’1119 
 
These complex logics and logistics of military repatriation and gambles on switching loyalties 
exemplify the ambiguous practicalities of fighting for, and returning to, a potential new 
South Sudan. 
 
This is a study of a history of home-grown local political theory and practice, and an attempt 
to integrate the study of what Hunter calls ‘intellectual history from below’ with high political 
histories of civil war, and broader concerns about the creation of popular nationalism.1120 It 
demonstrates the co-existence, or nesting, of multiple parochial and iconoclastic 
identifications and personal projects within a southern Sudanese wartime urban community, 
an example of the creative confusion and political compromises inherent in histories of the 
intellectual worlds of eastern Africa. It also illustrates the possibilities of emotional and 
philosophical histories of civil war. 
 
This thesis has a depressing trajectory: it was researched and written during a time of a loss 
of optimism and political freedom, and is in some ways a history of possibilities lost. I 
started working on this thesis at South Sudan’s independence in 2011, an event of 
spectacular emotion, and a time of extensive local reflection on and reconsideration of these 
personal activist histories and political philosophies. Over 2012 and 2013, as I was working 
in South Sudan, these messy but potentially intra-ethnic and cross-border ideas of 
community pluralism and solidarities were being closed down: by the pressures and 
prejudices of establishing financial and personal security in one’s “home area” (or, often, the 
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high-stress fast-growing suburbs of urban areas), continued violence and insurgencies in 
part resulting from the entrenchment of neopatrimonial militarised order under the political 
domination and attempted ideological hegemony of the SPLM/A, and violent economic 
collapse encouraged by the government’s shut-down of oil production in January 2012.1121 I 
finished research a few weeks before the internecine struggle over control of the SPLM/A 
culminated in massive intra-SPLA violence in Juba, and horrific massacres. The resulting civil 
war has dashed the hopes of many in the South Sudanese and international community. 
Now South Sudan’s government is essentially understood in standard contemporary political 
analysis as a less artful and more explicit version of the militarised neopatrimonial extractive 
and violent state of old Sudan, now commonly summarised using Alex de Waal’s descriptor 
of kleptocracy:1122 it is now becoming hard to find any explanations of South Sudan’s current 
crisis that do not implicitly or explicitly describe the state’s collapse and renewed war as an 
inevitability.  
 
However, this thesis demonstrates a longer popular history of often-radical political creativity 
for alternative national futures, well beyond a basic mass demand for independence, localist 
and ethnically-focused understandings of self-rule, or ideas of liberation primarily based on 
resisting Sudan; it also evidences the intensive efforts of the southern Sudanese “masses” to 
intellectually and emotionally fill out these ideas, and demonstrate the practicability of 
Sudanese horizontal moral community. This did not, for many people, equal secession: 
 
‘We southerners, we believe that Sudan - it belongs to the Sudanese people, and the 
people of [Sudan] are southerners, Darfurians, Blue Nile, and the South Kordofan 
[sic]. … [The referendum] is a second step, after the unity of the Sudan: …when 
[the] central government is mixed, [with] southerners, western Darfur, where all 
Sudanese are seeing their colour there… that’s what we mean, that’s the attractive 
unity we mean - not south Sudan alone. When there is no consideration of [us], or 
there’s no reflection of our needs, all of us – the Sudan can be divided into so many 
countries.  And that is what we believe [is happening] now.’1123 
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‘We don’t think of separation. You see, most of the northern people, they don’t want 
separation of the south. They say, instead of [the] southern[ers] to separate from 
the country, it is better for the government of Bashir to go.  … So, at that moment 
[in Khartoum], we were thinking [of the] total liberation of the country, [from the] 
Islamists, so that the Islamists will be smashed out of the country and the country 
will remain unite[d] – and people practice democracy. … [Even those who were pro-
SPLM] would say they don’t want the separation of the south, but they were just 
looking for what - the total liberation of the country, and the practicing of democracy. 
[In 1999], because that principle of self-determination was granted in peace 
negotiations which were held in capital city of Nairobi … they said that it is better for 
southerners to get away from the country, because the country is not going to be 
liberated [in its entirety], and the ideology of the Arabs will not finish in the country 
[sic], unless we go so that we can make our own state. … And people began to 
discuss this. And we felt shy on such a thing [sic], because we were not interested in 
the ability of the SPLM to divert the country - because we think that if the SPLA was 
able to liberate the [whole] country, this will [be a] success. But if not, then this idea 
will fail. … The change which is going [on] now in our [new] government, it is what? 
It is a [false] change. It is not an environmental change. … Even – I am telling you 
this – if the southerners [knew] that the South is like this, like we are living now, 
they would never vote for separation.’1124 
 
Ideas of this New Sudan, while apparently “failed” in political and military terms, still have 
significant popular purchase, not least as a way to discuss the construction of an inclusive 
national community and responsible self-governance. Demands for responsible political 
change and representation have long coalesced around the term “federalism”, which is in 
effect somewhat a catch-all term for anything from territorialised tribalist entrenchment to 
radical, pluralised, decentralised and inter-ethnic governance. This competition over the 
definitions of federalism, and more essentially over the nature of South Sudan’s national 
community, continues today;1125 federalism has, since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
and particularly since the 2013 political crisis, been both an essentially banned political topic 
and a political tool via the supposedly “federal” division of South Sudan’s ten states into 
twenty-eight by President Kiir’s decree on 2 October 2015.1126 This study has documented 
some of this history of competing imaginations of federal community, from horizontal 
brotherhoods of pan-southern and pan-Sudanese activists to the ethnicised, territorialised 
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and militarised practicalities of the SSDF and Ashara Wilayat; and South Sudan’s new 
citizens continue to try to make room for political dissent and discussion.  
 
The political events of 2011 to 2015 have structured this thesis’ subject, content and 
perspective. Over the course of research, there was a moving field of possible topics and 
approaches to studying the intellectual history of Khartoum, constrained also by my naiveté, 
and people’s confidence in expressing themselves in my company. For instance, the focus on 
resettlement and social reconstruction in 2011 to 2012 among the recently-returned 
communities of Northern Bahr el Ghazal essentially structured the topics of the first three 
chapters of this thesis. Local recruitment to Paul Malong’s para-SPLA militias in this period, 
and concomitant popular topics of debate, were focused primarily on the disputed border 
with Darfur (what is known as “Mile 14”), and thus conversations centred on past lives 
within, and understandings of, a Sudanese black community. By early 2013, however, as 
recruitment increased for Mathiang Anyoor, and particularly with Malong’s rally in Aweil in 
July 2013 in support of President Kiir’s firing of his Vice-President Riek Machar and dissolving 
the national cabinet, research on political pluralism, federalism and alternative political 
futures became highly charged. But it was also increasingly possible to discuss the 
significance of the SSDF in Khartoum, often as an oblique way of talking about the 
resurgence of the old Khartoum patterns of SSDF elites and paramilitary ethnic fiefdoms 
which were entrenching themselves across South Sudan by 2013 and 2014. 
 
People’s reflections on the meaning and significance of their Khartoum intellectual projects – 
and their own translations of past texts and songs – evolved in line with the deteriorating 
political climate. Many people’s initial defensive emphasis on pan-ethnic solidarities became 
tensely nuanced in the course of repeated discussions over 2013, and other songs and 
poems, particularly on inter-ethnic rivalry, brainwashing and manipulation by elites, and the 
militarization of ethnicity, were increasingly referenced and translated to me. As space for 
political discussion was closed down by violence and intimidation over 2014 and 2015, the 
possibilities for reconstructing these Khartoum projects diminished. In turn, these projects’ 
activists and authors emphasized the importance of recording their past work, as a means of 
demonstrating (and championing) a broader political pluralism, activism and subaltern 
  250 
intellectual culture that many saw as being forcibly extinguished in favour of a PDF-style 
mobilization of violent ethnicised ignorance. But they were also increasingly pessimistic over 
the rapidly-diminishing space to exercise their histories of alternative ideas. 
 
 
“We are hoping it will become good”: a note on the current situation 
 
 
‘War is said not to be in Northern Bahr el Ghazal, but war does not start on the day 
you take up arms, but it starts when people eat, talk, sleep, move [apart] – this is 
when the war starts. Because if you don’t eat together, talk or move freely together, 
sleep in the same house – there is war already, you are in war.’1127 
 
I visited Aweil in mid-2015, to present some of my writing and arguments to friends and 
advisors and to hear their retrospective feelings on this research, and ideas of South 
Sudanese nationalism since the civil war restarted. Several people described the aftermath 
of the crisis as going “back to normal”: although, as they also emphasised, there was more 
space in Khartoum to discuss problems and voice complaints. One teacher argued that, 
although the policies appeared the same as those of the Bashir regime, Bashir was only 
using people as ‘human machinery’, ‘but you [did not] bring your thoughts to what your 
hands are doing’: instead, he said, the SPLM demanded full loyalty in thought as well as 
deed.1128 Many men and women described the sharp narrowing, since about mid-2013, of 
being “South Sudanese”: ‘to be in [the] SPLM means you are really supporting the new 
nation, … and to be considered in the community as a person who can tell the truth.’1129 
 
‘Politics is something burnt down. They have taken our voices by force.’1130 
 
Although during research in 2012 to 2013, it was common knowledge that most people 
accessed state and NGO jobs through “uncle certificates” (rather than any educational 
                                                
1127 Anon., 12 June 2015. 
1128 Ibid. 
1129 Anon., 16 June 2015; many people reported a comprehensive programme of SPLM party registration 
across South Sudan during 2014, in preparation for then-slated 2015 national elections. 
1130 Anon., 16 June 2015. 
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ones), access to work, food aid, land rights and other opportunities have since become 
almost entirely dependent on patronage, and with the current economic crisis and militarised 
political order – particularly in Northern Bahr el Ghazal – ‘you [have to] jump according to 
the beat of the drum’; ‘so here it is difficult to do the right thing and still maintain your 
position.’1131 Several men and women commented on how South Sudan is quickly becoming 
an ‘inherited country’; according to one teacher and writer whose past work is documented 
in this thesis, many of the military elites are consciously perpetuating an educational divide, 
‘for poor people not to reach them, like the sky and the ground’; they themselves ‘have 
exported their children’ for education. The remaining 99 per cent, he explained, are seen as 
‘thorns for their fence.’1132 
 
The ethnicised, militarised authorities of 1980s to 2000s Khartoum are resurgent across 
Northern Bahr el Ghazal and in Juba: by late 2015, Abdel Baggi Ayii Akol re-emerged as a 
“traditional authority” in Abiem East in Aweil East, and one of his sons rebelled from the 
SPLA with a small group of soldiers to join the SPLM-In Opposition armed forces in 2016; 
and courts called Ashara Wilayat have been established across Juba, again under the 
guidance of Deng Macham and with many of the same agents, in an explicit revival of the 
Khartoum inter-ethnic courts system. Militia recruitment has also continued, particularly in 
Northern Bahr el Ghazal, although it is difficult to differentiate between militias, SPLA 
reserves, and the personal forces of ex-Governor (and now Chief of General Staff of the 
SPLA to President Kiir) Paul Malong Awan. The largest of the recruitment drives in Northern 
Bahr el Ghazal has been to what is popularly called Mathiang Anyoor (“brown caterpillar”), a 
force organised since around 2008 as a more formal organisation of wider youth-based 
western Dinka militias from Warrap and Northern Bahr el Ghazal states, operational during 
the 1980s onwards.1133 Many of the young recruits to Mathiang Anyoor were moved to Juba 
in support of President Kiir during the SPLM crises in late 2013, as part of the Dut ke Beny 
force (roughly translated as “protect the boss”), and allegedly participated in the massacres 
                                                
1131 Anon., 16 June 2015; this is noted by Thomas, South Sudan, pp. 23, 94–5. 
1132 Anon., 12 June 2015. 
1133 Naomi Pendle, ‘“They Are Now Community Police”: Negotiating the Boundaries and Nature of the 
Government in South Sudan through the Identity of Militarised Cattle-keepers’, International Journal 
on Minority and Group Rights, 22:3 (July 2015), p. 414. 
  252 
and intense violence in Juba in December 2013.1134 In Aweil, Mathiang Anyoor is specifically 
understood as a “tribal battalion”, ‘oriented to answer the tribal question’; people compared 
them to Sudan’s Popular Defense Forces.1135 
 
This recruitment has been fuelled by shock and anger at the mass murder of Dinka people 
across Greater Upper Nile during the civil war,1136 with many people invoking the violent split 
in the SPLA in 1991 and the resulting ethnic divides as a direct comparator: ‘they think that 
the old history has come back.’1137 Many men and women in Aweil expressed 
embarrassment, anger and deep sadness at these narratives of Dinka “domination”, 
arguments for ethnic federal enclaves, and events in Juba that were ‘really genocide’; one 
man, a teacher, recounted the proverb, ’if you want to dig a hole to bury your brother, make 
it large, because you will be in it tomorrow.’1138 He went on: 
 
‘It is not a matter of Dinka, Shilluk, Nuer, Bari, Zande. It is a matter of a bad man on 
a throne. We are not all children of Salva Kiir Mayardit. You tell them [in Juba] that 
there are still some Dinka brothers.’1139 
 
But even as many people emphasised that the civil war is a ‘political issue which has been 
preached in a tribal manner’,1140 a variety of mobilising ideas were circulating in Aweil in 
mid-2015: that the Dinka would be killed if the Nuer rebel Riek Machar took power, that the 
integrity of South Sudan demanded the eradication of rebel challengers to President Kiir, 
and most arrogantly, the idea that as the Dinka are the national majority in South Sudan, 
they should not accept minority rule. The dominant, zero-sum tribalist narrative of the civil 
war, in the words of one teacher, is ‘creating a gravitational force that will pull you 
down.’1141 
                                                
1134 Final Report of the African Union Commission of Enquiry on South Sudan, 15 October 2014, p. 22. 
1135 Anon., 12 June 2015; although one former member, speaking to Radio Tamazuj, reportedly said ‘they 
even aspired to march north to "annex Kosti”’, much like Garang’s speech: ‘Generals say Juba 
massacres done by private militia, not SPLA’, Radio Tamazuj, 9 March 2015. 
1136 Court meeting, 14 June 2015. 
1137 Anon., 12 June 2015; see Thomas, South Sudan, pp. 285, 281–284. 
1138 Anon., 12 June 2015. 
1139 Anon. 2, 12 June 2015. 
1140 Anon. 3, 12 June 2015. 
1141 Anon., 12 June 2015. 
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Recruitment to this patrimonial, tribalised military order also was and is often the only option 
for many young men, with one elderly sub-chief describing Northern Bahr el Ghazal as a ‘dry 
wood forest’ for collecting President Kiir’s soldiers. During my visit to Aweil, there was very 
little food in the market, partly because of a serious failure of the first rains; women in a 
rural village market were selling edible tree leaves, much like during the previous civil wars. 
Across Aweil North, grain was being bought by the sack at the Darfur border for around 800 
South Sudanese pounds (SSP), and re-sold in Aweil town for up to 1400 SSP, while cash 
incomes from government jobs and manual labour remained static at around 300 to 700 SSP 
per month, for a primary school teacher to ranked police officer respectively.1142 Many 
teachers suspended work in favour of fishing, or working as handymen and cleaners in the 
United Nations base in Aweil.1143 Several people compared the situation in Northern Bahr el 
Ghazal by 2015 as akin to the famine of 1988, and there is a growing out-migration: people 
have ‘lost hope’, and many men and women have moved across the border to southern 
Darfur, or back to Khartoum.  
 
There is very little room or purchase now for hopes of an inclusive, inter-tribal South 
Sudanese nationalism, and very little public space for political discussion, in Aweil or Juba: 
‘everybody, we don’t trust ourselves.’1144 The cultural and intellectual forums re-established 
in Aweil and Juba from around 2008 to 2011 are now ‘just talking down’, under the political 
radar, for fear of the consequences of discussing alternative political futures and possible 
change.1145 Teachers and students are the first to be mobilised into the military and militias - 
much as in the previous civil wars.1146 The currently expanding civil war does not provide the 
practical or intellectual space for these projects: as one market worker said in Aweil, ’we 
want a quick peace to come - so that people can know their mind.’1147  
  
                                                
1142 Anon., 16 June 2015. A sack of sorghum, for instance, would sustain a family of six people for about 
three weeks on one meal a day. 
1143 Ibid. 
1144 Ibid. 
1145 Anon., Aweil suburb, 15 June 2015. 
1146 Anon., 12 June 2015. 
1147 Anon., 15 June 2015. 
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